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Abstract 
Ambient Attitudes. On Practices of Contingency, Treason and Humour outlines 
post-critical modes of involvement in current artistic practice. The project intersects 
current philosophies of difference with post-critical contemporary arts practice and 
mobilizes their conjunction to set up new conceptual frameworks for emergent 
modes of (non-)engagement. Placing its investigative focus on contemporary artistic 
practice, the project is set against a broader crisis of representational relationships 
between theory and practice, and is embedded in questions around contemporary 
concepts of resistance (Antonio Negri, Paolo Virno) and the possibility of non-
representational relationalities (Jean-Luc Nancy). 
For artistic and cultural practice as exemplary field, the project argues a move from 
specificity to contingency through Giorgio Agamben's notion of the whatever and 
Liam Gillick's early practice; it diagnoses slippage from trickery toward treason in 
Gilles Deleuze's notion of extended play and Gabriel Orozco's situational inserts; 
and it mobilises an attitudinal shift from irony to humour through Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari's notion of minority and Andreas Slominski's trap-settings. These 
moves are shown to overs pill the limited and limiting economies of established 
critical models which cohere around implicit claims for sustainable exchanges 
between theory and practice: the critique of institutional and other specificities, 
trickster engagements with game-like structures and ironic responses to given 
situations are all invariably premised on representational assumptions about the 
ways in which situations and responses, gestures and conceptualisations relate. 
Against such models of reciprocity and as challenge to their coherence, Ambient 
Attitudes. On Practices of Contingency, Treason and Humour profiles practices 
which fuse a basic refusal to engage with an affirmation of productive encounters. 
Ambient dispersal as a new, fundamentally contingent milieu for contemporary 
practice and its articulation in qualities, effects and attitudes is thus argued to have 
a quasi-paradigmatic relevance for resistant practices at large, including any 
theoretical involvement with them. 
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o Introduction (Setting up ambient) 
0.1 Preamble 
"Where all possibility of action seemed inappropriate, 
all sorts of activities became possible"l 
There is an emergent expanded field around art in which new modalities of 
involvement come into being. At increasingly widespread intersections between 
artistic practice, philosophical discourse, sub-philosophical theorizations of art as 
well as politics and most fields in-between, configurations are emerging which 
involve, in one way or another, the making and installing of artworks of some 
description; a lot of writing about art and with art that relates to the work by 
expanding it; the salvaging of philosophical vocabularies and repertoires on one 
hand and the look toward art practices as trigger for new types of thought on the 
other. All of these are underpinned by a shared investment in the need to move 
away from illustration as predominant mode in which the fields interface; and 
another need, implicit in the former and making it more urgent, to develop more 
assertive combinations that should have effects rather than producing insights, and 
that should be played out rather than dissected. 
This field emerges in the aftermath of models of dealing with art which were 
variously grounding themselves in epistemological certainties-be it in the refined 
formalism of recent critical projects (politically inflected or otherwise) or linguistically 
inspired approaches developed from the (post-)structuralist tradition; be it in 
phenomenological accounts premised on experience or indeed its current (im-
)possibilities, or the new art history of complex social contextualisations. Yet no 
matter how wide the gaps and how fundamental the differences between these 
approaches, the real shift in the present occurs not from one such model to another 
or indeed toward yet other (or more refined) models. Rather what is currently 
becoming possible is the inauguration of new modalities beyond the teleologies that 
bind all of them together. 
The coherence of explanatory models has lost most of its currency not because of 
the way in which it is in constant need of broadening out and refining, but rather 
through the way in which redundant attitudes of contemplation and introspection 
inherent in analytical ways of looking at art and facilitated by it seem inappropriate 
1 Marc Camille Chaimowicz, wall text for Here and There ... (1979-2006), as presented at 
Tate Triennial 2006: New British Art, Tate Britain, 1 March - 14 May 2006. 
page 7 
for current forms of artistic as well as discursive work. The new non-teleological 
forms of accounting for practice and its effects no longer cohere into models. Rather 
they posit an effective politics of activated encounters generated by and around art 
in the present which displace the normalised analytical and/or introspective modes 
of existing models. At stake in this is thus also a different mode of relating to 
existing models. Rather than having to overcome such models, these new 
modalities are premised on a surplus that precedes and indeed overspills them. 
"The final word on power", as Gilles Deleuze argues, "is that resistance comes firsf'2 
so that what is produced is not a methodological shift but a re-organisation of the 
entire field of encounters which acknowledges and activates their potential. 
This project on what I call Ambient Attitudes is set up as a response and approach 
to that possibility of a field that re-arranges as well as multiplies engagements. As 
supposedly discrete practices re-configure their respective outlines, and previously 
distinct realms have started seeping in and out of each other in what Maurizio 
Lazzarato calls a zone of indifference (between labour, political and artistic work)3, 
realms and activities alike enter into an indirect proximity of odd mirrorings which 
constitute a new sort of milieu from and within which to work. This project takes off 
from the potentiality of this milieu. It also starts from a disenchantment and from 
recognizing a misfit: a sense that in most approaches to and involvements in art, 
things do not seem to play themselves out as fully as they could and should, if they 
are indeed to be taken seriously as modalities that set their own terms. And a sense 
that dealings with art are potentially (and this potentiality matters) more confusing, 
stimulating and unstable than what they are given credit for in the terms of most 
existing models. 
For me, that has been for a while now the everyday experience of being involved 
with such practices in multiple ways: making art, teaching theory, writing art criticism 
and organising events in the art world (some of which are exhibitions, others 
discursive platforms). What is stimulating as well as challenging about these is not 
only what they produce each and very time, the new perspectives, the 
contradictions, the productive misunderstandings and those that remain 
problematic. They also develop an expansive set of relations between adjacent, 
parallel and obliquely related knowledges which are productive as such and 
inaugurate a way of always thinking and navigating within different horizons at once, 
2 Gilles Deleuze: Foucault, trans!. Sean Hand, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988, p.89 
3 Maurizio Lazzarato, 'What possibilities presently exist in the public sphere?', available 
online under http://www.generation-online.org/p/fplazzarato4.htm (last accessed 6/11108). 
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thinking about art through reading philosophy, assembling discourse through 
looking at art and working with it, often both ways making things do what they are 
supposedly not very good at, on the odd chance that they unlock new possibilities in 
the process. (Similar things need to be said about the uses of fiction too, for 
instance.) Against that background, which is simultaneously one of experience and 
of expectation, disciplines have always seemed at best strategic ways of containing 
knowledge formats. But also the sorts of representational relationships 
conventionally set up between different fields of practice and knowledges, seem un-
useful then to describe how things come together, and indeed to outline how they 
might come together from here on and sideways. 
If indeed the current moment is saturated in this sense, if the tendency with which it 
opens onto a to-come4 that is as yet unclear and needs to be generated, seems 
more explicit and pressing; if it is one where coherences within specific fields break 
down as much as they do in the coming together of those fields, and where the 
restlessness of time is more pronounced than often, then the question of how to 
inhabit that situation is key. And in a more productivist sense, the question becomes 
what kinds of effects are being produced, and which ones can be generated from, 
through and with this present and an engagement with the art embedded in it? How 
can this involvement be imagined if imagination is to be posited as a "gesture which 
throws a web over the to-come so as to know it, construct it, organize it with 
power,,5? How can it be invented such that this inhabitation itself qualifies as 
practice under the same terms in a field where "the old techniques do not work" 
because "there is no exteriority on which to fall back, on any occasion,,6? 
One key concern of this thesis is what happens when models of (critical) 
engagement are abandoned in the process, how this leaving behind works, what 
kinds of effects it produces and what kind of new encounters with art it enables, sets 
up or activates. One important part of that is art as practice that stakes a claim on 
the present and the way it can be read. Another is philosophy as re-arranging of 
conceptual parameters and opening of new possibilities. The rest are all sorts of 
activities surrounding it, modalities of engagement that become possible for and 
through art-the way one talks about art and through it, the way one can set up 
arguments with it and also use it to not concentrate on anything at all, if that seems 
4 Antonio Negri speaks of a necessarily "creative search of the to-come" in this sense 
(Antonio Negri, 'Kairos, Alma Venus, Multitudo: Nine Lessons for Myself, in Time for 
Revolution, London/ New York: Continuum, 2005, pp.129-241, p.148) 
5 Ibid., p.147 
6 Antonio Negri, The Constitution of Time: Timepieces of capital and communist liberation', 
in Time for Revolution, London/ New York: Continuum, 2005, pp.19-128, p.47 
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useful. All of which is part of an expanded and obvious as well as counter-intuitive 
and suggestive dealing with art as trigger for all sorts of productions expanding and 
responding to the present. 
This thesis argues for art in an expanded field of encounters where art and the 
engagement with it are equally prominent and equally active, where art is distributed 
between what works do and what can be done with them. So at least part of the 
challenge is to take on the fictions, the plots, the situations works seem to set up 
and find themselves immersed in; the inappropriate readings and the questions of 
how they could have happened and whether they should or not and why. 
At stake in these activated encounters are encounters in the full sense in which art 
and the engagement with it are necessarily and inevitably on an equal standing; and 
are activated because they produce effects, unclear for most part but active in 
generating potentialities, most of which refuse to answer to any of the clear cut 
categories they seem to be emerging from. In this saturated time as milieu for 
current practice, and the present work in response to and as part of this practice, 
resides a peculiar way of specifying material: a sort of continually unhinged form of 
reciprocity which specifies the material each time such that it exists only ever in 
explicit assemblages along whose lines it is active. The very notion of a position 
from which to observe these re-configurations or indeed represent them is 
increasingly pressurized, verging on untenable; none of the above ever really exists 
outside of the ways in which it is mobilized. These sorts of assemblages need to be 
produced, rather than possibly being an object of study. 
As far as the primary material for this thesis goes, this means that very different 
types of it qualify as relevant because their relevance now involves their potential 
for being productive, rather than an established linkage between material and the 
subject of the study. Most of the material here, be it text- or image based, features 
along similar lines of unscripted/ less scripted encounters. As far as these are 
images, they are the thesis' material as much as the texts are and also visually take 
the place of text (the texts, in turn, are theoretical as well as fiction). 
In addition, there is a whole sequence of other images too, scattered throughout the 
thesis that operate slightly differently by making primarily associative appearances. 
Their smaller pictures are of an associative nature and looser in the ways in which 
they relate to the material discussions of the main text. They perform their non-fit in 
largely uncommented combinations, are interspersed in the text and accompany it 
in parts, on a sideways series of steps from which to go in and out of the text, its 
discussion and the focus it projects. 
page 10 
The other, very similar question is one of vocabulary. Inserted, or rather used in the 
text is a range of terms that have been helpful to me for dislodging in-built 
arguments through their connotations, through the ways in which they only partially 
fit and through the ways in which they indicate the kind of attitudinal slippages which 
are crucial to the project. Terms such as overspill, underperform, 
inappropriateness as well as ambient and attitude in themselves have 
been useful as corrective gestures of sorts in relation to the more canonically 
outlined terms that resonate throughout. They may not have universal appeal but 
have been helpful for me in the process of the research and its formulation - they 
are highlighted in the text as activations and should indicate a possible vocabulary 
of word-gestures which builds up throughout the project. These terms, like the 
images, are not subject to definition or similar forms of clarification but necessarily 
embedded in the context of the use they lend themselves to. In the text, a slightly 
differing font is used for these terms (when they are first used) so that they can be 
set apart as well as smooth with the surrounding text. They are merely pointed out 
here as possibilities, and there are always potentially more to be added to the 
range. Attitudes do not really claim a stable vocabulary. 
0.2 Some dedications to the story of the ape 
"Tenderly yet in some degree hardheartedly should this tale be tackled, 
which declares that it occurred to a monkey one afternoon to drop into a 
coffeehouse and idle away the time of day there."? 
In Kafka's Report to an Academy, an ape who speaks and behaves mostly like a 
human, is invited to give a report on his former life as a beast. His sequence of 
events goes something like this: shot in the jungle by a hunting expedition he wakes 
up aboard the expedition's ship on her way back to Europe and comes to himself 
between decks trapped inside a cage too small to sit or stand in. What he calls "his 
own memories" begin here,s and the report then goes through a series of moves 
through which the monkey leaves behind the condition of the captive. The way in 
which he leaves behind whatever was given and ready for him; how he undoes 
captivity by shifting attitude and the way in which he turns the horizon of his 
7Robert Walser: The Monkey', in: Selected Stories, trans!. by Christopher Middleton and 
others, foreword by Susan Sontag, New York: New York Review of Books Classics, 1982, 
pp.145-148, p.145. The seeming contrast between the two monkeys is only superficial -
Walser's is here read as an extension of Kafka's and its continuation. 
S Franz Kafka: 'A Report to an Academy', in The Complete Short Stories, ed. by Nahum N. 
Glatzer, London: Random House Vintage, 1999, pp.250-262, p.252. 
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condition into a milieu of activity instead, are moves which are emblematic, indeed 
exemplary for the kind of new encounters developed in the following for, through 
and with art. 
The first impulse obviously is to flee. It would make so much sense for the beast to 
break free and get back to where it belonged because that would seem to offer a 
radical solution to all kinds of problems from cramps to being spat at, and because 
the urge for space feeds on vague and half-forgotten memories of a freedom with 
uninhibited movement in that very other place which for the monkey was the jungle. 
And for a monkey flight should always be possible - even if he could not force the 
boards of his cage apart, he could at least attempt to bite through the lock by 
degrees.9 
Yet his problem is not the (im)possibility of flight but where it would lead and what 
that would allow for. Even if he managed to escape in trying to thus get back, he 
would only ever perish among the predators surrounding him in their own respective 
cages, ending up strangled by the pythons or devoured by the lions. Or beyond 
them, if he ever made it that far, he would drown in the open ocean. Either way, he 
would only ever find himself captured by other cages, other beasts or too much 
waterlOo 
What is needed instead is a whole new way of setting up relations between the 
monkey and the cage and the boat and beyond, between the beast and the 
structure and the milieu in order not to break free, not even necessarily to claim new 
ground but at least to invent new moves and new articulations between the two. 
Again and again in the cage, the ape's options are determined by partitions. His 
movement is confined by boxes nailed onto planks and, more importantly, by 
determined trajectories which lead into death through strangulation or drowning. 
Or, still under the perspective of a return to his natural state, they lead to the circus, 
the other obvious option for a monkey in captivity, into the kind of rehearsed 
choreographies that make even apes smile: performances of self-controlled 
movement which are to the monkey but a mockery of what nature would have 
beenll. The scripted, deterministic nature of all these options is at the core of his 
capture, is that which he has to work to overcome: not by taking apart the cage or 
9 Ibid., pp254/55 
10 For a discussion of the tradition of thinking the animal as contained and the human as 
uncontained, see Giorgio Agamben's conflictual notion of an "anthropological machine" of 
modernity for which "the production of man through the opposition man/ animal, human/ 
inhuman, is at stake". (Giorgio Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004, esp. p.37) The way the monkey in Kafka reconfigures (pragmatically 
at least in motivation) the contradistinction between human and animal, plays into this too. 
11 Kafak, op.cit., p.253 
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choosing other ones but by inventing other possibilities out of it, to develop other 
scripts outside of the ones made available in the binary pairings of capture and 
freedom, constraint and mobility, resignation and flight, as well as monkey and 
human, object and interpretation. Needed are inventions and shifts that allow to re-
script the situation in question instead. 
And so he decides to invent a different way out that will make movement possible 
where escape cannot. Instead of aiming for freedom, he gives up being stubborn 12 
and learns how to spit and smoke and drink, how to break into human speech and 
reach the cultural level of an average European, half sitting and half lying in his 
rocking chair and gazing out of the window13. Giving up hope on returning to the 
freedom that was, becomes a prerequisite for a series of moves through which he 
implodes his way out into a way in and ends up leading the beast out into humanity 
and its particular forms of conduct rather than directing him back to the spaces or 
behaviours that were once natural to him. 
The present project around Ambient Attitudes should be dedicated to the monkey's 
story because it offers a similarly indirect account of such a transition from 
confrontation and constraint to new forms of mobility. Like the monkey's, the 
present project takes on a set of expectations toward explicating, toward insight, 
toward privileged access to both sides of a divide which runs between animal and 
human for the monkey, and between art and theory for this project. The monkey 
was presumably once one and is now presumably the other. He should by all 
accounts be able to talk about the former through the prism of the latter so that (and 
that is the promise and the conceit) both sides can finally become accessible 
through him, that they can be juxtaposed instead of having to be processed into one 
another. When asked he is more than happy to comply with the request made of 
him, accepts the invitation with only a slight hesitation and indeed delivers his 
speech in front of the Academicians. What he outlines to the assembled group of 
dignitaries is not the expected and desired first-hand account of his former life as an 
animal though. Instead he explains how he came to be respectable among humans, 
and outlines the series of encounters he orchestrated to get there. Describing the 
process of his own becoming human, the ape presents the academy with a story 
that sits awkwardly if not altogether uncomfortably alongside the account they had 
hoped for and expected. On one hand because it presents them with an aftermath 
rather than a pre-history, and on the other hand because the ape's story is to a 
12 Ibid., p.250 
13 Ibid., p.255ff. 
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large extent also a fable of invention; his report is an account of inhabitations, 
strategic decisions and sideways moves. In the same spirit, this dissertation does 
not attempt to unveil arts practices but work along and around them on a trajectory 
of animations and appropriations. Like the ape's report, this one too 
underperforms, frustrates expectations, "cannot comply with your request to the 
extent you desire,,14 and produces differently inhabited knowledges instead. 15 
In another sense then, this present work on Ambient Attitudes is dedicated to the 
figure of the monkey because his shift in attitude translates defiance into a form of 
inhabiting a situation and opens the horizon of an engagement from which 
movement can be generated. When the monkey states how much he needs a way 
out of captivity, he is not asking for freedom but for the possibility of a different kind 
of movement. "No, freedom was not what I wanted", he says. "Only a way out; right 
or left or in any direction.,,16 He constructs it, quintessentially, by disregarding the 
ways in which conditions and with them positions of captor and captive, controller 
and controlled have been allocated and by then inhabiting differently the situations 
they set up. (And in doing so, that is the claim, the monkey simply disregards and 
thus undermines their claim to authority.) This shift in perspective onto the situation 
goes with a fundamental shift in attitude. When he claims that the first thing he ever 
learned was giving a handshake and that this betokens frankness 17, the frankness 
of that gesture is not first in a temporal sense. (The detailed account of his transition 
starts with him spitting and being spat at and picking flees.) Rather it comes first as 
a foundational setting which asserts a fundamental shift in attitude from the 
covertness indispensable for escape to the explicit assertiveness of his inventions. 
14 Ibid., p.250 
15 The seventh dedication would be a dedication to having-been-both. The monkey escapes 
being a trapped monkey by becoming human, and through this way in finds types of 
movement which undercut a whole series of ideas about what it means to be somewhere 
(among humans, human). There is a whole politics of gestures in this, which the monkey 
becomes very good at manipulating-his entire trajectory is one of inventions, making up 
moves and patterns in order to become human in such a way that the very stability of what it 
might mean to be human comes undone. Being human, being smart, having insight is no 
longer an exclusive domain, but it becomes, through his appropriations, subject to 
processes of making and erosion, of becoming human and of not always having been 
human. This project should then be dedicated to him also because he claims this as a 
position from which to re-assess. If "your life as apes, gentlemen, insofar as something of 
that kind lies behind you, cannot be farther removed from you than mine is from me" (ibid., 
p.250), hasn't then everyone gone through such transition from monkey to human? And 
does that not at least erode or at most undo distinctions one is used to drawing? And is this 
erosion not contagious? If it was not such a shame to reduce the monkey to the field one 
habitually calls the arts, or indeed the artist, then this (and he) would be obviously 
attractively also 'me'. 
16 Ibid., p.253 
17 Ibid., p.251 
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The frankness he talks about is a condition of this assertiveness. Somewhere along 
the transition from cage to bourgeois sitting room, he claims, his move from one 
captivity to another allows for movement and is therefore captivity only under very 
different terms. Being caught and inventing a way out appear much more intimately 
linked here than one would normally assume to be useful or indeed appropriate. 
The way in which the present text remains entangled in its material and 
reassembles it thus, is dedicated to this mode of the monkey. 
Thirdly this is also dedicated to the ape because his moves imply moves away from 
what might have been appropriate situations or frameworks. Instead they are 
directed toward new, differently fitted grounds which need to be inhabited under 
new grounds. The monkey could live in the zoo, and might even have the freedom 
humans have when they, like monkeys, swing on ropes. He has the option, it seems 
to him early on, of settling in the replica of his milieu and accepting a reductive 
approximation of his habitat all premised on suiting him and meeting his needs as 
far as possible. But he does not, he prefers not to, and invents instead a way into a 
situation which had never been his. This text is dedicated to him because it too 
takes the indispensable misfit (between monkey and society, between actor and 
situation, between art and its given theoretical frameworks), as a given set of 
tensions to work from and with in the way it relates a work to its milieu. 
Furthermore, the Ambient Attitudes project is dedicated to him because in the 
process he decides to neither simply escape from nor capitulate before his 
condition. Instead, the strength and ingenuity of his project lie in the fundamental re-
formatting it produces. Inventing a way out of the conditions of a situation by 
inventing new parameters for it, he refuses to submit and commit to what one would 
have to call his condition. He decides that his main aim is movement, not freedom 
when he finds himself locked up in a cage that is so narrow he can neither stand nor 
sit. The beast who "had had so many ways out of everything" now "had to devise 
one,,18, "only not to stay motionless with raised arms, crushed against a wooden 
wall,,19, as he says. The discovery which leads him into becoming human disregards 
captivity as all-encompassing condition to which freedom is the only alternative 
option on offer. Instead of subscribing to the mutually constituted inescapability of 
captivity and freedom, the monkey invents a way out that produces itself through 
encounters and engagements which are played out as continual adjustments. So he 
attempts not to escape, necessarily, but to create the possibility of movement where 
18 Ibid., p.253 
19 Ibid., p.254 
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really none is possible and where this lack of possibility, this lack of a pre-given 
perspective means that movement needs to be, but also can be invented anew in 
terms of its scale, its perspective and relevance. 
In short, he makes a whole series of moves that can be useful as indications toward 
a politics of activated encounters that will be developed here: The monkey's 
process is a sequence of ways of setting up these encounters between him and his 
humans, his behavior and their expectations, their patterns and his imitations. And 
with these encounters comes the question as to how one can start steering them, 
which attitudes can be played out in relation to them and how they can be inhabited, 
how one can effectively move through them. Instead of an allegory of resistance, 
the monkey's story offers a tale about the possibilities of generating, framing, re-
framing and assessing encounters in order to enable movement. This line of 
thought underpins most arguments in the thesis, from those engaging the 
slippages of contingency through the invocation of treason to the ways in which 
humour overspills ironic economies of meaning. All of these need to be played out 
through the performance of juxtapositions. The monkey is very good at 
demonstrating just that. 
In crucial addition, the project also needs to be dedicated to the monkey because of 
the way in which he only ever exists as a fable of invention. His key modality is 
fiction. First and foremost as an invention of his own, for whom the becoming 
human appeared as a "fine clear line of thought,,20 he made up (even though with 
the belly) and then as a story of those who write him, first Kafka who invents him as 
a figure of his own report and then Oeleuze/ Guattari who re-write him into the 
blueprint for a new kind of (literary) politics. 21 Insofar as this project writes its 
material as a series of encounters and invents itself through their collisions, it 
follows a similarly constructive logic of operations. Main concern then is not only 
what they do to each other, the playing and the situation, the thinking and the work, 
the baseball and the pitch it has left and the orange on the window sill, the museum 
installation and the mainstream novel one might want to juxtapose it with. What 
matters is mainly what they can be made to do with each other, and what the 
natures of that with might be. 
A last and somewhat minor dedication is to the nature of the gestures invoked. As 
apes have a tendency to not only play but also playfully copy, their mimicking 
makes all sorts of connections. It takes the monkey a long time before the 
20 Ibid., p.2S3 
21 Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari: Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, Minneapolis/ London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986 
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components fall into sequence, until he knows the difference between a burning and 
an extinct pipe when pressing the tobacco down. In the meantime, play is its key 
modality as well as one of its key motives. In Kafka's story, it occurs as the realm of 
spectacle and performance, circus and society etiquette in the overall play on roles 
that the Report stages. 22 For this thesis, games are those of art or art in relation to 
them in the full sense extended sense in which the German term Spiel 
encompasses game and play and slippage all in one word. Spielen, its verb, 
mobilizes all of them and potentially at the same time in a playing with things which 
makes them do what they do not or cannot normally perform. 
0.3 Exiting and criticality 
The proposed ambient de-framing of artwork here is twofold: on one hand it 
updates rhetorical and conceptual tools which are invested and embedded in 
established notions of critique, confrontationality and questions of scripted 
competences and which need to be re-configured for the different types of works, 
situations and broader usages at play in the context of this project. On the other 
hand, it profiles modes and attitudes as singular forms of criticality in parallel to and 
against the background of such models. Enacted through new forms and styles of 
encounters, these ambient modalities imply a fundamental shift in positionality from 
frontal to oblique in a variety of ways: rather than inscribing works and frameworks 
into predetermined exchanges, it becomes necessary to work out possible and 
productive intersections between works, milieus and their component parts. Oblique 
involvements in milieus then need to be taken up and mirrored rather than 
analysed. And the non-linear juxtapositions between works, models and 
knowledges thus produced then generate configurations where all intersect but 
where neither figures as a stable reference for the other. 
In the background and as effective horizon to this twofold operation, there is an 
intersection between such conjunctures and the ways in which recent non-
representational political thought has re-mapped categories toward fundamental re-
configurations of the political and the potentiality of radical change. In both fields, 
cultural practice and political thought, the very notion of positions is being 
abandoned along with claims for ideological grounding and clearly discernible 
critical projects, from canonical Marxist projects through to their Althusserian 
22 In Robert Walser's story of a monkey claiming a coffee house and propositioning one of its 
customers, the dimension of society etiquette as domain of play is staged in the monkey's 
nonchalant! impertinent disrespect of etiquette, and more immediately recognizable as 
premised on unfitting attitudes (see Walser, op.cit.). 
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variants; from the various formations of identity politics as they emerged from 
feminist and post-colonial projects through to a Foucauldian account of micro-
politics. In the move away from these horizons, the notion of the political is not so 
much abandoned as it is re-assessed as proto- and post-political potential. In the 
place of programmatic contributions to existing critical projects and concerns 
emerges instead a notion of resistance as opening up of new types of possibilities 
re-configured beyond established confrontationalities. In this form of resistance and 
in the way in which its generative impetus disrupts dominant ordering patterns of the 
respective field of practice (political, art and mixed fields as well as their 
intersections), strategies of exit overlap with a leaving behind of the very notion of 
strategy. Critique, refusal and affirmation are interwoven into mutually constitutive 
operations. 
As Antonio Negri argues in his recent account of political possibilities in the present, 
not only have the concepts of resistance changed in what he calls postmodernitl3; 
the most astounding fact is how its practices are transformed. 
"If we attempted to identify [resistance] in accordance with the categories 
and experiences of modernity, we would now be incapable of understanding 
it. In modernity, resistance is an accumulation of forces against exploitation 
that come to be given a subjective determination through a 'prise de 
conscience'. In postmodernity, none of all this." 
In the place of modern confrontationality, resistance (if that is what it still is) as 
enacted by the postmodern multitudes which for Negri determine the current socio-
political condition, is played out "in a diffuse manner" and in such a way as to 
"escape the increasingly confining enclosures of misery and Power.,,24 
At stake is not resistance as a coherent set of operations against a fundamentally 
coherent set of dominant conditions, and directed toward a programmatic and 
agreed upon set of aims; at stake here is rather a set of resistant practices that defy 
clear (intelligible) placement and are made up of some out of the all sorts of 
activities which make up the milieu and set up its possibilities. Crucial for the way in 
which such dispersed resistance allows for an undoing of capture, through the 
modes in and through which these practices are played out as activity. Part of this 
23 For Negri's notion of postmodernity as real subsumption and its relationship to 'laboratory 
Italy' as well as his assessment of the ongoing relevance and broader critical scope of Italian 
Operaismo's analysis, see his 1997 Introduction to The Constitution of Time', reprinted as 
'Afterword' in Negri, Constitution of Time, p.120-128). He claims of the 1981 text that its 
concerns can and should be translated "into a revolutionary dialect of postmodernity" (ibd., 
p.120). 
24 Negri, 'Kairos, Alma Venus, Multitudo', p.188 
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other form of resistance is refusal, part is affirmation. If a fundamental, strategic and 
tactical refusal to engage under the terms offered up opens a new field of 
operations, then it becomes important to work out what kind of productions become 
possible under the condition of such originary refusal. It is at least one of the urgent 
tasks, if not the most urgent, to re-configure their very relationship in these new 
formats of exchange. Or more precisely: to work out how refusal can be thought in 
this sequence not as a fundamental setting of parameters, not as a rigorous new 
framework that demands its own forms of allegiance and commitment, but instead 
as a first gesture in a whole series of re-adjustments and re-orientations directed 
toward generative encounters and situations. All kinds of activities can be played 
out only where refusal stops short of setting new authoritative, regulatory 
parameters for coherent and appropriate behaviour. Rather than providing a 
foundational framework of integrity, refusal needs to be thought as an affirmation of 
possibilities and through the affirmation of these possibilities also as an affirmation 
of an originary ungroundedness that allows for lateral juxtapositions to be played 
out. 
One key motive in this field of contemporary resistance (its "second key word", as 
Paolo Virno claims) is exodus as a gesture that fuses the refusal of a given situation 
with an affirmative embrace of an elsewhere which orients the move. Exodus is 
transformative in that it "modifies the conditions within which the struggle takes 
place, rather than presupposing those conditions to be an unalterable horizon; it 
modifies the context within which a problem has arisen, rather than facing this 
problem by opting for one or the other of the provided alternatives. In short, exit 
consists of unrestrained invention which alters the rules of the game and throws the 
adversary completely off balance,,25. This loss of balance is not a result but an 
effect, a secondary, side-effect in that it "hinges on a latent kind of wealth, on an 
exuberance of possibilities, in short, on the principle of the tertium datur',.26 
Defection then is an affirmative gesture, rather than simply one of withdrawal, and 
"allows for a dramatic, autonomous, and affirmative expression of this surplus".27 
25 Paolo Virno: A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, 
Los Angeles/ New York: Semiotext(e), 2004, p.70 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. See also Sylvere Lotringer's notion of what he calls lUxury in Autonomia and which he 
reclaims as "a lUxury that we should be able to afford: the lUxury of imagining a future that 
would actively bring together everything we are capable of " (Sylvere Lotringer: 'We, the 
Multitude', in Virno, op.cit., pp.7-19, p.17. For a broader historico-political contextualisation 
see also Sylvere Lotringer: 'In the shadow of the Red Brigades', in Sylvere Lotringer, 
Christina Marazzi (eds.), Autonomia: Post-political Politics, Los Angeles/ New York: 
Semiotext(e), 2007, pp.v-XVI. 
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The inversion of aims and effects produced through it, has its own implications for 
the confrontational assumptions underpinning it. Such resistant tactics opens a 
quantitative imbalance of power but operates onto a qualitative register too. This is 
why outlining the heterogeneous encounters of such resistance is useful as a 
template for re-thinking the stakes of different cultural practices and their forms of 
coming together, too. The real "throwing off balance" lies in the fact that even the 
registers and critical parameters of engagement are emptied out by sprawling 
involvements that overspill their specificity. 
Resistance is thus prior to what it defies28 in that it is not a response but consists of 
another set of moves which are no longer determined solely by their starting point 
but also by the ways in which they are directed toward an elsewhere. And this 
elsewhere, because it is unhinged from cause/effect relationships, operates 
elsewhere in relation to its parameters too, be they temporal (before and after) or 
spatial (inside and outside). Under these terms "there is no more outside,,29 only an 
expanded (un-bounded) inside with "exodus [ ... ] leading nowhere but here".3o 
Exodus "as the only possible creative event" then is "the name for a transmutation 
of the values of resistance" "that would [Le. could] finally exhibit an other 
postmodernity".31 An other mode of involvement becomes possible here that 
oscillates between refusal and affirmation, resistance and flight and starts 
generating a milieu where both tendencies overlap. This mode is at least suggestive 
for re-thinking engagements between artistic practice and theoretical concerns as 
well as their articulations in relation to both. It is a matter of working from this 
situation Hardt and Negri call postmodern as a given premise and of simultaneously 
mobilising the potentiality of what Lotringer calls postmodernity's amphibious 
nature. 32 The present project gestures toward the latter as an opening for possible 
multiplications to be generated. 
28 "One might say in this sense that resistance is actually prior to power." (Antonio Negri, 
Michael Hardt: Empire, Cambridge, MAl London: Harvard University Press, 2000, p.360) 
29 Ibid., p.186 
30 Eric Alliez, Antonio Negri, 'Peace and War', in Theory, Culture & Society, 20:2, 2003, 
pp.109-118, p.116 
31 Ibid. 
32 For Lotringer, capitalism itself "keeps providing its own kind of 'communism' both as a 
vaccine, preventing further escalation, and an incentive to go beyond its own limitations." 
Both options in response to this ambiguity, "absorbing the shocks" and "multiplying the 
fractures" can thus be part of the "luxury of thinking ahead, unimpeded" granted by the 
spectre of capitalism and in spite of itself (Lotringer: op.cit., p.18). Alliez/ Negri call that 
which can be produced from this monstrous: The "product of generation is always a 
'monster'" (ibid.) not as moral category but in terms of the improbable fusions and 
combinations, and in their turning component parts of various creatures into other life forms 
which then (and that is important too) take on their own dynamics. 
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Art figures in this post-critical scenario first and foremost as proto-political 
potential toward a re-configuration of the present. In Virno's account, its potential is 
generated by levelling art, work and speech and claiming them as proto-political 
through the way in which they require and in turn constitute an audience, social 
organisation and a language, and how they perform proto-political situations33 . Art 
in this account is paradigmatic for a new type of politics both in the way in which it 
indexes potentiality and in the pragmatics of the inevitably public situations it 
generates. Implicit in both is what Alliezl Negri call art's direct attack on "the 
partition of identities that regulates the political effects of the relation between the 
utterable and the visible, or between appearing, being, and dOing.,,34 Such 
disregarding, production-oriented attack on the enforcement of categories, no 
matter how direct it may be, cannot be contained where containment itself is under 
attack, and is inevitably and necessarily entangled in other forms of exchange onto 
which it abuts: "this [attack] is what [art] cannot do for real, that is, without academic 
mediation, without situating itself in the taking-place of what it wants to de-
monstrate in order to reverse - by situating itself, and therefore placing us, both 
within and "after the passage of life through the ordeal of nihilism"(Agamben).,,35 
Art's attack on the enforcement of categories is then itself subject to what the 
authors call "academic mediation" and in this sense always also entangled in the 
overall distributions art supposedly interferes in. Rather than standing outside of the 
dynamics it generates, art is itself subject to mediation as another level of undoing 
of competences. The remit then is double: ways in which art can be animated need 
to be animated in themselves as dynamic points of departure through which art can 
become generative of new possibilities. 
Virno describes this shared and contested milieu in terms of the potential it holds for 
what he calls a "general hybridization" from which emerge not only the potentiality of 
the multitude, but also late capitalism's inherent communism. Drawing in particular 
on the erosion of formerly constitutive distinctions between politics, labor and 
intellect Virno observes and argues for,36 this general hybridization shall here be 
applied to mobilizing art and mediation and/as/of potential. 
33 See Lotringer, op.cit., esp. pp.52-56 
34 In Alliezl Negri, art features furthermore in terms of "the artist in his or her effort to extract 
expression from the unworldly [ ... J by the construction of a world once again made possible", 
a world set against "the hegemonic media regime of the image" (Alliez/Negri, op. cit., p.115). 
The direct attack above is a function, for Alliezl Negri, of art performing this extraction. It is 
also its effect and will be taken up as a starting point here in this sense. 
35 Ibid. 
36 See also Virno's tri-partite distinction and its overcoming: then, in modernity (Arendt), and 
now, in the amphibious postmodern. The claim back to Arendt and notably Marx (when 
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At stake is a question as to what kind of relations some of the artwork sets up, and 
as to what kind of relations can be constructed for a thinking with and through and 
from these practices? The important task in both is to develop a thinking from and 
toward which will start fusing ways in and out. Positing work without considering the 
involvement with it would undercut precisely the crucial effect of artwork Alliez/ 
Negri posit as its potential for generating "social danger" where this is understood 
as having an impact ("political effects") on the relation(s) "between appearing, being 
and doing", which for them constitute the very core of political distribution in the 
present. 
In this perspective and at the risk of taking it too seriously, even the notion of 
mediation is misleading in that it seems to posit a primacy of the work and a 
secondary status of the engagement with it whilst in fact it marks a crucial hinge 
between artwork and situation, a hinge that is unacknowledged but serves to qualify 
the claims made for the artwork. Foregrounding this hinge and indeed taking off 
from it, the Ambient Attitudes project posits both the various involvements the work 
sets up and the possible involvements with it as operations that inevitably mutually 
constitute each other. If artwork indeed "attacks directly the partition" between 
appearing being and doing, then this undoing has to also affect the artwork that 
produces it. It can never only be the artwork that produces that sort of attack, nor 
can it be artwork alone that would be exempt from the effects generated. Rather 
artwork has then also to be thought under these very effects, affected too by the 
attacks it itself launches. It can and has to be thought as itself caught and oscillating 
between appearing being and doing, and needs to be animated in their interactions 
and interferences. 
0.4 Ambient Modes: Contingency, Treason and Humour 
The ensuing chapters arrange clusters of concepts and works as a way of 
Virno posits in the second of his Ten Theses on the Multitude and Post-Fordist Capitalism 
that "Post-Fordism is the empirical realization of the "Fragments on Machines" by Marx", 
"without, however, any emancipating consequences" (Virno, op.cit., p.100)) is not a simple 
attempt at historically legitimising his outlook. The reference back, to the contrary, indicates 
the unresolved (and potentially unresolvable) nature of the tension at play, a tension that is 
now potentially closer than before to being possibly mobilised. The question of its 
mobilisation, its potential, is now unresolved and was unresolved before. The historical 
reference, ironically, serves here as a safeguard against the kind of deterministic argument 
underpinning Negri/Hardt's take on historical materialism through the figure of the multitude 
in relation to which the crises of capitalism, as well as the 'production of the common' they 
argue in Multitude, re-enact Marxist determinism. See Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri: 
Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, New York! London: Penguin, 2004. For 
a critical assessment of their Marxist re-interpretation of class struggle see also Lotringer's 
(cautious) introduction to Virno's Grammar of the Multitude, and Lotringer's critique of Hardt! 
Negri there (Lotringer, op.cit). 
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producing such mobilities in order to overcome the impasses of existing critical 
frameworks and the ways in which they assess the possible effects of art. One 
chapter addresses how contingency allows to overs pill specificity, another tells 
stories of treason beyond the economies of trickery and intervention, and the last is 
concerned with an attitudinal slippage that occurs between irony and humour and 
opens onto confusingly unstable effects. Each of these clusters follows and 
produces a fundamental shift away from established critical models and elaborates 
on a series of different ways into conceptualising and articulating ways out. Through 
and with them the project will attempt to shadow artworks exiting from situations 
and engagements by trying to, in the same move, exit from a scripted, 
representational relationship to the artwork itself. The shadowing consists in 
following some of the artworks' moves and projecting them onto broader conceptual 
concerns, whilst simultaneously projecting theoretical moves and attitudes onto the 
works in question. The way in which this interplay allows to animate artwork and 
theoretical frameworks alike provides the effective horizon to this entire project. 
'Mode One: Contingency', the first of these clusters, attempts to drown out notions 
of specificity as structuring principles for an engagement with artistic practice. The 
chapter outlines how specificity figures in recent critical accounts of artistic practice 
as a way of projecting a fundamentally responsive exchange between given 
conditions and artistic responses to these. The chapter then profiles modes of 
indifference set up to defy and overspill these limiting economies. Taking off from 
two recent, paradigmatic conceptualisations of specificity, Nicholas Bourriaud's 
Relational Aesthetics project37 and the historical trajectory of site-specific practices 
(as well as institutional critique as their implicit critical horizon), the chapter 
deconstructs them as models of analytical highlighting and essentialised difference 
respectively, and argues that both result in ultimately limiting reading patterns 
premised and focused on generating overall coherence between an intervention 
and the situation it addresses. 
In order to mobilise such contingency against established notions of specificity, the 
chapter follows the ways in which some early spatial as well as discursive 
interventions by Liam Gillick operate across the divide of theoretical and practical 
operations and set up multiple and incoherent involvements in the situations they 
relate to. Contingency here destabilises the focal precision implicit in claims of 
specificity and sets up a whole series of unbalancing adjustments that reconfigure 
the basic coordinates of relationships at play. Against the economy of a specific 
37 Nicolas Bourriaud: Relational Aesthetics, Dijon: Les Presses du Reel, 2002 
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response or intervention, contingency sets up a loose fit between factors that 
contribute to varying degrees to the constitution of a situation. One of contingency's 
key strategic features is its capacity to unhinge linear causalities, and with them 
unilinear connectivities as such. And in terms of this looseness, contingency allows 
to replace economies of necessity with probabilities, likelihoods and ultimately 
merely possible connections, outlining a conjunction of refusal and indifference 
which sets the grounds for new forms of affirmation. 
Concepts have to then be played out accordingly in relation to refusal, indifference 
and affirmation. Challenging the close fit implicit in commentary functions and 
cohering reading patterns, the Ambient project proposes instead to work out how to 
operate in relation to contingency without re-cohering it. Articulating outward 
openings through loose fits, near-misses and other figures of seeming imprecision, 
this chapter unhinges the specificity of works as well as concepts and opens them 
onto a field of expanded and unclear effectivities. 
'Mode Two: Treason', the second chapter, develops a trajectory from trickery 
toward treason as play between two fundamentally incompatible conceptualisations 
of intervention which are set up here as an interplay between game and playing. 
Whilst the notion of the game features as a structured set of scripted exchanges 
into which trickery can intervene, play features as an uncontained sequencing of 
moves that constantly re-set the terms under which they take place and opens onto 
the more radical departures of treason. The chapter examines how the slippage 
between both modes affects the rules, grounds and effects a game is determined by 
and that it (the game) in turn generates. Gilles Oeleuze's extended notion of playas 
developed primarily in his work on Lewis Carrol38 and Gabriel Orozco's situational 
inserts are set up in this tension so as to take games beyond notions of structure. 
Instead, they are moving it to the point where treason is only one perspective onto 
the traitor's activities which are also always and necessarily part of an affirmative 
move. At this point, and only at this point or when coming from it, can it become 
possible and important to betray the distinction between trickery and treason, and 
challenge the possibility of setting them apart. In their place then emerges a notion 
of proliferation for which leaving-behind is always also the affirmation of an 
elsewhere generating effects which feed back into the situation it leaves behind. 
Narrativity, which already plays a significant minor role in some of the discussions 
around contingency in chapter one, is a key mode in understanding and mobilising 
this kind of sprawl. As work! concept cluster, the 'treason' chapter narrates a home-
38 Gilles Deleuze: The Logic of Sense, London: Athlone, 1990 
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run set up by Gabriel Orozco around New York's Museum of Modern Art39 with/ 
through a game of baseball and the stories its ball takes on in Don Delillo's 
Underworld novel4o . Blurring Orozco's spatial dispositifs and Delillo's combinatory 
plot sequences into a multiple narrative strand allows to appropriate and re-
assemble both into a narrative engine for the chapter itself. Situational inserts and 
extended play thus extend into trigger objects for a narrative sprawl that gestures 
toward un-containing the chapter itself. 
Evasion as a paradoxical movement into and way out of a situation features as a 
key concern throughout the third chapter addressing the modalities of 'Mode Three: 
Humour'. It is organised along a movement from irony to humour as shift through 
which escape can be conceptualised as a pro-active rather than a defensive stance 
and operation. Humour is not only, as will be shown, a productive reaction simply 
because it startles expectations. Its relevance lies furthermore in the way in which it 
allows to conceptualise escape as going beyond the classical dichotomy of ways in 
and ways out, as if they were really to be opposed. 
The chapter sets up Sigmund Freud's notion of the joke41 as background against 
which to play out Deleuze's notion of humour as un-cohering practice. Following the 
shift from irony to humour outlined by Deleuze, the chapter backtracks irony from 
this conceptual re-adjustment: What Deleuze describes as the circularity of irony is 
here projected back onto Freud's notion of the joke as its fundamental structure 
(and structural foundation). Freud's reading of the economies at play in forms such 
as the joke can thus be taken up against the grain of his model as a way of 
highlighting and problematizing their implicit claims for coherence. 
Projecting these readings onto Andreas Slominski's conceptual animal traps and 
the ways in which they solicit a multiplicity of milieus as real traps for imagined 
animals, 'Humour' mobilises an attitudinal shift from irony toward humour as way of 
re-thinking the potentiality of sideways movements and lateral slippage. Drawing on 
Deleuze and Guattari's shift from the symbolics of circularity and depth toward 
figures of laterality and flatness, the chapter turns their mobilisation of minor 
practices into a blueprint from which to re-visit the effects of Slominski's trap-
settings. The blurring of conceptual and spatial registers of laterality allows to posit 
these works as fusing a basic refusal to engage with an open-ended affirmation of 
39 Gabriel Orozco, Home Run, projects 41 exhibition, The Museum of Modern Art, New York, 
1993 
40 Don Delillo: Underworld, London: Picador, 1999 
41 Sigmund Freud: Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1960 
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productive encounters and a new kind of effects generated through these. 
0.5 Post-critical. A preliminary note on attitudes 
So if this mobilises contingency, treason and humour in order to update existing 
critical vocabulary, inscribe broader horizons and enable new modes of operating at 
their intersection, then this adjustment consists partially at least also in re-assessing 
attitudes within and toward the field; they are necessarily what the project shifts 
towards. The material consulted and used is therefore primary material for the most 
part, literary fiction and philosophical construct as well as artwork, because it is, for 
this project, not so much a matter of understanding and/or explaining the material 
differently, as it is a matter of mobilizing it in new ways. There are obvious 
implications to this for the text itself, for the way in which repetitions and shifted 
priorities animate the relationships between the different chapters and for the ways 
in which similar motives and key concerns are consistently re-revisited throughout. 
The chapters constitute mutually responsive clusters much more than consecutive 
chapters. Also because such current artistic practices correspond to the new modes 
of involvement which animate their discussion here not necessarily in content or 
ideas, but rather in shared attitudes of approximation and distance and the 
dynamics of contiguity played out through these. The project of exiting strategies is 
always on one hand a matter of developing strategies of exit and on the other to 
enact ways of exiting the framework of strategies as such in the same process. For 
Virno, attitudes are central to an understanding of as well as a dealing with the 
present condition because they are central parameters to what he describes as 
post-Fordist production, and because in attitudes lies what he calls the amphibious 
potential of post-Fordism/ postmodernity. This is a realm which therefore needs to 
be considered also in terms of what appropriate responses to it might be, or rather 
attitudes in relation to that. 
The problem and the urgency of the project lie in replicating moves without falling 
back onto cohering models and positions. Or, as Nancy puts it in a different context 
yet within a similar horizon: 
"1. How can one know in what way and just how far critique-both 
revolutionary critique, including its most recent manifestations, and also so-
called reformist critique-remains paradoxically and unconsciously subject 
to a classical model in which reality is opposed to appearance and unity is 
opposed to plurality? (This model assumes that a certain Nietzschean 
lesson is constantly misunderstood or avoided within the critical tradition 
and, at the same time, that the whole question of what can be called "art" 
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from the pOint of view of social critique remains more or less untouched.) In 
other words, to what extent do "critical" thinking and the critical attitude as 
such entail this subjection (if "critique" always presupposes the possibility of 
unveiling the intelligibility of the real), and what other attitude is necessary, 
where an attitude of resignation is out of the question?,,42 
The following chapters address this problematic of critique by taking up both key 
leads: on one hand, by replacing the depth of what Nancy calls subjection with the 
flatness of lateral sprawls in which dispersal overspills concentration and multiple 
involvements undermine marked out positions and engagements with these. On the 
other, by replacing the imperative for models through the active use of modes which 
are to be played out in their place. 
In contrast to models inevitably relying on and imposing structures, modes enable 
sequences along lines of attitudes; in this perspective involvements can be cohered 
around a shared attitude displayed toward them whilst remaining otherwise 
disparate and inconclusive. Also, under these terms, involvements need to be 
generated in terms of a relation which needs to be set up and brought into motion; 
at stake is precisely the movement this actualisation enables. 
The horizon of these attitudes remains, in Nancy and here, post-critical rather than 
a-critical in that it insists on the generation of effects, rather than disavowing 
impact43. Nancy's coupling of a necessary "other attitude" with his insistence that 
42 Jean-Luc Nancy: Being Singular Plural, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000, p.54 
43 In this sense, the notion of the post-critical builds on and expands Irit Rogoff's notion of 
criticality as "operating from an uncertain ground which while building on critique wants 
nevertheless to inhabit culture in a relation other than one of critical analysis". What is 
required, argues Rogoff, "would be an open and fluid space in which numerous forms of 
experimental conjunctions between ideas, politics, images and effects might take place" (Irit 
Rogoff, 'What is a Theorist?', 2003, n.p., available online under http://www.kein.org/node/62. 
A German translation of the paper is published in Martin Hellmond, Sabine Kampmann, 
Ralph Lindner, Katharina Sykora (eds.), Was ist ein KOnstler? Das Subjekt der Moderne, 
MOnchen: Fink, 2003.) See also Rogoffs elaboration on criticality in "'Smuggling": An 
Embodied Criticality', paper at conference TRANSFORM. The Future of Institutional 
Critique, Lentos Kunstmuseum Linz, 12/10/05: "What interests me in 'criticality' (and I am 
aware that this is a contingent and not entirely satisfactory term, not least because it is 
already occupied with various meanings I am not much interested in - but at the moment it is 
the best that I have at my disposal) is that it brings together that being studied and those 
doing the studying, in an indelible unity. Within what I am calling 'criticality' it is not possible 
to stand outside of the problematic and objectify it as a disinterested mode of learning. 
Criticality is then a recognition that we may be fully armed with theoretical knowledge, we 
may be capable of the most sophisticated modes of analysis but we nevertheless are also 
living out the very conditions we are trying to analyse and come to terms with. Therefore, 
criticality, is a state of duality in which one is at one and the same time, both empowered 
and disempowered, knowing and unknowing". Post-critical is, on one hand, the necessary 
supplement to such criticality's impossible adjective, and on the other, provides an opening 
out of its effectivity by unhinging the cause-effect relationships conventionally assumed 
behind accounts of critical operations. 
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resignation is out of the question, marks the effective horizon of the present project: 
that all formations including those of staged or effective indifference need to be 
accounted for in relation to existing critical models and effects to be generated, and 
therefore have to be accounted for also as deviations, as un-answerable 
challenges, diversions and affirmative acts of turning-away. 
The present thesis therefore does not unveil what Nancy calls 'intelligibilities' but 
aims instead to indicate possible operations of exiting. The main task, under these 
terms, is not to find a new appropriate attitude, but rather to insist on the notion of 
the attitude as such, as a de-substantialised refusal to categories of commitment.44 
Contingency, treason and humour/Ambient Attitudes thus sets up contiguous 
modes beyond the limiting exchange economies of established and applicable 
theoretical models, analytic, critical and otherwise. Instead, the impetus lies on 
effects generated alongside and through these involvements in such a way that new 
encounters, contextualisations and juxtapositions develop their own sets of logic 
and friction, continuity and disconnectedness. The dynamics of these effects and 
the feedback loops they emerge from and in turn generate, are what is being 
investigated here. 
44 Agamben's notion of the gesture as residual space for a singularity that remains pure 
potentiality, corresponds to this notion of the attitude in a complex series of overlaps and will 
be developed in 'Mode One: Contingency (Un-fitting settings)' below, pp.28-76, esp. in what 
he calls Bartleby's formula and the way it oscillates between refusal as gesture and as 
attitude. 
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1 Mode One: Contingency (Un-fitting settings) 
"Rather, it would seem that a general law of intrusion is 
exhibited: there has never been only one [ ... ] As soon 
as intrusion occurs, it multiplies, making itself known 
through its continually renewed internal differences.,,45 
This work is concerned with new modes of involvement and the effects they 
generate and allow for. Engaging with recent (and current) art practices, it considers 
exchanges between works and situations in order to mobilise a notion of active 
entanglement as operational dimension for both, the works in question and any 
engagement with them. The project profiles this as a notion and mode of the 
ambient, in relation and as response to these. 
1.1 New encounters with and through art 
Conceptually and methodologically, the project operates at the intersection of recent 
post-critical theory and artistic practice and mobilises them as two sets of 
developments that fundamentally re-frame discussions of and assumptions about 
effects in cultural operations and artistic practice. Large parts of the first set are 
concerned with de-regulated accounts of effects and the repercussions they 
generate; broad strands of the second set activate modes of interference that 
oscillate between affirmative involvement (collusion) and disjunctive intervention 
(disruption). In both fields, shifts in the way effects are considered culminate in the 
dimension of an effect-ivity that defies inherited categories of engagement and 
undermines conventional forms of accountability. 
This effectivity contrasts with linear models of accountability in that it is 
fundamentally multiple, potentially sprawling and necessarily uncharted on anyone 
of the inherited trajectories. Inherited models of context and engagement are 
directed towards results, either in the form of an actual outcome or at least in the 
form of an intention or expectation, whilst the effects at stake here cannot be 
premised on such endings. Here, instead of developing towards a relevant 
outcome, situations are mobilised in such a way that they generate a sprawl of 
propositions; not as a production, but rather as a setting up of mere possibilities that 
give up radically on control and directed ness by purely allowing for a configuration 
to produce itself and take place. Even where a result or outcome are generated 
from this process, they have ceased to provide a relevant index to the workings of a 
situation, presenting merely the most easily recuperable component of a multiplicity 
45 Jean-Luc Nancy, 'L'lntrus', transl. by Susan Hanson, in The New Centennial Review, Fall 
2002, pp. 1-14, p.9 
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of effects generated. To unlock, assess and activate other parts of that spectrum is 
the aim of the present project. 
What these samples outline (as works and as engagements) is a possibility to 
overcome notions of condition and context through a precise and fundamental re-
arranging, or rather, re-configuring of the entire web of relations in the mode of the 
encounter. What is "in the course of becoming possible,,46 by taking off from these 
works and engaging with them under new terms is a mode of engagement that 
differs from inherited models and engages practical operations as much as 
theoretical ones - a mode that (as such) defies assumptions of complementarity, 
reciprocity and their corresponding equations between work and situation, 
intervention and effect, cultural operation and critical reading strategy. Beyond the 
trickery of interferences that "claim to take possession of fixed properties, or to 
conquer a territory, or even to introduce a new order", unfitting settings in this way is 
a first step in an overall project towards the "creative theft of the traitor".47 
The shift from results to effects and the closely related parallel one from outcome to 
impact can be traced in both sets of developments, post-critical theory and some 
recent artistic practice. In the former, the shift can be summarily and tentatively 
projected around what Giorgio Agamben outlines as the potentiality of whatever 
entities and their implied propensity for multiple engagement. His notion of the 
whatever itself performs an unframing from structural boundedness (an unframing 
already performed-albeit differently-by post-structural accounts of differance as 
deferral of meaning and differing from given structural systematics), but more 
importantly it inaugurates a new type of operability by allowing for movements and 
trajectories to take place under the terms of this unframing. 
The important shift inaugurated is one in perspective, displacing a strategy of 
ungrounding towards the notion of an engagement that is fundamentally contingent 
and yet looses nothing of its actuality. To the contrary: it is the radical contingency 
itself of whatever entities that provides the very precondition for their generating of 
effects. If whatever is understood, as Agamben suggests, not as an emptied out 
formula ("it does not matter which") but as "such that it always matters",48 this 
(necessary) inversion can provide a formula of contingency that insists on the 
actuality of encounters, without referring them back to the regulatory categories of 
46 Gilles Deleuze, Claire Parnet: Dialogues, London: Athlone, 1987, p.147 
47 Deleuze/Parnet, op.cit, p.41. 
48 Giorgio Agamben: The Coming Community, Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993, p.1 
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necessity or will. 49 Jean-Luc Nancy formulates the same insistence when he 
invokes an "absoluteness of the finite" as "our sense of finitude, the one that is to 
be made ours, to be appropriated, and thus, that is yet to come [ ... ] which lies in the 
availability of the singular, of the non-totalizable, [ ... ] dispersed totalities, and in the 
necessity of contingency". 50 
It is from this type of engagement that a new "politics of [the] whatever"Sl can be 
thought which is both radically evasive and through this emptying out generative of 
disruptive impact. Premised on the impropriety of singular constellations "in which 
phenomena arrange themselves in a gesture" and which overspill the distinction 
between means and ends, this politics opens onto a working of "means that, as 
such, evade the orbit of mediality without becoming, for this reason, ends."s2 
This evasion (that for Agamben constitutes the core modality of a politics to come, 
"an opportunity" that "humanity [ ... ] must at all costs not let slip away"S3), is the 
horizon against and within which the latter set (some recent and current artistic 
practice) gains virulence not as a model or exemplification, but as a starting point 
and challenge for developing ways of engagement. This second set is made up of 
practices that display a seemingly impassive indifference towards inherited 
oppositional models, and premise their operations on the effectivity of minor 
gestures below the threshold of established revelatory or deconstructive strategies. 
Rather than intervening in any meaningful way, these practices operate by way of 
insertions that re-configure effects in a new type of play beyond the structurality of 
structure and its inescapable embeddedness. 
After the empirical turn of deconstructive applications in early cyberfabulations and 
their generalised blurring of reality registers (under the onslaught and as 
appropriation of supposedly generalised technoscientific innovations and 
applications) that opened the structurality of structure towards non-language 
49 Giorgio Agamben: Potentialities, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999, p.254 
50 Jean-Luc Nancy: The Weight of a Thought', in The Gravity of Thought, London: Humanity 
Books, 1997, p.75-84, p.78f. 
51 Agamben, Coming Community, p.85. Whilst Agamben's account is primarily concerned 
with "whatever singularity" insofar as it defies state machineries and operations of power 
(taking off from Deleuze and Foucault respectively) against which the whatever is activated 
as that which is "in no way a real predicate" (ibid., p.3), the present approach extracts from 
his project the whatever as operational mode, mobilising it for a formula in which whatever 
happens. 
52 Giorgio Agamben, Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics, Minneapolis/ London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p.56f 
53 Agamben, Coming Community, p.65 
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registers (empirical turn) and blurred the (conceptual) borders between both54 ; and 
in the light of the corresponding promises of dispersed entanglements and chaotic 
repercussions that still glimmer in the background of the differently situated 
practices in question here55 - after all this, the more recent practices in question 
play in a novel way that needs qualifying not only outside of linear patterns and 
beyond the structure of games. It also needs qualifying outside the near-utopian 
charges of these earlier deconstructively and digitally informed perspectives. In their 
place emerges a mino,s6 play of whatever entities and their dispersed effectivities, 
premised on contingency and impropriety. 57 
Both fields of practice are clearly and plausibly informed by each other, and it would 
be na·ive and unwise to refute obvious connections. Given the extent to which 
Guattari or indeed Deleuze and (to a lesser extent and in a fundamentally different 
reading) Agamben are functionalised in relation to recent practice, the connection 
as such cannot even be reclaimed as novel. But the type of play in question not only 
informs both fields independently. It can also be mobilised as possible mode of their 
coming together and generate a conjunction that raises the stakes for both. 
Beyond an illustration of common sources, overlapping concerns and systems of 
reference, there is another, seemingly more negligible similarity that concerns a 
mode of operations spanning both fields. The ways in which situations are 
accounted for and interacted with, share recurring key characteristics of dispersal, 
fragmentation and non-coherence that add up to a type or rather form and style of 
thought. And since the practices in question address modalities and attitudes more 
than they achieve efficiency, since they are more concerned with mobilising 
inapproriatenesses than they are with arranging adequacies, it is exactly from these 
features that such a thing as a new sensitivity (on one hand) and attitude (on the 
other) need to be approached and generated. 
This type of conjuncture of the fields replicates the quality of the encounter at stake 
between work and situation, an encounter that is accounted for on one hand and 
actively solicited, enhanced, mobilised on the other, blurring the borders between 
54 For a broad overview, see e.g. Neil Spiller (ed.): Cyber Reader: Critical Writings for the 
Digital Era, London: Phaidon, 2002. Also more specifically: Donna Haraway, 'A Cyborg 
Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century', in 
Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, New York: Routledge, 1991, 
p.149-181 and Sadie Plant, 'Coming Across the Future', in Joan Broadhurst Dixon, Eric 
Cassidy (eds.), Virtual Futures: Posthumans and Cyberotics, London: Routledge, 1998 
55 For a partial overview over some of the discursive and artistic approaches, see Timothy 
Druckrey (ed.): ars electronica. Facing the Future, Massachusetts/ London: MIT, 1998 
56 For the category of the minor see Deleuze/ Guattari, Kafka, esp.16-28. 
57 Agamben: Coming Community, p.65 
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both. The conjuncture at issue here is thus not simply an overlap of interests, of 
questions, of doubts, to be charted and traced. Rather it is in itself the kind of 
encounter that can open (and can be turned into) an operational space to be 
activated and mobilised, an encounter-trigger itself under the condition of expanded 
effectivity. 
What is in the process of becoming possible in the conjunction of both is therefor 
also an expanded collusion between theoretical and practical elaborations that turns 
both into components of a mutual working and opens onto a widely expanded series 
of encounters. Categorical differences such as theory and practice relinquish their 
importance here; in their place emerge series of encounters between a work and its 
situations, between an intellectual frame and an artistic appropriation, between a 
horizon and an attitude, an effect and an operation. 
In this expanded field of encounters, ambient is a strategic device transporting both 
a horizon of interest and a working attitude in relation to it. Appropriated here as a 
set term rather than defined, it carries a whole range of charges, some of which 
take on particular importance: it is 
important how ambient is generally 
defined as encompassing on all sides 
and completely enveloping in such a 
way that that includes circumfusion 
and a notion of investment; and how 







differentiations between container and 
contained - literally it translates as 
that which surrounds by going 
around. It is always and against this 
background in particular a term that 
challenges clear distributions, and 
even at its most applied installs at 
best confusingly new forms of stability. NASA, for instance, conceives of the 
ambient in contrast to focal forms of directedness. It is interesting then too how 
recent neuro-physiological approaches in perceptual studies differentiate between 
an ambient and a focal mode of (spatial) perception: the focal mode concerns the 
nature of objects being examined and is characterised as an intensive and clearly 
directed type of attention primarily based on stable, high definition visual 
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fig.1 
information. The ambient mode, on the contrary, is relevant for establishing the 
subject's relationship to its surroundings, for situating it spatially, and processes 
low-intensity information from a much wider section of the visual field available. 
Whilst object recognition through focal vision is optimised through concentration, 
spatial orientation in the ambient mode increases with broader low-density 
coverage. 58 
Ambient and focal processing are thus not only directed towards different entities (a 
surrounding field vs. an object), rather they represent structurally different 
modalities of engagement. Whilst the former tends to dominate studies and 
investigations, a re-evaluation of the latter could suggest the peripheral as index for 
a different type of attention that bypasses focus by importing an ambient non-
intensity into central areas of a field (of vision). Reconfiguring engagement under 
these metaphorico-conceptual terms acknowledges a variety of inputs (not just 
visual ones) as contributory factors, turning the processing of information into a 
heterogeneous assemblage of different components. Whilst the focal mode is 
premised on attention and therefor has a propensity to fail under the impact of 
disturbances, the ambient mode is fundamentally reflexive in nature and therefore 
able to reconfigure itself in response to changing stimuli. Its stability relies on an 
assemblage that replaces focality with dispersal, precision with balance, and 
isolation with overall integration. As different, "hitherto neglected system", ambient 
processing posits both, a different object of processing as well as a different 
modality for the engagement with it. 
The overlaps between these usages of the ambient are in themselves worthy of 
investigation, notably in the way they question any clear-cut differentiation between 
perception and approaches, between situations and attitudes and the objects 
58 See Herschel W. Leibowitz, C.L. Shupert, Robert B. Post, 'The two modes of visual 
processing: Implications for spatial orientation', in Peripheral Vision Horizon Display 
(PVHD): NASA Conference Publication-2306, Edwards: NASA, 1983, p. 41-44. (available 
online under www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/87978main_H-1232.pdf (last accessed 
29/10108) ). The context of the paper is military and addresses research into the dys-
functions of spatial orientation in vehicle guidance and aircraft instrumentation. (For more 
civilian applications see e.g. Richard H. Y. So, Andy Ho, W. T. Lo, 'A Metric to Quantify 
Virtual Scene Movement for the Study of Cybersickness: Definition, Implementation, and 
Verification', in Presence: Teleoperators & Virtual Environments, April 2001, Vol. 10, No.2, 
pp.193-215). The point is obviously not, as Brian Massumi remarks in relation to his own 
appropriations of scientific knowledges, "to make the humanities scientific" or indeed 
appropriate their claims of empirically founded relevance, "the point is to borrow from 
science in order to make a difference in the humanities" (Brian Massumi: Parables for the 
Virtual, Durhaml London: Duke University Press, 2002, p.20f.). Whilst Massumi considers 
this a project of renegotiation, here it is primarily a metaphorico-conceptual appropriation 
that knows itself to be self-referentially and inappropriately just that - a generative loose fit 
which stops short of any of the larger claims Massumi rightly criticises (see Massumi, op.cit., 
p.19f.). 
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around which they are generated. The term's main strategic use though lies in the 
coming together of these charges in the conceptual impurity of a term that (even 
though it is very precisely not ambience) also resonates with its multifarious 
applications in current electronica and club culture, spanning across a field of 
(musical) settings from John Cage's silences to Brian Eno's music for airports and 
the more current idioms of trance and ambient electronica, as well as the socio-
architectural pattern of the ambient lounge in current club culture. 59 Furthermore 
(and again in partial overlap) configurations of the ambient can also be traced in 
relation to immersive modes in current digital media, particularly in virtual reality 
applications and gaming, where the term is loaned from an architectural circulation. 
(In fact, the term ambient mode itself, as used in the current project, was first 
suggested by a video game description and is taken from there. 60) 
Rather than having to be emptied out, clarified, this multiplicity of connotations 
operates a series of contaminations that overload the term in such a way as to 
undermine its generic applicability. Most of its connotations are potentially relevant, 
but instead of complementing each other they join in oblique linkages, some of 
which are factual, some metaphorical, some simply transported through the poetics 
of the term. Rather then being accumulative, the various charges of ambient are 
thus allowed to operate as blurring devices that further replace focal precision (as 
would be required for the projection of a close fit) with dispersed encounters and 
their particular forms of togetherness. The content the term captures and the 
charges it mobilises condition each other in feedback loops that avoid ambient 
becoming simply another model (for work) or method (of approaching it) to be 
applied; rather it (the term, the attitude, the style) has to always be played out in the 
various encounters themselves. 
59 For the particularly interesting way in which Brian Eno first coined the term Ambient Music 
in continuity with and differentiation from commercial Muzak, see in particular his 'ambient 
music manifesto' as published at the American release of "'ambient #1 ': music for airports" in 
September 1978 (http://music.hyperreal.org/artists/brian_eno/MFA-txt.html(last accessed 
29/10108)). Some of these and other phenomena are outlined in a broad overview in Mark J. 
Prendergast: The ambient century: from Mahler to trance: The evolution of sound in the 
electronic age, London: Bloomsbury, 2000. Conceptually though, the project reduces 
ambient to a traceable, accountable feature, invoked as a new core modality for 20th century 
music to be written into the accounts of codified avantgarde practice and ideology. The 
focus as such, and the historiographic register of the work, immediately undercut any 
potentiality of the ambient as new type of practice. 
60 'Our Design Playground' operates as background to Francis Lam's multi-user chats pace 
at www.db-db.com and, when first launched, offered the possibility of "fading into 
background obscurity through the "ambient mode" function" (Jonah Brucker-Cohen, 'Hi 
There Leak Much?', on Rhizome.org, 20/10/2002, available online under 
http://rhizome.org/editoriaI/924 (last accessed 29/10108)). 
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Strategically, ambient as particular form of non-focality necessarily involves an 
unfitting from coherent (cohering) patterns of accountability. In a first instance, 
ambient will thus be outlined against two existing and relevant but ultimately 
inappropriate categories: site-specificity as model that recuperates interventions by 
accounting for them in terms of appropriate and efficient response; and a notion of 
the relational that approaches divergent relations to a supposedly dominant context 
by establishing the latter as underlying and supposedly stable index of reference, 
and thus channelling relations and interferences into accountable contrasts. Both 
paradigms regularise and stabilise encounters under the assumption of a coherent 
overall economy of exchanges. Both will be solicited here through an active unfitting 
of their various component parts in relation to each other, and it is on the basis of 
this un-cohering that the ambient move will then open onto a different kind of effect. 
1.3 From settings to set-ups 
Where elements come together, they can fit and not fit in different ways, and there 
are of course different ways how these fittings and unfittings can be thought. But 
fitting (or unfitting) is in itself already a particular way of thinking about how things 
come together, and it has implications: as soon as they are addressed under the 
conceptual frame of fitting correspondances, things fit in as much as it is now pre-
determined what can happen between them. They can fit or not fit (albeit to varying 
degrees), and in that polarity they will necessarily fall into pre-scripted forms of 
togetherness. 
The following research is therefore an attempt at developing forms through and 
within which elements can come together in such a way as to not fall back onto 
already charted patterns. It is an attempt at resetting the conceptual framework for 
modalities of engagement, and it is therefore firstly a play with existing notions that 
tries to play them out against each other in a movement towards a fundamentally 
different understanding of what can happen when elements come together. 
One such pair of elements is insert and context. Both are parts of a pairing as 
corresponding elements that fit and make sense only ever in relation in relation to 
each other. Most of the features of fitting relationships can be played through in 
their interdependencies. 
The first is the complementary constitution of both in a notion of context that implies 
the coherence of a structure within which an insert can be located. Even though 
they are normally understood in a dichotomy of that which is stable (context) and 
that which is not (insert), their relation as such is always conceived as stable, their 
respective positions safeguarded by a series of hierarchies. Figures (of speech, of 
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action, of gesture) in this scenario are outlined against the rigidity of the foil in front 
of which they produce themselves and their dynamics. Backdrops, when thought of 
as part of this complimentary pair, accordingly assume the role of passive 
backgrounds, providing the inserts immobile and communicably stable 
counterweights that safeguard the coherence of the overall arrangement. 
The second fundamental feature in this kind of togetherness is the implied causal 
dependency of component parts. Distinctions between categories such as action 
and background, insert and context introduce hierarchies which inevitably prioritise 
one over the other by according it causal primacy - the former always either 
determines the latter or is informed by it in a duality where idealistic and materialist 
traditions still serve as conceptual stand-ins to indicate the basic options available. 
A stringent causal link of some sort can normally be constructed either way under 
these terms. 
Whichever way their respective hierarchies are thought, the causality itself, as 
causality, remains stable, and this causal determinacy of effects is the third 
recurring feature. Whether one element informs the other or is disturbed by it, is 
only of secondary importance here. What does count is the fact that both add up to 
an effective unity premised upon an understanding of complementarity as desirable 
and supposedly necessary. Complementarity is, through this very operation, not 
only constructed but naturalised and stipulated as inevitable condition under which 
effects, too, have to be accounted for. 
To talk of a situation in terms of context or insert or indeed their duality is thus 
always to assume a coherence of conditions and their generalisable applicability. 
The aim of the present project is to undo this assumed coherence by elaborating a 
mode of operation that circumnavigates the underlying assumption of 
complimentarity. 
What is at stake in this enterprise is thus a form of engagement that can account for 
the complexity of current configurations both cultural and artistic. And that can, in 
taking off from these, propel them further. That the integration of art into culture and 
culture into broader societal concerns can now be taken for a condition rather than 
an aim means that some corresponding key concerns and strategies (highlighting 
and adjusting of conditions etc) need to be re-assessed too. Under the condition of 
a generalised entanglement between realms and operations, the very categories of 
insert and context, intervention and situation need to be opened up towards a more 
active configuration of interferences. Embeddedness needs to be activated as a 
condition from where to re-set an entire arrangement; as a starting point for a move 
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towards linkages and trajectories that are now multiple and ambient, complex and 
playful rather than linear and efficient.61 
Questions then emerge as to: How something relates to what is no longer its 
context but something more subtle and multiple. How gestures and situations might 
come together as modular components on the level ground of an encounter, rather 
than as two separate categories of an incident; components in whose coming 
together positions become exchangeable because they allow for multiple 
occupations, and where elements do more and less than simply supplement each 
other in causal closure. 
Without these known elements and positions or indeed the hierarchies implied 
between them, starting point for any engagement is exactly a not-knowing what 
happens and an attempt to chart exactly that in a move away from patterns and 
objects of exchange, towards a form of coming together that maintains questions of 
how things come together, what these things are and what happens in their coming 
together as overlaps and interferences. 
Rethinking relationalities outside the 
seemingly all pervasive parameters of 
fitting thus inevitably starts with two 
given sets: the assumption of a 
multitude of possibilities on one hand 
and a series of limiting registers under 
which they are addressed on the other. 
And because the latter (thinking gesture and surround as a polarity of active and 
passive, happening and enabling, dynamic and static) appears as such a 
tremendous reduction of the former (the numerous graduations and involvements 
that defy causal integration), what is at stake is primarily this very inadequacy as a 
possibility to register omissions that remain unthinkable under the existing 
conceptual framework. 
Some fundamental assumptions about relations and dependencies need to be 
undone in order to thus rethink relationality beyond the existing patterns of 
regulated exchange, and this requires new attitudes towards engagement. Because 
61 For an early moment in the shift towards complexity as paradigmatic see for example lIya 
Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers: Order out of Chaos. Man's New Dialogue with Nature. 
London: Heinemann, 1984; for subsequent assessments with particular emphasis on the 
humanities, see for example N Katherine Hayles (ed.): Chaos and Order: Complex 
Dynamics in Literature and Science, Chicago/ London: University of Chicago Press, 1991; 
Manuel de Landa: 1000 Years of Non-Linear History, New York: Zone Books/ London: MIT, 




it is not simply a matter of profiling another model, but rather simultaneously to 
profile different qualities of encounter, and to profile them differently. To mobilise a 
notion of the ambient in an attempt to not simply foreground a backdrop, but to go 
beyond the futile inversion of a formula that in itself remains stable. What is at stake 
effectively is a way to account for encounters based on multiple slippages, as 
fundamentally different quality of coming together, precisely because these 
encounters defy the categories of background and foreground, backdrop and figure. 
More or less workable models (of differing degrees of subtlety and applicability) to 
think the relation between insert and 
context obviously exist and the project 
takes off from these, notably from 
recent politico-philosophical 
considerations around evasion, 
exodus and criticality. But these also 
need to be applied in a different 
attitude because the notion of the 
model itself needs to be rethought 
under the terms of this project. Like 
notions of context and condition, that 
of the model too is premised on 
coherence and applicability. What is 
needed instead is a strategic 
superposition of existing reading 
strategies such as site-specificity, 
institutional critique or intervention 
onto works that consciously exceed 
the categories of such strategies, in 
such a way that works and their respective codified readings can be shown to be 
complicit (elaborated in mutual exchange and profiting) but can also contain or at 
least indicate the possibility of an unlocking of both. The introduction of new terms, 
registers, angles and approaches can shift their blurred and partial fusion in such a 
way as to unlock the work and re-assess its workings. And these workings can then 
in turn be projected back onto established (reading) strategies in order to go 
beyond, not stop before the project of a critical engagement. 
This methodological shift represents an attempt at adjusting (where possible) and 
re-configuring (where necessary) a set of critical models that at the time of their 




of involvement to be recognised or to occur. The aim in this re-assessment and re-
assemblage is thus not archaeology aimed at highlighting past shortcomings or 
redressing inadequate understandings and approaches. Rather it revisits the scene 
of these operations under different terms and by operating in the very different 
modality of an ambient interference, for which setting is a matter of tuning tonalities 
rather than of arranging a stage. 62 
It is therefore not necessary or even useful to denounce works, or even reading 
strategies, for their reductive implications and limiting repercussions (only in relation 
to the reading strategies will limitations have to be played out insofar as they can be 
useful, from this different perspective, to indicate new modes ex negativo. 
Otherwise, replacing the quest for new coherences with an inhabitation that 
appropriates rather than critiques, is a starting point for most current projects 
invested in forms of criticality63.) Instead this is an attempt to configure works and 
discursive patterns in such a way that they can go beyond a simple fitting and 
exceed criteria of appropriateness and function. The samples of works discussed in 
the present first part of the investigation are therefore not works that emerged in 
direct dialogue with such notions as site specificity, institutional critique and 
intervention and could become subject to a retrospective attempt to excavate or 
resuscitate them. Rather the project takes off from recent works that actively 
position themselves in a deferred and mainly implicit dialogue with these notions; 
they are works that allow for slippage in relation to these reading patterns and in 
doing so propose in this very dialogue a new type of fitting. No longer the more or 
less close fit of complementarity under which an insert is assessable in terms of the 
impact it has on a situation as context, imposing straight equations between work 
and critical reading strategy. To the contrary, the works under investigation here 
mobilise the encounter as multiple form of contact with surroundings on a variety of 
different registers. These surroundings then include theoretical apparatusses as 
much as cultural, physical, institutional and other constitutions of reality in varying 
combinations. 
62 "An ambience is defined as an atmosphere, or a surrounding influence: a tint" (Eno, 
op.cit.). For a closer examination of the shift between setting and set-up and its implications, 
see further down the discussion of Andreas Slominski's practice in Mode Three: Humour 
(Imploding effects). 
63 Rogoff argues that the project of criticality itself cannot be separated from (and is indeed 
premised on) "the processes of exiting bodies of knowledge and leaving behind theoretical 
models of analysis and doing without certain allegiances. 'Criticality' as I perceive it is 
precisely in the operations of recognising the limitations of one's thought for one does not 
learn something new until one unlearns something old, otherwise one is simply adding 
information rather than rethinking a structure." (Rogoff, 'What is a theorist', n.p.) 
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This enterprise will thus be taken up from two different but overlapping 
perspectives: The attempt is firstly to register different modalities of contact. 
Emergent forms, modes and patterns of contact that defy distinctions premised 
upon differentiated registers of activity, categories of occupation and modalities of 
perception. The juxtaposition of current practice with its existing reading patterns 
will outline a radical shift in attitude that concerns not so much the object of 
engagement but the attitude through which that engagement is determined. Rather 
than following and highlighting a shift in what the focus of activity is placed upon 
(from work to context for instance, or from object to process), the shift under 
investigation here regards very different sets of differences: It concerns the ways in 
which different forms of confusion and solicited incompatibilities set up connective 
webs that are no longer textures or networks64 because the type of constellation 
differs in quality rather than structure: instead of contents or patterns, it concerns 
modalities and styles of coming together. At one end of their spectrum will be 
Agamben's formula of potentiality as suspension, a "no more than [which] hovers so 
decidedly between affirmation and negation, acceptance and rejection, giving and 
taking,,65 and becomes virulent in their interstice. At the other end will be the type of 
conjunction Deleuze proposes in the form of an "and and and" as particular type of 
non-accumulative sequence allowing for multiple connectivities. 66 
What emerges out of these are less determined and more prolific forms of 
connectivity. And since it is these that can be mobilised to overspill existing models 
of opposition and complementarity, the second perspective then is to take up on this 
potential in order to re-set the terms for new modes of engagement with these forms 
of contact; in short, to register different forms of contact, but also to then register 
them differently. 
1.2 Over, beyond and under site-specificity and relational aesthetics 
For artistic practice, relating to a context implies referring to the given dimensions of 
surroundings, cultural or political, institutional or administrative, in all their possible 
permutations and interrelations; it also means to assume and then relate to their 
qualities, to their underlying bias and repressive implications, to the constraints they 
64 For the relevance of 'texture' and 'network' as paradigmatic structures, one derived from a 
late poststructuralist project, the other from early theorisations of dispersed/ non-hierarchical 
structures in emerging electronic media, see: for the former for instance Eva Meyer: 
Architexturen, Frankfurt am Main/ Basel: Stroemfeld, 1981; and for the latter the seminal 
Virtual Futures conference organised by Warwick University (Dixon/ Cassidy, op.cit.) 
65 Agamben: Potentialities, p.256 
66 Deleuze/ Parnet: Dialogues, here esp. pp.9f. and 34f. 
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impose, the framing they provide and the articulations they supposedly exclude or 
corrupt. That which cannot be said or done within a given context is one of the 
fundamental referents for critically engaged practice because it provides a 
(negative) framework with and against which to mobilise the work. (To address the 
corruption utterances undergo through their permissive integration into an existing 
context, is another attempt at rescuing (ex negativo) the potential for resistant 
otherness). Context67 in this sense-as object of a critical investigation or as 
support for a rearrangement of its component parts-is effectively one of the main 
parameters for the projection of such framing coherence. Reducing surrounding 
phenomena to functions of an inescapable mutuality, context provides a bracket 
against and within which economies of exchange and intervention, deviation and 
difference can be cohered and then negotiated. 
The practices under consideration here will be mobilised to overs pill and undermine 
such understanding of and engagement with context. Operating beyond the 
parameters of specificity, beyond categories of site and outside the stable 
economies of intervention, their potential lies in actively dissolving manageable 
relationalities with their surrounding conditions by exceeding given parameters of 
legibility. As modes of involvement that are blurred and distracted rather than 
precise and efficient, these practices can be mobilised to unhinge the very 
conditions for specificity and focus. And since the focus and precision of an 
intervention make for its potential as dissonant practice, suspending these basic 
critical parameters of specificity opens up the possibility to reconsider the entire 
project of critical engagement. 
More or less recently two main perspectives have emerged that maintain and 
update the critical project under increasing pressure on the notions of coherence (of 
context) and efficiency (of artistic practice). One is a scenario of coherence and 
affectability for which an ever-expandable notion of the site of artistic practice 
serves as cohering framework within which insert and context can be synthesised 
67 For the notion of context, see Peter Weibel (ed.): Kontext Kunst. Kunst der gOer Jahre. 
Cologne: DuMont, 1994 and more recently and more critically Holger Birkholz: Kontext. Ein 
Problem kunstwissenschaftlicher Methodenliteratur und kOnstlerischer Praxis. Cologne: 
VDG Verlag, 2002. The term has determined discussions around recent art practices - in 
Ger .. many the term 'context art' was coined to account for roughly the same set of practices 
Bourriaud discusses as 'relational'. Yet even Nicolas Bourriaud assumes and diagnoses a 
"will to reveal the invisible structures of the ideological apparatus" as driving impetus behind 
the work of artists "from Andrea Zittel to Philippe Parreno, from Carsten Holler to Vanessa 
Beecroft" and demands (subtle forms of) "contextual stUdies" for an engagement with these 
(see Bourriaud: Relational Aesthetics, p.64 and p.109f.) 
page 42 
as mutually dependent.68 The other is a structurally bound model of oppositionality 
premised on relational qualities and possibilities activated by contemporary 
practice. 69 
The former (site specificity) installs site as parameter of functional coherences in 
relation to which specificity can be played out: from physical space to the overall 
internal logic of an artistic production, recent formulations of site increasingly 
expand the field of investigation onto a broader range of what needs to be 
configured as a coherent, determinant context, around and within which practice 
and situation can then be re-cohered. But no matter how far its parameters are 
expanded, their function remains to indicate and account for a regulated exchange 
between work and (framing) context. 
The latter, Nicolas Bourriaud's project of a relational aesthetics, upholds an 
underlying model of efficiency and outcome of artistic operations and adjusts it in 
relation to recent practices by updating the opposition between context and 
intervention as a contrast of critique and dissociation.7o 
Both models, site specificity and relational aesthetics, can be seen to provide types 
of adjustments and corrections (practical or conceptual, simultaneous or 
retrospective) that take care to re-establish the overall coherence of relations 
68 For an overview over the discussion's main facets, see Erika Suderberg (ed.): Space, 
Site, Intervention. Situating Installation Art, Minneapolis/ London (University of Minnesota 
press) 2000. See also Alex Coles (ed.): Site - Specificity: the ethnographic turn, London 
(Black Dog) 2000. The engagement here will concentrate on Miwon Kwon: 'One Place After 
the Other. Notes on Site Specificity', in October 80, spring 1997, p.85-11 0 because it covers 
a vast area of practice, and most notably because it attempts to actively broaden site 
specificity as field of interest and type of approach. In order to follow the argument and 
highlight its structural implications, it is therefore particularly suited for an exemplary reading. 
(The text was subsequently and with slightly different focus re-worked and published as 
Miwon Kwon: One place after another: site-specific art and locational identity, Cambridge 
(MA)/London: MIT, 2002. Unless indicated otherwise, the present analysis follows the 
former version of the text.) 
69 Nicolas Bourriaud: Relational Aesthetics; and Postproduction: Culture as Screenplay: How 
Art Reprograms the World, New York: Lukas and Sternberg, 2002. 
70 For an assessment of Bourriaud's notions from a position of critique rather than criticality, 
see the related exchange of articles between Claire Bishop and Liam Gililick, esp. Bishop's 
opening article (Claire Bishop, 'Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics', in October, Fall 
2004, pp.51-79) and Liam Gillick's first response (Liam Gillick, 'Contingent Factors: A 
Response to Claire Bishop's "Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics''', in October, Winter 
2006, No. 115, Pages 95-106). Claire Bishop's critique of Bourriaud's position effectively 
folds the entire argument back into straight service provision and a horizon of imaginary 
productivity. Rather than going beyond Bourriaud's formulation of assertive mini-utopias, she 
argues for a straight position of recognisable critical impact. In a subsequent outlining of 
what she considers "the best collaborative practices of the past ten years" (including Phil 
Collins' they shoot horses (2004), Jeremy Deller's Battle of Orgreave (2001) and Lars van 
Trier's Dogvil/e (2003), she dismisses practices clustered under Relational Aesthetics as 
"well-intentioned homilies that today pass for critical discourse on social collaboration" 
(Claire Bishop, The Social Turn: Collaboration and its Discontents', in Artforum 
international, February 2006, pp. 178 - 183, p.183) 
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mobilised in recent and current practice: Seemingly digressive strategies in relation 
to sites become part of the henceforth expanded operations and self-understanding 
of that very site; nonchalant and oblique relational occupations are turned into 
structural highlighters by the sheer force of their contrast to supposedly given social 
and power structures. When assessed in terms of a potential for divergence and/or 
recuperation, site specificity presents the mirror image of Bourriaud's (social) 
relationality: both embed the critical operations of practice in a broader, expanded 
macrostructure by prescribing their patterns of connectivity. As recuperative 
operations in this sense, both models will serve as backgrounds onto which to 
project the ambient. While site specificity's central concern with coherence will be 
outlined against dispersed types of engagement in a closer reading of some 
exemplary work, relational aesthetics (as strategy for the locating of practices and 
their effects) can serve as an immediate entry towards the problematic of 
unaccountable differences. 
In relation to recent practice and indeed some of the practices that are the subject 
of this study, Nicolas Bourriaud's model of relational aesthetics has re-set the terms 
for an entire discussion. Levelling art and other practices in a blurring of spaces, 
realms and structures, the project gives up the supposed exclusivity of the art venue 
by embedding it not in society as networked machinery of power, but in an 
expanded range of (niche-)spaces of divergence, cultural and non-cultural. Going 
explicitly beyond institutional critique and its bounded ness which proceeded 
"through the filter of a critique of the institution [ ... ] in order to show the functioning 
of the whole of society", Bourriaud levels the exhibition venue as "a place like any 
other, a space imbricated within a global mechanism,,71 in such a way that it can be 
conceived beyond "the principles of an analytical materialism that was Marxist in its 
inspiration" and become "a model, a laboratory, a playing field" which is "never the 
symbol of anything, and certainly not a metonymy,,72. 
Instead of mobilising the workings of an other space in relation to society in the 
terms of a heterotopology as suggested by Foucaule3, Bourriaud shifts the effects of 
cultural production towards a structural (rather than topical) account of 
oppositionality, projecting inter-human experiences as "relational space-time 
elements" through which "utopia is being lived on a subjective, everyday basis, in 
71 Bourriaud: Postproduction, p.65 
72 Ibid., p.64-66 
73 For Foucault's other spaces see Michel Foucault: 'Of Other Spaces' (1967), in Diacritics 
16, Spring 1986, pp. 22-27. 
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the real time of concrete and intentionally fragmentary experiments".74 Beyond the 
gallery space as subject of metonymical inscriptions and corresponding revelatory 
projects, the project thus successfully reconsiders the role and function of the 
exhibition in the light of recent post-ideological practices that appropriate critical 
models elaborated from the 1960s onwards. Placing a strong emphasis on the 
different directedness of these practices, Bourriaud demonstrates how they can be 
seen to effectively defy critical parameters by generating affirmative types of effects 
instead of responding to analytical impulses. 
Yet by the same operation, Bourriaud levels the role of the visual arts venue in 
relation to the larger cultural (and social) field only to then reclaim its exclusive 
status as "base camp [within the vaster ensemble of public space] without which no 
expedition would be possible,,75. Formerly reserved to the arts in spatial terms or in 
those of a particular realm, exclusivity is now re-assigned as set of structural 
characteristics, (again) turning the exhibition into an "interstice defined in relation to 
the alienation reigning everywhere else"76. Ironically it is this position that only 
serves re-integration: when mobilised against the dominant structures of late 
capitalist organisation and exchange, relational practices are simply re-instated as 
oppositional propositions in such a way that the underlying duality itself remains 
unaffected. That the art venue is now no longer the exclusive arena (if indeed it ever 
was) of this juxtaposition changes little with regard to the structure of its operations 
so long as the oppositional scenario itself constitutes the exclusive scale along 
which operations are accounted for: Even though "the imaginary of our day and age 
is concerned with negotiations, bonds and co-existences" and has supposedly left 
behind modernism's "imaginary of contrast [ ... ] which proceeded by way of 
separations and contrasts"-Bourriaud binds these "new assemblages, possible 
relations between distinct units, and alliances struck up between different partners" 
back exclusively onto social relations. "Relations between people and the world, by 
way of aesthetic objects" then become "various forms of modus vivendi permitting 
fairer social relations".77 
Premised on the assumption of a dissonant potential of these art practices, the 
notion of the relational establishes an indexical scale on which the structural 
properties of relations can be contrasted, anchored in the spatial and temporal 
dimensions of social conditioning and their inherent potential for change. But once 
74 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.44f. 
75 Bourriaud, Postproduction, p.65 
76 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, p.82 
77 Ibid., p.42-46 
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the potential of divergent "habitual and perceptual patterns,,78 is thus qualified in 
terms of "alternative forms of sociability, critical models and moments of constructed 
conviviality,,79 and outlined against "the alienation reigning everywhere else,,8o, they 
are inevitably re-inscribed into a simple pattern of contrasting (and therefore 
recuperable) qualities. 
The operational logic between "relational space-time elements, inter-human 
experiences" and the "straightjacket of the ideology of mass communications,,81 as 
underlying concern for recent practices, remains oppositional. It re-inscribes the 
recent practices in question not only in a societal context (one might argue that this 
is just one limited application of what is potentially a much vaster theoretical 
proposal), but also (by the same operation) integrates them into an oppositional 
structure that makes them (again) accountable for, simply turning the collisions 
between relational set-ups and dominant ideology into another stable exchange 
between pre-determined sets. Art again fulfils the function of a contrasting 
exception, only that this exception is no longer configured in terms of a cultural 
confinement that would set apart art (world) and larger societal concerns, but as a 
structural possibility. 
Even though Bourriaud sets up this exchange in order to update the way 
component parts of the cultural configuration can be seen to refer to each, he is 
obviously not concerned with rethinking the nature of their coincidence. The project 
upholds their respective positions as well as the assumption of a consistent, 
culturally relevant and artistically efficient way of negotiating their relations. Its 
lowest common denominator remains a coherent economy of means as measuring 
scale against which impact can be assessed. Whilst the spaces of current art 
themselves supposedly escape the dominant logic of capitalist organisation in the 
form of an interstice-not as contrast, but as a realm below the threshold of 
systemic recognition and subjection to the overall set of coherent rules82-, their 
social function as contrasting models re-inscribes them into the accountability of a 
coherent societal framework to which the artwork stands in (demonstrative) 
structural contrast. 
Not only does this leave the duality of situation and insertion intact as main 
structuring principle (explicitly inspired by Althusser's structural Marxism, 
78 Ibid., p.69 
79 Ibid., p.44 
80 Ibid., p.82 
81 Ibid, p.44 
82 Ibid., p.16 
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Bourriaud's own materialisme aleatoire has implicitly inherited the underlying 
dialectical structure. Rather than engaging with effects, Bourriaud accounts for 
them, and does so by remaining true to the dialectical spirit). This same duality also 
structures the encounter between work and audience as its "direct interlocutors,,83: 
The work as model appeals to and relies on the faculties of an audience to mobilise 
the work's dissonant potential, and thus establishes an exclusive, appropriate 
register for the engagement between work and audience. Different types of effect or 
the variable intensities with which they impact, do not register here. Even where 
audiences become participants and are set free from constraints of societal 
conditioning-in situations where, like the interstice "which fits more or less 
harmoniously and openly in to the overall system [ ... ] but suggests other [ ... ] 
possibilities", the "contemporary art exhibition "creates free areas, and time 
spans,,84-even then the (critical) relevance of any project is negotiated in 
conventional terms of oppositionality: Where the openness to dialogue and 
discussion is reclaimed as a "(relative) social transparency" of the "coefficient of 
art", the appeal to an audience as recognising guarantor of the work's operations 
cannot be challenged. The social dimension as much as the transparency of its 
operations impose a clearly defined register of recognitions and interactions as 
response to the artwork. The negotiation of its effects is "undertaken in a spirit of 
transparency which hallmarks it as a product of human labour",85 and 
simultaneously provides material for thought. 
Both are imagined as transparent and potentially open and re-cohere art in terms of 
its effects as model or programme. Even though the model is understood as 
functioning diagram rather than a maqueUe86, this malleable adaptability does 
nothing to undercut its overall coherence, to the contrary, it guarantees its 
applicability against the pitfalls of representation. 
And similarly his notion of the programme reductively prescribes a particular form of 
interaction as well as its activating subject: the term itself is used in rhetorical 
ambiguity between recent digital media applications and the extended sense it 
originally carries in Deleuze as a "means of providing reference points for an 
83 Ibid., p.43 
84 Ibid., p.16 
85 Ibid., p.41 
86 The non-dimensionality of the functional model is at the core of Bourriaud's (vague) notion 
of an 'Operational Realism' in which "the work proposes a functional model and not a 
maquette. [ ... ] the concept of dimension does not come into it, just as in the digital image, 
whose proportions may vary depending on the size of the screen, which, unlike the frame, 
does not enclose works within a predetermined format, but rather renders virtuality material 
in x dimensions." (Ibid., p.112) 
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experiment which exceeds our capacities to foresee,,87; but the implications of the 
former inevitably re-instate the notion of an application as something to be 
executed, to be carried out. Even though "these programmes [are made up] without 
guaranteeing the[ir] applicable character,,88, they are production possibilities that 
imply a producer as the very basis of their operationality. 
Whether as model or programme, the work figures as challenging instigation for 
which legibility is a necessary condition of their working. Bourriaud's potential of 
efficiency relies on the legibility of a proposition and needs to be negotiated as 
contrast by an acutely aware observer, capable of judging "these artistic proposals 
[ ... ] in a formal way; in relation to art history, and bearing in mind the political value 
of forms".89 Critical potential, in this set-up, remains premised on the actively 
focussed, critical faculties and awareness of an audience. 
It does not matter here how much critical credit to accord to the relational project, or 
how sophisticated it does or does not seem to be. The aim is certainly not to make 
Bourriaud's compilation of essays the subject of a meticulous conceptual analysis 
(which is obviously neither an appropriate nor a particular productive register of 
engagement). Aim is rather to use Bourriaud's construction as a foil with in-built 
limitations against which to outline a different style of encounters in (relation to) 
recent practice. 
What matters for the purpose of the present argument is the fact that the focality 
and directed ness of encounters is not a central concern for Bourriaud's thinking, if 
indeed it is of any concern at all. And this kind of gap is interesting precisely 
because it allows for thought to take place in it, surrounded by and taking off from 
other bits and pieces of the project. And even though this gap might be in itself a 
question of style, a tactical move not to foreclose work-to operate beyond this 
linear form of appeal and address, not to undercut exactly this problem, is a central 
concern of the present study, and its own main difference in style. 
What is needed and becoming possible in the present investigation and the 
practices that form its objects, is a different perspective: a possibility to rethink 
beyond oppositional structures through a consideration of what becomes possible 
and thinkable by avoiding the proposition of an alternative. It becomes possible then 
(and only then) to start thinking in terms of an expanded oscillation between insert 
and situation as ambient-mutually embracing, unfocussed, and virulent through its 
very dispersal. Then (and only then) can the different constituent elements be 
87 Deleuzel Parnet: op.cit., p.48 
88 Bourriaud, op.cit, p.71 
89 Ibid., p.82 
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overlapping and or parallel and or adjoining in a multiplicity of deregulated 
encounters that defy the stable economies of reciprocal conditioning. What is at 
stake is an unfitting as never-quite-fitting-either-brief, a way to think practices as 
thoroughly embedded (in situations and reading patterns) but in such a way that this 
embeddedness can now be fundamentally multiple as well as always again partial, 
a new kind of involvement that is simultaneously premised on and generative of 
encounters. 
1.3 Generating clusters 
To approach this mode and condition is necessarily a matter of double operations: 
following works as solicitations of given registers and soliciting them as potential for 
discursive operations. If the key interest in the investigated shift lies in the differing 
degree to which registers of activity and forms of embeddedness are maintained or 
undone, highlighted, blurred or actively collided, then the intereseo of its 
investigation necessarily lies on the slippages opened and how they are operated. 
Not as a new realm to delineate, but a different kind of operation to account for. 
These operations have to do with spaces and sites, questions of how to occupy 
them and related questions as to what an insert might be, consist of and effect, but 
in a differently structured consistency than the one that is implicitly assumed in the 
related critically codified projects. In parallel to and in overlapping exchange with 
these shifts, the project aims to elaborate new forms of engagement as triggered off 
and informed by these practices. Ambient modes are thus the modes of practice as 
much as they are a new discursive proposition in relation to them; an attempt at 
engaging with new forms of coming together that as such enables their recognition. 
A new type of reading that takes off from these practices and takes them along on 
its own accelerated trajectory. 
And so this first, (non-)foundational chapter proceeds in two steps. Three clusters of 
works will be isolated as samples and read in terms of their potential of site 
specificity, institutional critique and critical intervention. Overlaps and lack of clarity 
in the choice of samples and their attribution to the three categories are intentional 
and inevitable: The categories are chosen because they are exemplary for reading 
strategies and patterns of engagement, not because of their supposed coherence, 
necessity or relevance; and because of the loose fit through which the samples 
operate in relation to these categories, the choice of the samples too is to some 
extent necessarily and explicitly random. Rather than a lack or shortcoming, this is 
90 Because of the nature of that which is being investigated, this interest has to be clearly 
differentiated from an investigative focus in terms of its modality of attention. 
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the very basis of their validity for the project. The exemplary approach as such as 
well as the practices under consideration here consciously project randomness and 
bias onto the engagements in question. That a work in the museum should be 
discussed in relation to site specificity (and not institutional critique), that the gallery 
should be assessed as a site for institutional critique (and not site specificity) and 
that the most direct intervention discussed should be an interference that remains 
as such imperceptible, only continues the logic of a loose fit set up by the works 
themselves. 
"In the course of becoming possible,,91 here is an intersection installing works as 
examples that serve as coagulation pOints and operational diagrams without 
however becoming paradigmatic or representational. For this to become a 
possibility, the example has to be mobilised for what it conceptually always already 
is: neither particular nor universal but suspended between the two and active in 
their interplay. "Where it exerts its force", writes Agamben, "the example is 
characterised by the fact that it holds for all cases of the same type, and, at the 
same time, it is included in these. [ ... ] On one hand, every example is treated in 
effect as a real particular case; but on the other, it remains understood that it cannot 
serve in its particularity." Rather than ever really standing in for the larger category, 
the example stands in relation to it; it is representative, but also part of the set and 
"plays alongside [ ... ] like the German Bei-Spiel.,,92 It is both incomplete and 
excessive, and through this double constitution necessarily imports its own 
contingencies into the make-up of the grouping it supposedly stands for. This is not 
representation, but an exchange with the group that constantly challenges not only 
its own role as example, but also the overall coherence of the set in question.93 It is 
in this sense of an intrinsic and mutual incompletability that the example is always 
and inevitably inadequate as representation or illustration and constantly defies the 
possibility of a close (let alone total) fit. The example itself therefore is, one could 
argue, the problem, not one that requires closure but one that sets the working 
conditions and horizons for a new mode of (always also incoherent) engagement. 
Both the theoretical category of the example and the material used as example can 
be mobilised in this sense, and will be: firstly now to indicate the horizon of a new 
91 Deleuzel Parnet: Dialogues, p.147 
92 Agamben: Coming Community, p.9f. 
93 Ibid., p. 9-11. See also Brian Massumi's "'exemplary" method' through which he insists on 
the singularity of the example and its propensity for proliferation (Massumi: Parables, p.17f.). 
By contrast, the present approach is more concerned with the two-sidedness of 
underperforming and overspilling, the destabilising impact of the example on the group as 
such, and how this configuration can be mobilised as working mode. 
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working modality, further down and to some extent throughout the text then in order 
to enact the ambient attitudes at stake in this project. 
The example's inappropriateness comprises two aspects: not only lack and 
inferiority when measured against the group and its coherence and completeness, 
but also an excess of contingent aspects when measured against the features 
necessary for an identifiable fit between set and sample. Rather than pointing 
towards a lack (of the close fit, the perfect match etc), the example can thus also be 
seen as an active insert into the very make-up of the group. Exceeding the 
individual case and undercutting the generic type, it indicates a tendentially different 
kind of engagement: it can neither cover what it supposedly stands for, nor can all 
of it ever be subsumed under the generic characteristics of the class, establishing 
instead an exchange between necessity and contingency that undoes their 
separation as the "two crosses of Western thought" and engages both in an 
oscillation that cannot be resolved in either category.94 What counts is the oscillation 
itself as dynamic mode and site of encounters. 
In and through these examples, it will be demonstrated to which extent and how the 
works in question can (consciously) undercut and overspill the trajectories and 
territories indicated by the inherited reading patterns associated with site specificity, 
institutional critique and intervention; at stake are fundamental (albeit subtle) shifts 
from the modalities of exchange towards a mode of the encounter as differently 
structured forms of coming together; a shift from an impetus of revelation towards 
an operation of projection that re-defines the object of engagement; and a shift from 
a perspective of use towards an unhinged notion of effect that reframes an 
understanding of embedded ness in a broader cultural scenario. Underlying all three 
is an investigation into fundamental assumptions about the focus and directed ness 
of cultural operations as well as corresponding patterns of attention and perception. 
The first case is an ensemble that installs a semi-functional environment of 
sculpture/furniture hybrids and Japanese animation in the sculpture court of a public 
gallery of British Art95. It is site-specific but only in such a way that the very notion of 
the site is drowned in the hyper-referentiality of the works on display. 
The second is a group of works that invest a commercial gallery with a fictionally 
derived scenari096. Its props and accessories charge the space as (deferred) venue 
and engage with issues of the gallery as charged institution and framework for the 
consumption of artwork. But their narrative propositions and multiple framings 
94 Agamben, Coming Community, p.40 
95 Liam Gillick: Annlee You Proposes, Tate Britain, 7 Sept 2001 - 31 March 2002. 
96 Liam Gillick: Up On The Twenty Second Floor, Galerie Air de Paris, Paris, April 1998 
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between fiction and documentary, their explicitness on one hand and continued 
withdrawal of experience and information on the other simultaneously un-ground the 
work. It is this multiple situating of the works that goes beyond any institutional 
sitedness and destabilises its underlying co-ordinates of audience, experience and 
staged re-enactment. 
As a third example then, the project outlines an interference in the public space in 
which the work interacts directly with its given social surroundings, and in particular 
time as one of its main structuring principles.97 Reprogramming time on a clock in 
the public arena, the work produces a structurally radical difference. By founding 
this adjustment on the coincidental juxtaposition of two fictional occurrences though, 
the work extends beyond a confrontational account of interference towards a mode 
of contingency that encompasses its origins as well as its directedness and 
potential effects. 
All of these samples defy (albeit in different ways) the logic of the close fit to their 
being situated and to the registers under which this situated ness is customarily 
addressed. As works, operations and interferences the examples assert an explicit 
lack of distinction between the registers of production and consumption, affirmation 
and analysis, reflection and intervention, and push these to a point where the very 
ideas of coherence and closure succumb under a critical mass of overlaps and 
deferrals. Following the movements and shifts of the work is thus not so much an 
analysis as it is an attempt to redirect attention and reconfigure it away from existing 
paradigms of critical engagement. This shift encompasses the production and 
placing of work as much as its perception. 98 
1.3.1 Dispersal and sprawl 
Where modular arrangements of sculpturally defined objects appear on the grounds 
of a museum and, more specifically, in front of the post-modern architecture of one 
of its extensions housing a revered painter who is also a cornerstone for a certain 
type of pre-modernism, site specificity is one of their default conditions. Because 
they have a physical location for which they were conceived; because they enter the 
institutional realm of the museum and operate within and against its parameters; 
because they engage in a dialogue with preceding samples that form the cultural 
97 Liam Gillick: Erasmus Ass Zehn Jahre Opium #2, documenta X, Kassel, 1997 
98 Site-specificity, like interactivity, is a condition of the constitution of work, but also 
(overlappingly so) of its perception. For the role of interactivity as constitutive dimension of 
work and the important distinction from a purely empirical account of interactivity, see 
Juliane Rebentisch, 'Mythos "Betrachtereinbeziehung''', in Texte zur Kunst, Nr.40, 
December 2000, p. 126-130. 
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domain's reservoir of references; because in this dialogue they are embedded in a 
whole series of ideological constructions underlying the domain's operations and 
legitimations; and because, by entering all these conversations willingly and 
explicitly, the pieces re-negotiate the expanded institutional remit within which this 
institution commissions such a thing as a semi-permanent grouping of works for a 
hybrid outdoor situation in the first place. 
To engage with the works in relation to their architectural, historical and institutional 
located ness indeed assumes site-specificity as default approach towards situated 
art practices, and to some extent that has to do with the work's entanglement and 
the way it entertains these connections and makes them apparent. Yet ultimately 
the apparent ease of the work's inscription into the field of site specific practices 
says less about the ensemble's directedness and critical impact than it does about 
the wide range of registers potentially covered by the notion of site. 
A near-historical trajectory of its permutations (in both artistic and discursive 
practice) unfolds into a spectrum of phenomena and conditions gathered and 
bracketed under the term:99 originally site-specificity takes place as a direct 
engagement with the physical conditions of the exhibition situation. Most notably in 
nascent forms of site-specific practices and emerging from discussions around the 
sitedness of art work as a legacy of minimalist practices, practices link up to their 
sites in an attempt to challenge the supposed autonomy and mobility of the artwork 
as conditioned by the modernist conception of self-referentiality and by the 
commodifying forces of the art market. Outside of the conventional art venue this 
expansion occurs in a predominantly assimilative embrace of the non-art situation 
as possibility for coherent experience 100; inside of its confines site specificity 
produces a revelatory gesture aimed at highlighting the implicit architectural and 
behavioural conditioning of art experience. Whilst the former is phenomenologically 
bound and centred around a notion of the subject of experience, the latter opens 
onto the cultural/institutional conditions of the situation of presentation, and is 
primarily premised on an impetus of disruption 101. In both perspectives, specificity 
describes an appropriate and ideally somewhat efficient interaction with a given 
situation, whether assimilative or disruptive. Site specific practices are thought to be 
99 As indicated above, this account largely follows Kwon's 'One Place after the Other'. 
100 Earth and Land Art can be seen as the most emblematic cases of this interest in re-
cohering experience and viewing conditions. 
101 The structurally useful distinction between assimilative and interruptive models of site 
specificity was first suggested by Rosalyn Deutsche. See Kwon, 'One Place after the 
Other', p.85, note 3. 
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specifically conceived for the spaces of their consumption and, above all, are 
thought to address these, be it in a revelatory or in an integrational mode. 
In another respect and increasingly dominantly then, site-specificity functions as an 
engagement with the cultural-ideological constitution of art as (institutionalised) 
realm of experience and mediation itself. In this approach, the site engaged with is 
constituted less in the physical spatiality of the exhibition space - even where this is 
regarded as a mere index of implicit ideological constraints - than the discursive 
formations founding and surrounding its operations as cultural sphere. Site in this 
sense is the result (not the prerequisite) of cultural operations, and it is thus the very 
texture of the cultural realm as arena for engagement and critique which becomes 
the object of site specific interventions. 
There is an almost convincing, seeming plausibility in any attempt to construct these 
two understandings of site as strictly successive, but neither the cultural conditions 
of showing nor the engagements with them necessarily follow linear patterns. To the 
contrary, both have to be understood as simultaneous possibilities that are distinct 
in their characteristics and applications but also overlap and become intertwined in 
the generation of profoundly hybrid forms. Any distinction between physicality and 
discursivity in this field merely indicates possible reference points for a range of 
activities and situations. 
It is against this background of critical framing that the furniture ensemble in 
question here not only passively encompasses but actively embraces most of these 
perspectives and corresponding questions as basic conditions of its installation. As 
objects of and for the museum installed outside of its building and inside its 
grounds, they engage the sculpture court as hybrid and solicit the corresponding 
questions of the grounded ness of art in the housing of the institution. In this literal, 
physical sense they occupy a situation between inside and outside that raises 
questions about their belonging to either realm: the inside as sanctioned shelter for 
art objects and corresponding patterns of appreciation where aesthetic value is 
customarily given priority over any potential use value. Or the outside as (semi-
)public realm where the interaction between public and work is regulated differently 
and enters exchange forms closer to the modes of use and appropriation 
determined by leisure and corresponding forms of conditioned sociability. 
An art historical reading of the work is clearly if misleadingly solicited by the way in 
which the work invokes and explicitly inscribes itself into the formal, institutional and 
art historical dimensions of the museum site. The reading, under these terms, goes 
something like this: As artefacts caught in this inside/outside, art/leisure etc 
ambiguity, the ensemble replicates and accentuates the duality of its institutional 
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sitedness through a double art-historical referentiality. Against the backdrop of the 
Gallery's architecture and its dominant colour scheme of green trims, the 
assembled modular elements appear as playful variations on colour that take up the 
architectural colour scheme only to expand its range and translate it into a 
multicoloured and explicitly contingent decorative arrangement. The sculptures' 
blue, red, yellow, beige, pale green and black panels bounce off Stirling's green, 
and the materiality of the objects only enhances this proximity: the powder-coating 
process employed for the colour of the modular elements is the same as the one 
used for the production of the Gallery's fittings. The linkage is ambiguous but 
stringent, and the sculptural ensemble is opposed to its architectural backdrop only 
in so far as it is originally also derived from it. 102 
In relation to their art historical precedents on the other hand, the work's sculptural 
components are firmly situated in a lineage of Minimalist practice. Formal 
similarities are striking (most explicitly in the open dialogue with Donald Judd), but 
the way they are self-consciously staged affects a number of dis- and re-
placements. Whilst the referenced (Late) Modernist sculpture postulated specificity 
and interest as essential and polemically exclusive qualities for the appreciation of 
artwork 103, key formal characteristics of these works such as modularity, contingent 
colour arrangements and intentional yet defiant proximity to the functional 
implications of design, are here translated back into the reference system of 
functional ensembles as potential chairs, tables and shelving units. Simultaneously 
reflected back onto the integrational aspirations of (Early) Modernist design and on 
the appropriations of its stylistic achievements, but not ideological constructions in 
contemporary design formats, Minimalism's insistence on the experience of the 
artwork as its core dimension is thus tentatively and/or ironically re-introduced into a 
broader context of social practices. Bringing the mutually exclusive horizons of 
Modernist design and autonomous sculpture into play and denying to resolve either, 
the work thus oscillates between the utopian aspirations of both 
integrational/social ones on one side and autonomously re-configured formalist 
ones on the other. 
102 Built 1980-84 by James Stirling architect as extension to the existing building to house 
the Tate's Turner Collection, the building is in itself an interesting housing for Turner's 
doubtful modernism. Even the tensions at play in the building thus prefigure the awkward 
positionality of the sculptural insert -the supposed flippancy and irreverance of the 
extension's postmodernism, itself articulated mainly through the colour applications, as well 
as the entrance's ambiguity between functional access to the educational facilities and 
entrance to the Turner collection (actually housed upstairs), can be seen as conceptual 
backdrops for the sculptures in the newly designated sculpture court. 




More than simply caught between the conditions of architecture, sculpture and 
(street) furniture, the ensemble is also fundamentally constituted in the interplay 
between reference systems of high art production on one hand and popular 
commodity circulation on the other. Soliciting both, the work stages its own status 
as hybrid and reflects this instability back onto the assumed qualities of either 
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system. The structural modularity of the assembled elements serves as almost 
allegorical token for this double promise of adaptability and self-identity. 
fig.6 
In all of these senses, the work fulfils the remits of site specificity thus not only 
because site specificity offers a default reading of located art practices, but because 
the ensemble itself actively stages these different reading possibilities through its 
explicit hyper-referentiality towards physical location, architectural setting, 
institutional grounding and art historical framing. When the work becomes a 
proposition for school classes as an improvised assembly and teaching 
environment on field trips to the museum, even recent convergences between site-
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specific concerns and community-based forms of activism 104 can be seen to be 
recuperated in the work's (pseudo-)functionality for the educational and outreach 
purposes of the museum. As series of potential but impossible open-air 
bookshelves, parts of the ensemble explicitly invoke and refute this form of 
appropriation. 
1.3.1.a Animating elsewhere 
Yet it is from another, more explicitly self-reflexive level of internal cohesion that the 
arrangement becomes problematic in a much more productive way. In addition to 
the sculptural arrangement, the installation comprises a video animating a Manga 
character purchased from a Japanese agency specialising in readymade characters 
for animation and cartoons. As part of the overall make-up of the commission, the 
video too can be read in terms of an explicitly multiple sitedness: As a comment on 
and engagement with the physical and symbolical setting of the museum, the out-
facing monitor is displayed behind the otherwise black window panels on a rounded 
corner of the building and thus set just inside the (mirroring) screen separating 
inside and outside and symbolically differentiating between museum and world 105 . In 
a distancing move against the institutional background of Tate Britain as then newly 
re-defined situation for showcasing 'British' art106 , the video is an animation 
executed by a Scandinavian animator and exposed as such in the work's 
disproportionately extensive credits 107; and it is (even more fundamentally) based 
on a Japanese Manga character bought and copyrighted by two French artists who 
mobilise it as a vehicle for an international collaborative investigation into the 
current condition of cultural and intellectual copyrighting 108 which finishes in/ 
104 See Kwon, 'One Place after the Other', p.91, note 13 
105 In the exhibition's documentation in the accompanying publication (Liam Gillick: Annlee 
You Proposes, Tate Britain, Sept. 2001-March 2002), the video features in the form of stills 
only. The form of its installation is neither documented nor mentioned, turning the sited video 
itself into a "half-remembered" appearance. 
106 With the inauguration of Tate Modern in 2000, the former Tate Gallery was re-defined as 
Tate Britain and designated as "the national gallery for British art from 1500 to the present 
day" (http://www.tate.org.uklbritain, last accessed 14/10/08). Full credit for the animation 
runs 
107 "Story/Concept: Liam Gillick. Director/Animator: Lars Magnus Holmgren, aka Dr 
Frankenskippy. Producer: Dominic Buttimore. Voice of Annlee: Saskia Reeves. Sound 
Design: Oliver Davis. Production Manager: Gil James. Compositors: Marcus Moffat and 
Laurence James". Gillick insists wherever possible on the use of the entire caption. 
108 For a complete documentation of the whole project and discussion see Emily Mast, 
Pierre Huyghe and Philippe Parreno (eds.): No Ghost Just A Shell, Cologne/ Eindhoven: 
Verlag der Buchhandlung Walther Konig/ Oktagon, 2003, as well as Philip Nobel, 'Annlee, 
Sign of the Times', in Artforum international, January 2003, pp.104-109. For a more explicitly 
foregrounded deliberation on intellectual property, where "Apart from the clashes between 
the films' protagonists, the content is all in the fine print", see Gillick's collaborative 
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disappears into an Ikea fashioned Snow-White coffin in a Zurich museum and a 
smile-without-a-cat firework on a Miami beach 109. Furthermore and in response to 
the sculpture court as physically bound site for the work, the video's protagonist 
proposes a narrative derived from a working residency at a centre for international 
contemporary art in the Japanese town of Kitakyushu. 
Like the sculptures that are always tendentially more (complicated) than their brief, 
the video too, in terms of its site specific qualities, engages with the institutional 
framework's perceived limitations by integrating that which might still find itself 
excluded for all kinds of institutional reasonings: the mode of collaboration (which 
potentially undermines the exclusive position of the individual artist invited for the 
commission); the international composition of people involved in producing the work 
(serving as a counterweight to the nationally prescriptive definition of a museum as 
Tate Britain'); and the introduction of a digital animation as guiding narrative into 
the physical ensemble of the sculpture court itself (colliding media still perceived as 
belonging to separate realms of commissioning and reception). 
In relation to these dimensions of context, the video engages a marginality that 
seems set up primarily to test the permissive claims of the contemporary art 
institution as site for critical investigation. Neither disruptive nor assimilative in 
nature, the work operates in displacements that deterritorialise it only ever slightly 
from the site of its physical and institutional installation. These shifts can be 
conceived as a series of challenges to the institutional framework, yet they are 
explicitly recuperable. Successfully integrated into the finished work, they manage 
Briannnnnn and Ferryyyyyy project with Philippe Parreno (Liam Gillick and Philippe Parreno: 
Briannnnnn and Ferryyyyyy, Kunsthalle ZOrich , 20.01.06-26.03.06), discussed in Jennifer 
Allen, '1 000 Words: Liam Gillick and Phi lippe Parreno', in Artforum International, 43, 6, 
February 2005, p. 144-145, p.144. 
109 Pierre Huyghe, Philippe Parreno: A Smile Without a Cat (Celebration of Annlee's 
Vanishing), firework display, Miami Beach 2002 (fig.7). For documentation see Pierre 
Huyghe, Philippe Parreno, 'Centerfold: A Smile Without a Cat (Celebration of Annlee's 
Vanishing), in Arfforum international, January 2003, pp.110-111. And Joe Scanlan: Do It 
Yourself (Annlee), 2002 (fig.8) 
fig. fig.8 
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to retrospectively inscribe themselves into the brief too and re-negotiate its 
underlying assumptions. 
fig.9 
The function of these inclusions is thus double: on one hand, they were conceived 
as a highlighting move to test the perceived limitations of the commission's given 
framework; on the other, their ultimate function in relation to the institutional 
framework is one of expansion, in which a potential of digressive site specificity is 
ultimately recuperated by overall integration into the institutional framework. This 
occurs explicitly when concerns around copyrighting are acknowledged as one of 
the project's core issues in the accompanying publication (even if in the process 
collaboration and copyright are then premised as key concerns of the artist's 
project, rather than responses to the specificities of the commission, defusing its 
specific implications and all reference to the national implications of the 
commission's framework are avoided, shifting the discussion instead to architectural 
page 60 
and art historical reference systems)110. And it occurs equally tacitly when the 
international collaboration as challenge to the terms of the commission is 
simultaneously acknowledged and defused by explicit reference to the "French 
artists" as "friends" on the accompanying website entry.111 
Both, implicit and explicit recuperations are indicative of how the work necessarily 
arrives at retroactively broadening the commission's terms rather than putting them 
in question. Ultimately, the work fulfils a fundamentally assimilative function in 
relation to an institutional situation that is flexible and malleable mainly because it is 
still in the making. 'Tate Britain' "encompasses a description of location and 
suggests precise content", but could, "at this early stage of its existence [equally] 
just be a simple naming solution whose function therefor remains contingent upon 
the actions of people who will work in and around it.,,112 The possibility of integration 
as "soft critique" is at least one part of the work's self-conscious and self-reflexive 
siting. 
But then the video's narrative and visual structure undercuts any such relation to the 
institutional brief with an unsitedness that ends up unfittting the entire arrangement. 
Inside the video, the character's monologue appears as a disjointed account of 
projective thinking and vague memorisation that is in itself unsited, and this 
unsitedness prolongs itself in the constitution of visual space in the animation: the 
protagonist is surrounded by and submerged in a digital animation of sprawling 
special effects that defies any attempt at constituting or even projecting a location 
from where the monologue might be uttered. 
When the protagonist, Annlee, was first purchased as a digital file from one of the 
two Japanese agencies specialising in this type of commodity, she was an 
inexpensive, digital off-the-shelf character, designed as a minor module of low 
complexity and without particular background for use in Manga cartoons or 
commercial advertising. "She could exist in any kind of story, but with no chance of 
surviving any of them. As a digital 'extra', her predetermined destiny was to fade 
away quickly or simply perish after a few minutes of film or a couple of comic book 
pages,,113, a secondary background extra with low life expectancy to be inserted into 
a larger narrative thread. This condition of low definition and maximised malleability 
lies at the conceptual core of the whole series of Annlee works commissioned by 
110 See Katharine Stout: 'Annlee You Proposes', in Liam Gillick: Annlee You Proposes, pp.3-
7, p.4. 
111 See http://www.tate.org.uk/britain/exhibitions/giliick.htm (last accessed 14/1010S) 
112 Liam Gillick, 'Kitakyushu in the Spring', in Annlee You Proposes, pp.S-12, p.11 
113 Press release, Institute of Visual Culture, Cambridge, 2002, online under 
http://www.instituteofvisualculture.org/2002_no _ghost.php (last accessed 14/06/04) 
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Philippe Parreno and Pierre Huyghe under the title No Ghost Just a Shell, and it 
constitutes the focus of a large number of them. Following from this original brief, 
most of her applications are redemptive gestures through which Annlee is made to 
occupy the spaces of stories, situations and biographies she was denied under the 
original terms of her construction. 114 
In Annlee You Proposes the conceptual near-transparency of a largely unspecific 
character is taken as the basic condition for its use, not as the focus for a potentially 
critical re-configuration of its properties beyond their original, limited horizon. Her 
original pure functionality is translated into the function of a modular element in the 
animation of the overall situation. Profoundly embedded in the video's visual 
universe of cosmic animation, any physical or institutional specificity is drowned out 
of her appearance so that the video can figure as mere relay, as yet another level of 
animation in the overall multiple propositions exchanged between the work and its 
situation. 
When she talks about another place (Japan) and describes it as another island, 
then this referral on a screen in London links the character to the place of its 
showing, but also links it back to her place of production and the cultural con-
/subtext of Manga cartoons and advanced digital animation it originally emerged 
from. Yet even this place never becomes hers because the animation defies the 
category of Manga whilst the island she talks about is the Japan of a residency and 
a commission, not the exoticised universe of fully digitised, late capitalist pop culture 
commonly associated with the realms of digital animations and its currency within 
Visual Arts practice from Takashi Murakami through to Mariko MorL 
Through this series of internal displacements in relation to any recognisable cultural 
realm that could be hers and in relation to the internal logic of her artistic 
appropriations as commissioned by Huyghe and Parreno, Annlee is posited here as 
a sheer interface towards other sites. From the spatial and temporal co-ordinates of 
the video's location she refers towards the remoteness of an earlier residency; from 
a given location, she shifts the situation towards a narrated one in a move that also 
reframes the sculptural ensemble as approximative re-creation of "a half-
remembered Japanese place"; from the semi-public situation of a newly inaugurated 
sculpture garden, she thus also refers to the semi-private space of a communal 
area within the Contemporary Art Centre in Kitakyushu "where a temporary solution 
114 See for the circumstances of the purchase and its original implications Philippe Parreno's 
notes on the project, online on the Air de Paris website under 
http://www.airdeparis.com/annlee2.html(last accessed 14/10/08), and the monologue he 
created as first work in the series under 
http://www.ps1.org/cutianimations/instali/parreno.html(last accessed 14/10/08). 
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was created for a number of people who never asked for the gift they were 
given.,,115 
fig.10 
All of this relies on a reading of the work against a dimension of site, in patterns by 
which site can be constituted as a location for work and as a means for engaging 
with it. But whilst the sculpture's entanglement with its physical, cultural and 
institutional location as well as the video's framing seem to be conceived in such a 
mode of direct engagement, the way in which multiple linkages are set up between 
the video, its site(s) and the overall ensemble open onto more complicated 
operations of setting and unfitting. 
Specificity to the site of the work and displacements in relation to its potential are 
mutually constitutive in the overall ensemble. One is constantly outlined, highlighted 
and tested against the other, and their various degrees of fitting (because they 
certainly belong to the register of fitting and unfitting) can be seen as a critical 
115 Liam Gillick: Annlee You Proposes, p.11 
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investigation. But these solicitations are only one relational pair out of several, 
including less linear ones that span from work to site, from one element of the work 
to another, from the forms of their togetherness to the very constitution of site and 
beyond in a sprawling range of possible and mutually related connectivities. Whilst 
individually they can be accounted for in terms of an engagement with site, it is in 
their ambiguous and explicitly unclear coming together and the very quality of their 
unfitting that something else starts to emerge as a possibility. 
1.3.1 b Too much and too little and some more 
When Annlee claims that "there was another place just like this" and that "a 
projection from another place is required here, not the projection of an image, but a 
projection of settled thinking", she lays a claim on the very nature in which the entire 
ensemble is structured. Since the whole ensemble is designated as her proposition 
and not just the video (Annlee you Proposes is title for both, the installation and the 
video within it), it is under the terms of this proposition that the two originating 
situations at play - a residency in Japan and a commission for London - start 
overlapping in terms of concerns and conditions, with the video itself acting as 
interface onto the more remote of the two locations, as a device for their (re-
)arrangement, as a commentary on the configuration and as an additional (non-
)site in the overall picture. 
This overlap is mainly a function of the way in which the various component parts 
are arranged to (not) come together and cross: that one should be there for the 
appreciation of the other is one (impossible) bridge between sculptures and video, a 
proposition under which the benches fulfil their function by serving as viewing 
position from where to watch the video. That one should be the projection of the 
other is another possible, inverted arrangement between the same component 
parts: the video not as centre of attention, but as generating point from where a 
fictional character projects a "half remembered set of solutions" from Japan, a 
projection which then takes shape in the physicality of the sculptural ensemble. The 
sculptural group, in this scenario, simply becomes an approximative re-creation of 
an originally improvised intervention in the function of a semi-public space. In this 
circular scenario, the story comes to a close in mutually completed referentiality. 
But film and sound and the furniture for their consumption (as which the sculptures 
now necessarily appear) only ever join each other in oblique linkages, and a 
different form of encounter emerges from their slippages. The monitor is inserted 
into the oblique fac;ade of the building in such a way that it can hardly be seen from 
the viewing position indicated by the benches, yet it is near these benches that the 
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video's soundtrack comes out of concealed speakers in such a way that it is entirely 
inaudible from any other position closer to the monitor, from where the imagery 
could be seen. This physical unfitting dissociates images and sound and opens 
them onto other, more contingent applications and involvements. Once the video's 
overall cohesion unravels into visual and audio components, supposedly marginal 
effects take on a new relevance: the way in which the video image itself almost 
disappears behind the reflections of urban and architectural surroundings in the 
black glass behind which it is installed, becomes more than a disturbance now; it 
actively imports the reflections and through them its surroundings into the image 
(which is now more than just what occurs on the video screen itself). Equally the 
sound relates to the situation of the benches and tables in a new way by opening 
onto an inclusion of the contingent that is propelled through random operations of 
analogy between the (over-)heard narrative, sculptural forms and all that occurs 
between them. Once the observations, comments and reflections are loosened from 
the sole reference of the video's visual narrative (as far as this ever adds up to a 
narrative anyway), the monologue is partially ungrounded from its visual support in 
the video; as a result, the colours, shapes and even meteorological conditions 
described become more freely attributable. They can now link up to otherwise 
contingent appearances in and around the work's installation. Describing the "lumps 
and forms which I try to describe", which is firstly Annlee's attempt at recollection, 
can then also become a reaching out for water drops on the furniture's glossy 
surfaces on a rainy day. And the account of that other place, "a place on the other 
side of the world. Somewhere in the south there is the last big island. When it rains, 
it really rains. It was nearly destroyed, but the clouds were too low. And still cry.,,116 
contrasts and projects both locations by superimposing the London sky onto the 
video's animation through the mirrored surface of the museum's glass wall. 
This type of contingent encounter can be contrasting or complementary, 
disconnected or seemingly blurred; most importantly, it can only ever be made 
possible, but not planned. The way the connections occur can be facilitated or set 
up but necessarily remains unscripted, and it is in this register of unscripted 
encounters that the physicality and placement of monitor and sound open the video 
in its entirety onto a widely unregulated proliferation of analogies. Forms, colours 
and diagrammatic schemes sprawl outward from it and largely determine the way in 
which the video constantly (re-)configures itself and the situation of its showing. 
What occurs between them is no longer premised on the exchange between 
116 Ibid., p.9 
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different domains, but goes beyond their implicit reciprocity. In their place emerges 
a radically contingent and potentially expanding inclusiveness towards surrounding 
phenomena and events that, instead of emptying out encounters, insists on the 
generative dynamics of their unpredictability. 
"I you propose", as Annlee says, is then not the proposition of a resolved situation, 
but to the contrary levels 'I' and 'you' as two supposed centres that generate 
arrangements of things understood as always caught in their middle and generative 
of occurrences 117. Annlee proposes to arrange the presence of the Tate-installation 
as projection of a "half-remembered set of solutions" once executed in Japan, whilst 
the you of the implied address arranges the various elements as component parts 
of an experienced and potentially usable ensemble. The formula's lack of clarity in 
distinguishing address from originating voice (l!You) sets up their conjuncture as an 
encounter between two propositions whose various parts overlap and interfere with 
each other in a game across registers without however adding up. Rather than 
providing closure for either, the coming together of the solicited realms constitutes 
them mutually as potential. Both become propositions in relation to the other, 
elements for assemblages that oscillate by belonging to multiple geographies, 
realms and registers. 
By thus continually cutting across seeming divides, these elements are 
simultaneously unhinged and opened up towards novel types of contingent 
assemblages. The arrangement denies any privileged vantage point from where to 
gather elements into a coherent structure, a resolved narrative or even a completed 
audio-visual offering, proposing instead assemblages that are obstacled in such a 
way as to stop short of constituting new coherent units of meaning or even 
experience. 118 The various elements can only ever be activated in particular, 
contingent assemblages, never as a coherent whole. 
117 Things in this sense need to be understood in the full and ambiguous sense of the term, 
encompassing "the modern sense of object" and an older connotation of "that which 
concerns somebody", "anything that in any way bears upon men, concerns them, and that 
accordingly is a matter for discourse" (Martin Heidegger: The Thing', in Poetry, Language, 
Thought, London: Harper Collins, 1974, pp.165-182, p.174ff.). Heidegger differentiates 
between object and thing in order to establish a thing as oscillating between both 
dimensions of the term: passive entity and "matter for discourse". 
118 In his Turner Prize shortlist presentation in 2002, similarly the way in which the ceiling 
light was reflected on the vitrine containing the actual samples of work on show, replicated 
and emphasized the impossibility-inside the vitrine-to cohere the given samples around a 
stable degree of reality. Some were mere project studies, some illustrations, some came 
from realized graphic commissions, indicating an entire range of status considerations 
around the work, the plan, the sketch and the accomplished design. Some awaiting 
realisation, some realised in themselves, they were all subjected to the light reflecting in the 
vitrine's glass lid as hindrance of experience. That the ceiling itself carried a work that 
operated on multiple registers (Coats of Asbestos Spangled with Mica, 2002) only extends 
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Inherent in this partiality is an always possible dimension of non-inclusion. Not 
exclusion as wilful keeping outside, but the (negative) potentiality by which elements 
can be taken up or not from an offering, and in which both, access to components of 
the work and their cohering into assemblages, are contingent. Not only is it 
fundamentally open what the various elements of the work are synthesised into and 
what they are combined with in the process. It is also ultimately undetermined 
whether they will be synthesised at all or not. Since the arrangement opens onto all 
kinds of surrounding phenomena, the range of elements as well as the possibilities 
of their combinations, are tendentially open-ended. The audience only ever 
synthesises (a selection of) them again and again or does not and thus selectively 
and partially coheres arrangements from the offering. 
By the same move these very audiences automatically only multiply the contingency 
of arrangements by introducing their own partialities into the respective approach to 
the work. At stake is thus not an audience encountering a work, but rather a set of 
multiplicatory dynamics by which singular members of diverse audiences encounter 
constantly changing sets of elements that mayor may not cohere into such a thing 
as a work (complex or not). It is in this extended dialogical structure that the 
positions of audience and artwork make place for the expanded proposition of their 
contingent encounter. 
In an accumulative, assimilative mode of engagement aimed at maintaining a 
workable linkage between site and work, there are several possibilities to 
recuperate such sprawl: one constitution of the work can be read against another as 
mutually exclusive, imposing a choice through which one can illuminate the other; 
clues to the references and deferrals at play in the work can be followed up and 
this disturbance into an unclear effectivity itself suspended between phenomenological and 
conceptuall narrative accounts (Turner Prize 2002, Tate Britain, 30 October 2002 - 5 
January 2003, documented online on Tate website under 
http://www.tate.org.uklbritain/exhibitions/turnerprize/2002/gillick.htm (last accessed 
14/10/08)). 
fig .11 fig.1 
page 67 
then reflected back onto the site from a distance. Kwon argues in a similar sense 
when she discusses the physical and the discursive site of interventions being 
pulled apart as a recurring feature in site specific practices, and tentatively proposes 
to extend the notion of site in such a way that it can also encompass the oeuvre 
itself as site for engagement. 119 
Even though persuasive, this conceptual extension of site specificity inevitably 
points towards the structural limitations of the model itself: an accumulative model 
of site ultimately ends up encompassing the entirety of self-reflexive conditions and 
operations. The very operation of site specificity then turns into an ever-expanding 
feedback loop between site and practice and replaces the precision of an 
engagement with the adaptability of an increasingly malleable notion. Site 
specificity, in this extreme form, is emptied of specificity to such an extent that it can 
become visible as a formula with the main purpose of safeguarding coherent and 
accountable relations, rather than for engaging with the particularities of an 
encounter. And so even when, on the conceptual and temporal margins of the 
project of site-specificity, Kwon conceives of a situation "between mobilization and 
specificity", this situation still has to be perceived as "a terrain", in relation to which 
"being out of place" can only be useful if it occurs "with punctuality and precision" 
and thus under scrutinizable and accounted-for conditions. 12o 
Or alternatively one can enter the labyrinth of leads, follow them ad infinitum and 
then formulate that non-return itself into a statement about site and its 
characteristics and how it always falls short of that infinite demand. (Bourriaud's 
notion of the interstice becomes such a device for re-connection once it is 
measured exclusively in terms of its critical capability in relation to a supposedly 
given surround). 
In either case, the differentiation, diversion or transgression necessarily refers back 
to the condition, situation or context it supposedly left behind in order to profile itself; 
their binding relationality remains intact. Not only that, but it cannot (and this is the 
main point here) go beyond the coherence of a mutual reciprocity. 
In a different mode of engagement though it becomes possible here to follow at 
least some of these indications not in an accumulative quest for information, 
knowledge and ultimately stabilising feedback, but rather in order to reach the point 
where aleatory overlaps and contingent interferences reach critical mass and drown 
out the usefulness of a relation to site. At this point, choice and privileges succumb 
119 'One Place after the Other', p.93f. and p.104 
120 Ibid., p.110 
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under the multiplicity of linkages and in doing so unravel those hierarchies that 
normally safeguard focus: rather than directed and channelled, engagement is 
again and again reconfigured in different dimensions and registers in such a way 
that institutional critique, art historical referencing and architectural framing end up 
overexposing and thus blurring rather than complementing each other. 
When Giorgio Agamben appropriates the notion of the no more than from the 
Skeptics experience of suspension for his own formula of contingency, he outlines 
exactly this possibility of a move beyond referentiality: a formula in which the (dis-
)ordering principle of the no more than overspills attempts at recuperating 
coherence and constitutes the unsurpassable limit against which models run up. In 
Agamben's take on (Oeleuze's reading of) 8artleby the Scrivener121 , it is not the 
refusal of demands so much as the preference not to answer to them that 
establishes a "zone of indetermination" which defies existing patterns of 
acknowledgement and recuperation. 122 It generates an "irreduceability" over which 
the "categories [of the man of law] have no power": will and necessity succumb 
under the ambiguity of potentiality that "destroys all possibility of constructing a 
relation between being able and willing".123 
Against this kind of generative withdrawal existing models such as site specificity 
and relational aesthetics appear inappropriate not because they are insufficient or 
underdeveloped (site specificity in need of an even further expanded notion of site; 
relational aesthetics understood in more abstract terms of structure) but because 
the moves in question simply cannot be re-cohered as will (to intervention) or 
necessity (of specific relations). The problem is not that the applications lack 
refinement or subtlety, but rather that their very coherence fails to engage when 
projected onto encounters that no longer follow the same logic of accountability. 
Precisely this being out of reach indicates the point from where the no more than 
ceases to be a negative determination and begins affirming the whatever "such that 
it always matters" in a fundamental multiplicity of encounters. The formula for a 
different type of dynamic becomes conceivable here: the no more than "not as an 
affirmation or a negation, [ ... ] this is not the sense in which we use it but rather an 
indifferent [ ... ] and illegitimate [ ... ] sense".124 Between the two types of uses 
121 Herman Melville, '8artleby the scrivener', in: Bartleby; and, Benito Cereno, New York: 
Dover Publications, 1990. 
122 Gilles Deleuze, '8artleby; or, the formula', in Essays Critical and Clinical, London/New 
York: Verso, 1998, pp.68-90, p.73. For Deleuze, the formula presents not resistance (even 
passive resistance), but a structurally resistant 'agrammaticality'. 
123 Agamben: Potentialities, p.254f. 
124 Ibid., p.256 
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(indifferent and illegitimate), contingency becomes active precisely through being 
inappropriate - the illegitimacy that necessarily accompanies the formula's 
indifference pushes it beyond appropriateness, but most importantly pushes it 
beyond a simple disconnectedness and into a condition of entanglement, an ab-use 
for which unfitting is less a precursor than a continual modality of activating use 
beyond functionality. 
Whilst Agamben outlines this as a "new ontology,,125 it is here mobilised as a 
working premise, a style of operation under which "whatever" happens "such that it 
always matters". It provides a point from which it appears possible to invert the 
entire equation: works cease to function as indicators for the constitution of meaning 
and become instead mutually blurring filtering devices between insert and situation 
that un-condition either. They can now be conceived as devices (not traces) whose 
supposed legibility collapses and opens the view onto a different organisational 
mode, not model. Turning away from the lineages and trajectories set up in relation 
to parameters such as site and coherence, context and intervention, it becomes 
possible here to turn towards the very slippages that blur their respective registers 
and the ways in which the work relates to own diverse parameters. Not as a new 
realm or even model, but as a different mode of practice and its perception, and 
indeed as one that replicates such slippages throughout in the way in which it 
animates juxtapositions. 
Starting with these qualities to map out a field of activity opens onto a different type 
of sitedness that exceeds the relational parameters of a position and opens onto 
contingent assemblages instead. And even if this means to sever the linkage to site, 
or at least to level it as one relation among others, the move does not re-instate 
autonomy, which implies an internal logic of coherence, an internal fit. Rather it 
substitutes coherence itself with a heterogeneous assemblage that reconfigures its 
own parameters in constant unfitting. What becomes conceivable here is an 
unlocatedness in terms of an organisation that is relational in an expanded sense, 
encompassing internal relations as well as those with the outside. 126 Such a form 
overspills place not by constituting the richer, pi uri-dimensional construct of a 
multiple site, but by enabling an assemblage that (rather than opening up 
liberational space) constantly unhinges itself from anyone given consistency by 
shifting to another. (Bourriaud accounts for such processes of un-making that are 
125 Ibid., p.259 
126 Such an expanded notion of relationality overspills Nicolas Bourriaud's notion of 
'relational aesthetics' defined as an account of artworks in terms of "the inter-human 
relations they represent, produce or prompt" and premised on a socially determined 'co-
existence criterion' (Bourriaud: Relational Aesthetics, p.112). 
page 70 
not necessarily related to de-materialisation by proposing a fundamentally process-
based understanding of form which ceases to be finite: Form, for him and in 
relation tot he practes he calls relational and beyond, is a matter of constellations 
coagulating, of 'setting' the way ice sets in the transition from one state to another.) 
Contingency is here not accounted for as content but as produced in the aleatory 
nature of what can be taken up from the dispersed offering of the work. Not as an 
emptying out, but as constantly renewed promiscuity. 
What is at stake in response is the assembly of something other than a reading 
strategy for connections made and constructions introduced; an aiming at 
something other than the economies of exchange and returns, input and output that 
underly assessments of intervention. Rather an account of some recurring and 
constituent features of these novel encounters, an overview over some of their 
variable dimensions and effects produced. 
Among these, contingency takes on the role of a meta-condition: it implies an 
implicit refusal of the very categories of location and site as constitutive of meaning 
and critical potential (against specificity); it is one of the core modalities that 
unhinges assemblages from the specificities of their supposed context (exemplar); 
and it contaminates supposedly clear distinctions between registers of the work, its 
intended function and solicited or random effects in such a way that neither of the 
three can be upheld independently and become contingent in their mutuality as well 
as in the absolute sense. At stake is therefore a fundamental re-configuring of 
circular exchanges as multiple encounters which are never "encounters between 
domains, for each domain is already made up of such encounters in itself'.127 
Instead they offer contingent series of aleatory points of interfacing. 
1.3.2 Overlaps and near-misses 
And so when a sign "indicates arrival at the 22nd floor of the BIG CONFERENCE 
CENTRE,,128 outside a ground floor gallery and when inside that gallery an element 
of suspended ceiling over the desk area layers "the limited concerns expressed by 
the middle tier of social and economic projection" on top of the situation, these 
devices can no longer be seen to operate in parallel to or allegorical of the physical, 
economical and cultural implications of the gallery space. 
127 Deleuze/ Parnet, op.cit., p.28 
128 The recurring text passages are themselves part of the work, accompanying it in 
publications (see especially Susanne Gaensheimer and Nicolaus Schafhausen (eds.): Liam 
Gillick, Cologne: Oktagon, 2000) and other documentations (the most extensive of which is 
the Air de Paris gallery website under http://www.airdeparis.com). The extent to which 
information is provided and/ or withdrawn from circulation is another level of slippage in the 
way the works are constituted. 
page 71 
Institutional critique as a model relies on the assumption of a fundamental duality of 
meaning production, a duality by which one type of working (that of the gallery, the 
museum, the 'institution') can be uncovered through a form of direct engagement 
that reveals underlying structures behind a fa<;ade of surface appearances. Any 
intervention, in this model, proceeds through metonymy from one (presented) level 
of conditions and operations to another, hidden level of implications and 
involvements that can be revealed by and for critical engagement. 
For this type of operation to be functional and efficient, some basic structures need 
to be assumed as given: notably and most fundamentally a split between separate 
levels of meaning along and against which irony, metaphor and metonymy can 
operate as highlighting or revealing processes. And secondly then a critical 
continuity that allows to suspend one consensually agreed understanding of the 
(institutional) situation and replace it with a broadened, critically updated other. Not 
only metaphor, but also metonymy necessarily presupposes a set of contact points 
that can be determined and along which the investigation can proceed from the 
minute detail to the bigger picture and thus reveal the latter. The movement behind 
such operations is fundamentally linear in the development of its grasp and circular 
in its critical reflection back onto the situation it engages with. 
The cluster of works up on the floor129 deviates from this exchange by 
operating along lines of narrativity and fictionalisation that challenge not the gallery 
and its implicit workings but the stability of its relationship with the artwork. Rather 
than clashing with the gallery setting, the works overlap with it because they are not 
only entangled with the gallery through their placing, but also with the underlying 
fiction they are extracted from: The 22nd floor of the exhibition's title not only 
indicates a generic high rise setting with corporate connotations, but is also derived 
from a Big Conference Centre that organises fragments of fiction around the 
modalities of 'conciliation', 'compromise', 'negotiation', 'delay', 'consensus', 
'revision', 'concentration', 'dialogue' and 'assessment' as chapters of a book 130 
The various works placed around the gallery space are props that appear in the 
book or are derived from it, and they stage attempts at approximating both 
conditions, fiction on one hand and modalities of exchange on the other. At their 
intersection, the works constitute a supplementary space of negotiation and activity 
129 Galerie Air de Paris, Paris, 1998. The exhibition is documented online as Liam Gillick, Big 
Conference Centre, under http://www.airdeparis.com/artists (last accessed 14/10108). 
130 Liam Gillick: Discussion Island/ Big Conference Centre, Ludwigsburg: Kunstvereinl Derry: 
Orchard Gallery, 1997 
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within the realm of the gallery, the qualities of which determine the types of 
encounter produced. 
fig.13 
Because the scenario of the book itself never achieves closure but remains 
suspended between other books and related parts of the overall practice, what it 
provides is not a complete or even coherent set of elements to insert into or apply to 
the gallery. It offers instead a series of arrangements. In the exhibition, these are 
superimposed as such, as tentative arrangements, onto the gallery situation. 
One of these is a "test wall painted with attempts to match the colour of coca-cola" 
and "reflects a reference to a passage in the book BIG CONFERENCE CENTRE, 
where one location mentioned has walls the colour of Coca-cola". That the piece 
produces a slightly confusing transfer from taste to colour is only one in a series of 
shifts that determine the work: A given fictional space becomes the model for a 
preparational assimilation of the gallery wall that remains repetitive, haphazard and 
permanently suspended. The paint marks remain suspended on a level plane of 
more or less unsuccessful approximations that defy the logic of fitting to either the 
book (where the colour is given and covers the walls) or the colour model invoked -
none of the samples is recognisably closer to the colour of the trademark soft-drink 
than another. With the fulfilment of either reference suspended, the work appears 
as a mere series of shifts in relation to the notion of fitting, to the applicability of a 
model, to recreation and the layering of spaces. Fundamentally unconcluded, the 
marks insist on a trial mode of perceptual near misses as basis, condition and 
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working mode for a tentative type of insert. Rather than effectively approximating 
book and exhibition, the series of stains stages the (inconclusive) attempt at doing 
so. 
Beyond these structural features, the relation between works and setting is further 
complicated in cases where what is taken over and appears in the gallery, is not 
simply a representation of the book or an element from it. What is transferred in 
these cases are active props and accessories with allocated functions in the book 
and in relation to it; accordingly the displacement to the gallery affects their context, 
but not their functional potential which becomes therefore applicable to the gallery 
situation. It is possible then that "a large mirror is deployed in search of the three 
main characters from the book BIG CONFERENCE CENTRE" high on the wall 
above the gallery desk, without any necessary loss or deferral occurring in the 
transfer from one realm to the other. 
fig.14 
The resulting mode (and this is the main underlying difference to canonica l 
practices of institutional critique) is not revelatory but projective and thus open to 
occurrences of the contingent. The mirror transfers the demands of one realm (the 
book) onto the possibilities of the other (the gallery) not in a revealing fusion or 
confrontation but in a near-miss that fails to engage with the significant workings of 
the gallery even though it solicits them through the proximity to the desks as 
fetishised nerve centre of the gallery. Going over their heads, it picks up a range 
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contingent elements instead, some lighting fixtures, fragments of the surroundings, 
works and visitors and a vast expanse of blank ceiling. 
Claiming and incorporating the gallery space for the plot of the book and 
simultaneously projecting it (the book) onto the situation of the gallery, the work 
overlaps its setting with fiction instead of simply allegorising one through the other. 
Rather than relating documentary and fiction by activating one against the other, the 
work undoes their distinction and opens them up to the inclusion of contingencies of 
the surrounding given. Instead of layering the fictionally derived scenario on top of a 
supposedly unchanged gallery situation as a reading device for the gallery's 
workings, fiction seeps in (like contingency and in relation to it) and is constituted as 
a merely possible, supplementary dimension of the situation. 131 That the space in 
the book is introduced, under the title of 'Revision', as the space where someone 
propels himself against the reinforced glass wall until it gives way to his falling, is 
another such additional plot. 132 
1.3.3 Collisions 
If the encounter between work and situation can thus be decentred away from a 
category of appropriateness and the one-dimensional linearity of an impact, the 
notion of its effect too can be reconfigured as multiple and contingent beyond the 
function of commentary or constructive highlighting. What is needed in and through 
the third sample then is a re-thinking of what influence, effect and impact might be 
beyond linear models of efficiency. 
Where a public clock in the urban space structures time as homogeneous and linear 
and generally reliable, any interference with its processes must appear as a 
challenge to its function for the public domain and its underlying principles of 
131 This again needs to be differentiated from Nicolas Bourriaud's understanding of the 
exhibition site as venue for a movie without camera, which is fundamentally premised on the 
empowering possibility of enactment and proposes it as a "functional model" (Bourriaud: 
Relational Aesthetics, p.112). 
132 "Up there, the day before yesterday, somebody had finally done it. Lost in the place, 
caught and alone, they had repeatedly run full pelt against the reinforced glass of that best 
top room. Minor personal damage like brUising and broken teeth must have gone unnoticed 
in the repetitive drive for fresh air and dramatic absence. As far as anyone can make out he 
needed at least ten attempts. Moving faster and faster with each flailing run-up. Breathing 
hard and determined. And then on the eleventh impact, the glass gave way. Crashing open 
and falling away to allow brutal passage and moments of weightlessness on the way to the 
brutal chaos below. Numbed initially from the repeated window impact, our crasher came to 
a new form of consciousness half way down. The pavement concrete stayed where it was 
and didn't move up to meet him and his smile. Well they said it was like a grin although fuck 
knows how anyone could be sure with a flattened face buried in the top of a Toyota like 
that." (Liam Gillick, Big Conference Centre, Ludwigburg: Kunstvereinl Derry: Orchard 
Gallery, 1997, p.5) 
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coherence. Deregulating it must appear as a subversive disruption, immediately 
destabilising its role as an orienting device. 
In Erasmus ass zehn Jahre Opium #2, the space of this disruption is one of 18 
minutes that have been recuperated from the past 187 years. Through the 
introduction of a customised chip into the circuits of an electronic clock display in 
the public sphere, time is made to flicker between the current time of the day in 
1997 (the year the work was installed as part of documenta X133 ) and the 
corresponding time in 1810, which differs by approximately 18 minutes as a result of 
subsequent adjustments through leap minutes and seconds. Alternating between 
the two times at irregular intervals, the work destabilises the linear homogeneity of 
quantifiable time and interferes with an essential structuring device of the everyday 
at the end of the 20th century by making it unreliable. The work is in this sense an 
attempt at a mildly subversive form of confusion. 
fig.15 
But its confusion concerns not only the coherently structured realm the work 
engages with (linear time). It also regards the linkage of the work to other 
constitutions of time and setting, and the status and impact of the intervention itself. 
The chip introduces above all a confusion that feeds on and affects confusing series 
of fictional and factual temporal shifts and coincidences: 
The resetting of time from 1997 to 1810 repl icates a double temporal framework first 
set up in a book from 1995 in which the protagonist, Erasmus Darwin, Charles 
133 documenta X. Exhibition of Contemporary Art, Kassel, Germany, 21 June - 28 Sept 1997 
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Darwin's older brother, wanders through the streets of 1997 London under the 
influence of opium, whilst missing a dinner party held at his own house in the same 
part of town but some 187 years away in time.134 It has to do with the juxtaposition 
of an early 19th century character with the surrounding settings of late 20th century 
shopping outlets, and appears as a slippage between an opium induced trance and 
a meandering (non-)presence which constantly undermines any effective 
occupation of the situation. 
The derived work for documenta reclaims opium as underlying condition in the title 
'Erasmus ass zehn Jahre Opium,135 and translates the book's nebulous type of 
occupation into a fundamental unfoundedness of both time frames, given and 
inserted one: not only is time destabilised through the juxtaposition of two slightly 
differing settings which in turn take off from the non-fit between quantified linear 
time and planetary movement that makes leap seconds and minutes necessary in 
the first place; in terms of the work's impact too, contingency is mobilised in that the 
work's destabilising effect is itself random, its impact dependent upon exactly the 
kind of focussed attention it implicitly defies; nothing in the experiential realm 
indicates the working of the interference until it becomes discernible (not even 
recognisable) only at the precise moment of shifting from one frame of reference to 
the other, if at all. 
Furthermore the very coming together of these different times (fictional and factual, 
outdated and updated, precise and adjusted) is itself triggered by a set of 
coincidences that lie at the work's conceptual core and determine its workings: the 
book was "written in 1995 but set between 1810 and 1997", and when the possibility 
of a work for an exhibition arises in 1997, it is exactly "the coincidence of the dating 
and the exhibition [that] seemed useful".136 Not because it operates a destabilising 
irritation, but because it asserts contingency at the very basis of the blurring 
between fictional and factual. 
Yet also the work's foundation in a fictional scenario is contingent upon the way the 
work is being approached: the book as source and background only becomes 
apparent in the accompanying title/text. But rather than this information completing 
the work and privileging the more informed approach over any other, it simply 
establishes a parallel site of encounter with the work - if the contingency of 
encountering the work at all determines its installation in the public domain, in the 
134 Liam Gillick: Erasmus is Late, London: Bookworks, 1995 
135 "Erasmus ate opium for ten years" (my translation) 
136 Gaensheimerl Schafhausen, op.cit., p.65 
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catalogue it is the coincidental nature of overlaps between exhibition and work that 
is mobilised as 'useful'. 
Rather than simply reproducing or referring to one type of contingency, the 
catalogue entry sets the scene for a parallel encounter between audience and work. 
Which one of the two scenes (unprepared encounter in the public sphere or 
informed engagement in the catalogue) actually takes place or in which order they 
relate to each other, is consciously and explicitly undetermined. Here too, one is no 
more than the other. 
The diverse registers of the work's make-up thus add up to a whole range of 
indicated, but ungraspable framings. Nothing here is revelatory because not one of 
the work's propositions ever elucidates any of the others at play. The interference 
as such neither gains nor looses through being derived from the book and its 
chance encounter with the timing of documenta; the contingency of its effects is 
enclosed in the dispersal and confusion of its appearance.137 
In all these operations, the confusion solicited thus regards the make-up of the work 
itself as much as its effects. It presents a mode of time that is corrupted not in that it 
flickers between precise and imprecise timing frames. 138 Rather it is corrupted 
because it flickers between realms and registers and marks out the slippage 
between them much more than their (supposedly) contrasting characteristics. 139 
With constitution and effect of the work premised on contingency, function makes 
place here for a notion of use beyond recuperation, a 'usefulness' that defies 
attribution and opens onto sheer effects without given cause. 
That the interference can be recognised or not (and/or made legible or not), and 
how it is thus perceived if at all, reclaims not-doing and not-affecting as necessary 
(counter-)parts of this type of potentiality. At stake, ultimately, is not the intervention 
in subtle ambient conditioning, but the full potentiality of an interference that always 
incorporates the (random) possibility of its own ineffectiveness. 
137 Even though the title is possibly elucidated through the provided description of how the 
work originated, this clarification only becomes necessary once the title is acknowledged, at 
which point the explanation is equally available anyway. 
138 Any distinction between the two only opens onto different sets of questions: which one is 
which anyway - one is consistent, the other adjusted, but both can only ever approximate 
each other, hence the need for continual adjustments. 
139 Elsewhere, such notion of time is presented as 'III Tempo'. 11/ tempo is the title of a text by 
Liam Gillick that addresses the "potential of negotiating the points where actions and effects 
meet" (Liam Gillick, 'III tempo. The corruption of time in recent art', in Five or Six, New York: 
Lukas and Sternberg, 2000, pp. 23-26, p.26). The title has been appropriated here for the 
silent contamination it effects by contaminating the Italian(!) 'il tempo' - the corruption is 
silent, but also occurs between different languages in such a way that at least one of them is 
always out of place. 
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If this indicates indeed a flight from the seeming coherence of overarching 
structures and factual, social and cultural conditions, then it is so as a reaction to 
accounts of embedded ness that subsume the complexities of situations and works 
under their own structurally stringent terms. Against their background, flight is not a 
form of disengagement, but "on the contrary, to flee is to produce the real [and] to 
create a weapon,,140, one that can operate in and through a carefully unhinged mode 
of mobilised contingencies. Rather than disengaging from it, this flight generates a 
whole new set of moves in and of this 'real'. 
140 Deleuzel Parnet, op.cit., p.49 
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2 Mode Two: Treason (Stories of play) 
"At what point must ontology become ... what? Become 
conversation? Become lyricism? ... The strict 
conceptual rigor of being-with exasperates the 
discourse of its concept.. .,,141 
If contingency empties out a site of engagement by opening it toward new 
constellations, the nature of these assemblages-to-be determines how much 
mobility or indeed possibility are generated or shut down. In order to be generative 
between specifying regimes on one hand and vanishing perspectives on the other, 
these new assemblages need to be played out. In contrast to the seeming 
indifference of contingency, this play operates through moves in games which are 
set up to be reconfigured. 
2.1 Mobilising slippage 
Once whatever is at least provisionally taken out of its seemingly defiant and 
uninterested vagueness and is understood in its original sense by which it describes 
something "such that it always matters,,142 (Agamben), whatever happens is turned 
into whatever happening and opens two tendencies: on the one hand, it 
underperforms-as far as valid critical operations are concerned, whatever is 
never specific enough to enter their quantifying and qualifying equations. On the 
other it overspills, becoming uncontained in inherited legitimacies through 
continually unfitting itself from their qualifying frameworks. Both tendencies 
indiscriminately need to be considered as effective, since it is precisely in the 
ambiguous doubling of underperformance and overspill that the potentiality of a new 
affirmative politics of entanglement unfolds. 
Whilst chapter I developed how works can be seen to allow for these things to take 
place 143, the present part of the project considers more immediately whatever does 
happen under these terms, and what a trigger might be under their conditions. This 
shift in attention from generative withdrawal towards the occurrences it allows for, 
zooms in on the processes at play, but does so only in addressing both sides of the 
equation as intrinsically involved: the emptying out of conditions and circumstances 
141 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, p.34 
142 Giorgio Agamben: The Coming Community, p.1; see also chapter 1 above, 'Unfitting 
settings'. 
143 For the notion of an activating potentiality, see Giorgio Agamben: Potentialities, p.245 
(USa the potentiality of thought, which in itself is nothing, allows for the act of intelligence to 
take place"). 
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as determining factors as well as the re-charging of encounters thus generated as 
singular occurrences, only ever constitute each other; only under the condition of 
contingency and at the risk of nothing happening can whatever be opened up to a 
variety of encounters 'such that it always matters', precisely because neither of the 
collisions are pre-scripted, determined or otherwise legitimised. It is only in this way 
that 'whatever encounters' can be simultaneously "indifferent and illegitimate,,144, 
and mobilised as virulently active. 
At stake in this mutual constitution are non-directional, a-functional, a-specific forms 
of contact that can be productive and affirmative without falling back into the 
directional, functional, specific patterns avoided, over-spilled and by-passed through 
the various operations of unfitting developed in 'Mode One: Contingency (Un-fitting 
settings)' above. And so beyond the question of what is being produced here, in 
question is fundamentally the effectivity itself of this type of insert: how this type of 
unfitting re-configures the insert's relationship to what would otherwise be its 
context; and how this slippage feeds back into the situation it is indifferent and 
illegitimate to, if "the work of unfitting [is to be] as complex, as rigorous and as 
important as the work that goes into fitting within,,145? Beyond or within settings that 
unfit themselves and in doing so introduce irrecuperable slippage, is there any 
space for the active claims and affirmative solicitation of what Agamben calls 
'gesture'? If indeed gesture marks the threshold between fact and event and 
"breaks with the false alternative between ends and means,,146, and if indeed there 
is any space to appropriate it for a "pure mediality" that in and of itself mobilises-
then what are the possibilities of actively inhabiting that slippage? 
Gestures performed by the works in question necessarily raise the stakes for the 
gestures performed in approaching said works. If being implicated is a fundamental 
condition for connections to be made and provides the basis for any active 
involvement, this entanglement equally has to be translated into any theoretical 
approach to the material considered. It cannot simply be observed but needs to be 
mobilised in such a way that the nature of its mobilising itself accounts for the 
complicated forms of virulent involvement at stake. Any approach to work is as 
much about making claims and setting up attractions as is the work in question, 
blurring the distinctions between the two by operating in similar modes. 147 In this 
144 Agamben: Potentialities, p.256 
145 Rogoff: 'What is a Theorist?', n.p. 
146 Agamben, Means Without Ends, p.57 
147 This is not hermetic self-reflexivity but to the contrary a mutual contamination of work and 
dealings with it. The contamination goes both ways so as to undermine categorical 
differentiations and establish a conjuncture "in the process of becoming possible" (see 
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way the present chapter is produced through two conjunctures which are mutually 
constitutive: it uses a novel and a work of sculpture, both of which have a contingent 
relationship to baseball as mythical fiction. And it appropriates their juxtaposition in 
order to shift the register of the encounter towards a narrative mode that is both 
borrowed and mobilised and precisely in being thus derived, becomes the key drive 
for the chapter itself. 
The question of whatever qualities therefore applies to the solicitations operated by 
the works in question, as much as it also concerns the approaches to them. Since 
neither excess nor insufficiency can be essentialised in an attempt to account for 
whatever occurrences, productive encounters with these can also only be solicited 
through juxtapositions that in themselves uphold a similarly loose (permissive and 
productive) fit. To choose Don Delillo's (baseball) novel Underworld148 as foil 
against which to address the Home Run Gabriel Orozco installed in New York's 
MoMA some six years earlier149 , is neither specifically necessary nor necessarily 
appropriate; yet the application of one to the other is generative because it allows 
for a series of connections that can now be told rather than tracked and that can be 
mobilised, in and through this telling, as ways out of regulated exchanges. The 
telling of these connections and of the way in which they are being assembled into a 
narrative of juxtapositions, is both indicative of and performs the story itself as 
generative ambient mode. Don Delillo's rendering of a series of encounters hinged 
upon a baseball as narrative drive and motive, is appropriated here as a mirror 
through which to imagine Orozco's oranges; this particular fiction thus encounters 
Orozco's work in the same way in which the baseball in the book is again and again 
implicated in situations as trigger object and narrative device. All of these 
conjunctions are set up to answer to the category of generative encounters: 
between Orozco's oranges and all kinds of things, between the boy's baseball and 
his world and his father's and that of the ball; between the effectivity of the ball and 
that of Orozco's oranges; and between the different stories thus told, including that 
of their very coming together. 15o 
Modalities too thus overspill their fit in the encounter of different sets of material. 
The different modes of engagement solicited by Gabriel Orozco's oranges and their 
placement echo in the engagements solicited with and for these oranges; and the 
above, chapter 1 p.5) that needs to be mobilised as much as it needs to be paid attention to. 
It is not in the process of becoming real, but in the process of becoming possible. 
148 Don Delillo: Underworld, Picador 1999 
149 Gabriel Orozco: Home Run, projects 41 exhibition, The Museum of Modern Art, New 
York 1993 
150 Which is effectively what is being produced here, both through the work and for it. 
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narrativity of their encounters seeps in from Delillo as an inherent quality of the 
material. Baseball is the stuff for the novel, and the novel is then the stuff for going 
back to baseball with Orozco's oranges in such a way that the game becomes 
open-ended, rather than completed. The resulting effect is an ambient narrativity as 
a mode that is itself contingent assembled and uncontained, in an overall dynamic 
mobilised against closure. 
This mode generates connectivities that pull inward only in such a way that they 
also start sprawling out. This twofold perspective of generating encounters whilst 
withdrawing from qualifying frameworks is not a simple complimentarity. Rather it 
arranges a double perspective of inward and outward moves that instead of 
mirroring each other, generate a-symmetrical (and to some extent incompatible) 
dynamics of engagement with a given set-up, as well as a particular type of their 
coming together. The opposition itself is taken from Deleuze/ Parnet who profile "the 
creative theft of the traitor as against the plagiarism of the trickster" and outline the 
trickster as having "plenty of future but no becoming whatsoever. The priest, the 
soothsayer, is a trickster, but the experimenter is a traitor,,151. In a permutation, this 
opposition between trickery and treason is mirrored into the differentiation between 
different modes of treason below. 
Its twofold dynamics will be described here in terms of trickery on one side and 
treason on the other: If trickery is an active involvement with a given set-up that 
engages in such a way as to alter the game it is part of, treason presents a refusal 
to interact that tends to undo the very premise of what there was to engage with in 
the first place. Conceptualising desertion as one out of three ways of 'being against' 
alongside nomadism and exodus,152 Hardt and Negri develop the twofold effectivity 
of such non-engagement as a particular form of leaving-behind which has a forward 
effectivity and simultaneously produces (destructuring 153) effects on what it leaves 
behind. But also the hope implied in the 'wealth of desire,154 which propels this 
move forward, is equally twofold. It is necessarily a hope to overcome and move 
away as much as it is also an investment in the productive potential of submitting 
what was left behind to this kind of impact. This is the project's own notion of 
treason: a hope in and desire for treason as only mode of stimulating new 
connections. But these only ever under the condition of a radical promiscuity that 
replaces traditional notions of effectivity (as based on cause and effect, 
151 Gilles Deleuze/ Claire Parnet: op.cit., p.41. 
152 Hardt/Negri: Empire, p.210ff. 
153 Empire, p.412 
154 Empire, p.213 
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appropriateness etc) with a virulent connectibility155 that can generate new 
assemblages because it is in the work/world by leaving it behind and dragging it 
elsewhere. 
2.2 Playing (with) games 
Together trickery and treason mark out the extremes of a spectrum of effective 
(non- ) engagement; and raise the question as to how their coming together could 
be articulated, and more importantly, mobilised as an active conjunction itself. 
Rather than resolving their tension by means of contrast (which would only undo the 
potential of their coming together), the aim is to arrange inward and outward moves 
in an asymmetrical game that allows for a dynamic defying both means and ends. 
Under the umbrella of Spiel as encompassing both the game itself and the way it is 
played, all of this can productively be constituted as a Playing (with) Games. 
Shifting away from an account of qualities and effects towards one of possible 
modes, the question then is how to play (with) the im-possible outside of the game? 
What kind of moves does it allow for and what do they produce? What are the 
politics of the trickster, and what are those of treason? 
There are generally at least two very different types of game, or rather approaches 
to game as meta-phenomenon 156: A first one is premised on the assumption of 
mutuality and reciprocity between parties involved, and defines games in terms of 
an overall pattern of exchange; a game, in this understanding, is fundamentally a 
cohering structure that involves all partaking elements in a unifying network of 
actions and responses. It operates as a fundamentally structuring framework within 
which complex operations can be contained. 157 Another mobilises the game as 
155 Brian Massumi: Parables of the Virtual, p.20 
156 The German term Spiel encompasses both game and play (as well as slippage) and in 
combining the two allows for an engagement that ties them together exactly in the 
dimension of their irreconcilable nature. The impossible fusion between game, play and 
slippage effected by Spiel serves to constitute as much as highlight their mutual exclusivity 
and interdependence. Precisely because in this im-possibility, their coming together is 
paradigmatic for the conceptual set-up of the present chapter. 
157 There obviously is a residue of chance in games normally, and of the joy normally 
associated with playing them (for Huizinga etc, the second and less structural account of 
game playing postulates a fundamental purposelessness of the game, and conceptualises 
the game as playful rehearsal outside of the constraints of the effective empirical situation 
the game supposedly re-enacts; see his classical study, Johan Huizinga: Homo Ludens: a 
study of the play-element in culture. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.). Yet under these terms of 
a structural assessment, the very fact that these qualities are bracketed by structured 
activity cancels their qualitative difference by integrating them into the overall structured 
economy of the game as regulated. These "normal games [ ... ] retain chance only in at 
certain points" because they have "implicit models which are not games: the moral model of 
the Good or the Best, the economic model of causes and effects , or of means and ends" 
(Deleuze: Logic of Sense, p.59). The recent currency of game theory and related models as 
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starting point for a general unravelling of structure. Their main difference lies in the 
divergent assessment of the game's totalising potential. Whilst the former brackets 
and coheres phenomena under the conceptual umbrella of the game, the latter 
overcomes structural consistency by emphasizing the active potential implicit in 
different ways of playing the game. The game as structure in this sense is not part 
of but stands in contrast to an active notion of playing the game. Both are not 
mutually exclusive but attest to fundamentally different approaches to and 
investments in the game as milieu of operations. In the latter, performative 
accounts, games need to be played to be games, and place the emphasis on the 
permutations thus invited into the game's structure itself. Whilst the former 
formulates and imposes structure, the latter opens onto an account of dynamics 
generated through playing the game (sprawl etc). The two mirror and elucidate the 
tension between trickery and treason as range between structured game and the 
destructuring dimension of humorous playing. 
2.2.1 Games within the "economic circle of exchange" 
Notably the former, somewhat totalized and totalizing approach to the game as 
meta-structure, has allowed cohering various sets of phenomena (including and 
most prominently socio-cultural ones) into games in such a way that they can be 
described as well as analysed and (potentially) altered. It is this totalized notion of 
the game as cohering meta-structure (not the baroque notion of its playful 
unpredictability) that underpins most modern and current accounts of the game as 
cultural configuration. 
It is in this sense that Marcel Mauss' early analysis of gift-economies characterises 
gift-as-game as a "system of total services,,158. Its totality is operational in two 
regards: In terms of the far-reaching nature of its claims, the symbolic ensemble of 
exchange patterns discussed both affects and expresses "all kinds of institutions 
[ ... ] at one and the same time,,159 and is total in that sense; yet most importantly the 
games Mauss describes are total in that they are premised on an underlying 
obligation to mutuality that is both binding and ever-expanding. "The institution of 
explanatory devices for the understanding and increasingly management of complex 
economic as well as social situations attests to the regulatory horizon of such games. 
158 Marcel Mauss: The Gift, here p.5f. ("the exchange of gifts and the obligation to 
reciprocate"). For an attempt to re-singularise the move in the game as event, see Derrida's 
notion of the im-possibility of the gift "that disrupts the exchange, the course of history, the 
circle of economy" (Jacques Derrida, 'A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event', 
in W.J.T. Mitchell and Arnold I Davidson (eds.), The Late Derrida, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007, pp.223-243, p.230f.) 
159 M ·t 3 auss, Op.CI ., p. 
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"total service" does not merely carry with it the obligation to reciprocate presents 
received. It also supposes [and that is where the foundational quality lies] two other 
obligations just as important: the obligation, on one hand, to give presents, and on 
the other, to receive them."16o In the interplay of these three obligations, the 
economy of exchange expands through contact: submitting anybody who comes 
within reach to its (invasive) overall economic patterns, it continually generates new 
players. This expanding dynamic is aggressively enforced. "To refuse to give, to fail 
to invite, just as to refuse to accept, is tantamount to declaring war,,161 because they 
present refusals to engage that would undercut and thus challenge the most 
fundamental rule of the game: an overall coherence of exchange patterns, 
applicable to any form of contact and transaction. 
This is the underlying structural demand that diversifies into the formations of 
reciprocity that underpin social and cultural (inter-}action, as Slavoj Zizek argues 
when analysing the mutual interdependency of sacrifice and belief: 
"At its most elementary, sacrifice relies on a notion of exchange: I offer to the Other 
something precious to me in order to get back from the other something even more 
vital to me [ ... ]. The next, already more intricate, level is to conceive sacrifice as a 
gesture which does not directly aim at some profitable exchange with the other to 
whom we sacrifice: its more basic ambition is rather to ascertain that there IS some 
other out there who is able to reply (or not) to our sacrificial entreaties" so that "the 
world out there, inclusive of all catastrophes that may befall me, is not a 
meaningless blind machinery, but a partner in a possible dialogue, so that even a 
catastrophic outcome is to be read as a meaningful response, not as a kingdom of 
blind chance.,,162 
Under the terms of mutuality, everything becomes answerable simply because 
everything is now constituted as an answer (rather than recognized as an utterance 
or occurrence of some unspecified sort). And once it is constituted as an answer, it 
can in turn be responded too. Zizek's notion of ascertaining thus opens onto 
producing the other as answering, even and especially in the empirical sense of 
enforced integration Mauss investigates. 
160 Ibid., p.13 
161 Ibid. 
162 Slavoj Zizek: On Belief. London! New York: Routledge, 2001, particularly 'Sacrifice 
Versus the Feminine Renunciation', p.68-78, p.69. For Zizek, this reciprocity ultimately 
determines the constitution of the other. "The notion of sacrifice usually associated with 
Lacanian psychoanalysis is that of a gesture that enacts the disavowal of the omnipotence 
of the big other: at its most elementary, the subject does not offer his sacrifice to profit from 
it himself, but to fill in the lack in the Other, to sustain the appearance of the other's 
omnipotence or, at least, consistency" (ibid., p.69f) 
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Effectively and as observed by Mauss, "these total services and counter-services 
are committed to in a somewhat voluntary form by presents and gifts, although in 
the final analysis they are strictly compulsory, on pain of private or public 
warfare.,,163 They are thus not only enforced, but also automatically ensured. Non-
response, the refusal to enter the game and operate within its pattern, is not only 
heavily sanctioned but also ends up simply triggering off war as a substitute 
exchange, which in itself is only a slightly altered degree of the same kind of "total 
services of an agonistic kind,,164 that any non-response would be trying to avoid. 
Potlatch is a game that translates war into a more strictly symbolic register of 
activity and remains nevertheless premised on the same "principle of rivalry and 
hostility that prevails in all these practices,,165. Both provide mirror images of each 
other, down to the result produced (ruin) and the enforcement of compulsory 
engagement. "Killing wealth,,166 is the aim and result of war and potlatch alike, and 
both operate by enforcing engagement and thus imposing participation in the 
excessive exchange. Once considered form the perspective of an extended game, 
no operation in relation to it can possibly stay outside of its (forcefully) integrating 
claims. Once seen from within the game, everything can be recuperated as move, 
and thus assimilated. The only available operation is that of the trickster. 
Against the complementary background of potlatch and/or warfare, both attitudes-
willing submission to and participation in the game or the attempt to not 
acknowledge its obligations-are thus forcibly and somewhat automatically 
(re-)integrated into the overall economy of expenditure and gain, excess and 
destruction they end up merely stabilising. Premised on default incorporation, total 
games are thus not only self-regulating, but also have a tendency to become all-
inclusive under the imposed condition of overall mutuality.167 
163 M ·t 5 auss, Op.CI ., p. 
164 Ibid.,p.7 
165 ibd, p.6 
166 ibd, p.6, fn15 
167 This schema provides the underlying discursive formation in the constitution of the other 
through to Baudrillard's account of the 'radically other' of terror: however 'radically other' this 
formation might be, it is nevertheless constituted only ever in relation to the game, and thus 
as player. The projection of one schema onto the other necessarily also highlights the sliding 
scale of enforced recuperation operative between both. Baudrillard's take on 'terror' re-
articulates Mauss' totalizing account as critique of Western hegemonial power. Yet caught 
up in the very cohering logic that determines Mauss' account of the game, Baudrillard's 
argument ends up reproducing exactly the assimilative operations he diagnoses and 
criticises in Western responses: there is no other position available in this dispositif than that 
of the radical other, a position which undercuts the (assumed) radicality of the gesture as 
one that cannot be recognised. 
Explicitly drawing on Mauss and re-articulating his notion of the gift in terms of the structure 
of a game, Baudrillard posits "poker and potlatch" as paradigmatic games exactly because 
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Even where game is mobilised in the opposite tendency as fundamentally 
negotiable form of involvement in such a way that it allows for partial, temporary 
forms of engagement, the overarching condition of games is the reciprocity of their 
moves. This applies equally to the point where games regulate exchanges only as 
much as they also provide the possibility to reconfigure the rules of the game by 
interfering from within. There are moves that seem to not fall into any of the 
established patterns only to then modify those very categories accordingly. "The 
stronger the "move", the more likely it is to be denied the minimum consensus, 
precisely because it changes the rules of the game upon which consensus had 
been based,,168; any such move fulfils the game as adaptable and adapting structure 
for which "consensus is only a particular state of discussion, not its end"169. 
Modalities of participation are thus no longer necessarily secondary but instead 
become potentially constitutive of the (temporary) contract regulating the game: 
'Moves' feed back into the very make-up of the game in such a way that rules are 
changed by the way the game is played, making participation potentially active and 
transformative. Against these inherent feedback loops, "every utterance should be 
thought of as a move in a game" for which "to speak is to fight [ ... ] within the domain 
of a general agonistics,,170. Thus framed, every move is invested with the full 
capacity to alter the rules whilst simultaneously being subjected to the all-
inclusiveness of the game it feeds back into. 
of the quality of moves they allow for and the binding reciprocity they impose. Even the 
unanswerable challenge (death) is recuperated through war as response. Anything becomes 
part of a game, because game under these terms provides an expanding assimilative 
structure. 
So even if an act or a gesture (9/11) answers a dominant and totalised power (globalisation, 
in Baudrillard's account) by introducing a (supposedly) unanswerable challenge (suicide 
bombing), this defi still operates as a move within the game. Like any it tries to be the last 
and decisive move, tries to decide and end the game. But that does not mean it would leave 
the game behind-to the contrary it attempts to achieve control over it. What Baudrillard 
posits as unanswerable symbolical challenge is merely transgression, a cunning move 
(which is the only one left available: when one player amasses all the cards, the other has to 
change the rules of the game and is thus clearly and explicitly caught up in the exchange 
economy of the game, even if and particularly when pushed to its impossible extreme). No 
move in a game is unanswerable because every move is recuperable, the only seeming 
challenge appears as "'Transgression' , a concept too good for seminarists under the law of 
a Pope or a priest, the tricksters." (Deleuze/ Parnet: Dialogues, p.47). For Baudrillard's 
analysis of terrorism, see in particular Jean Baudrillard, 'L'esprit du terrorisme', in Le Monde, 
2 November 2001, and his 'La violence de la mondialisation', in Le Monde Diplomatique, 
November 2002, p. 18) 
168 Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986, p.63 
169 Ibid., p.65 
170 Ibid., p.10 
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Even where this all-encompassing dimension of the game multiplies into a variety of 
radically modular, partial games, where "language games are heteromorphous, 
subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic rules,,171 and set off against the 
"outmoded and suspect value" of consensus,,172 and systemic totality, providing "the 
outline of a politics that would respect both the desire for justice, and the desire for 
the unknown,,173, incorporation in the game creates an accountability that engages, 
formats and ultimately contains the dynamics of (inter-)action allowed for. Any move 
has to be answerable and establish a fundamentally integrating "contract, explicit or 
not, between players,,174 as foundational, even and especially in the light of the 
"heteromorphous nature of language games" which opens, according to Lyotard, 
onto the potential of a generalised and fragmented "knowledge of language games 
as such and the decision to assume responsibility for their rules and effects.,,175 Any 
gesture, act, gift etc is always directed towards the other/ partner in the game, who 
then in turn (willingly or not) projects their gesture, act, gift in reciprocity. Even in a 
scenario of multiple participating parties and beyond the obvious dualism of the 
underlying concept, the overall set-up remains uni-directional in that it is always 
directed inward, towards the other presumably caught up in the same game, and/or 
relating back toward the structure of the game itself.176 
2.2.2 Outward moves "beyond measure" 
Yet beyond its internal structural dynamics, the game also produces an outward 
proliferation of effective dynamics. Instead of simply producing results contained 
within or relating to the game's framework, these effects move away from the 
coherence of the game altogether. Once game-as-encounter is understood outside 
the reference to a site of meaningful coherence, its dynamics become multi-
directional and engage in fundamentally uncontained types of trajectories and 
circulations. Carroll/Deleuze's 177 account of Alice's game(s) presents such an 
171 Ibid., p.65 
172 Ibid., p.66 
173 Ibid., p.67 
174 Ibid., p.10. This includes the temporary contract (p.66) which Lyotard so ambiguously 
endorses by activating the legacy of Wittgenstein's language games as un-grounding and 
anti-essentialist modularities. 
175 Ibid., p.66 
176 Even the '''open system' in which a statement becomes relevant if it 'generates ideas', 
that is if it generates other statements and other game rules" (ibid., p.64), remains systemic 
and totalizing, even if it is not "terroristic" (ibid., p.63f). The economy of feedback re-coheres 
into rules what are originally statements and utterances. 
177 Lewis Carroll: 'Alice's Adventures in Wonderland' (1865), in: Alice's Adventures in 
Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass And What Alice Found There, edited with an 
introduction by Roger Lancelyn Green, with illustrations by John Tenniel, Oxofrdl New York: 
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involvement in game as modality rather than model which makes it possible to 
overcome the binary opposition of game and play itself, and to engage in the 
entangled dynamics generated from their encounter. 
Carroll/Deleuze elaborate this more complex inward/outward dynamic as a croquet 
game played in wonderland. It involves all the constitutive components of a game 
(players, playing ground, set of actions to be performed, as well as the material with 
which to perform these actions). Yet it reconfigures them in such a way as to make 
them permissive, productive and ultimately effective in a broadly affirmative sense 
of the term. The dynamics instigated allow outlining a paradigmatic account of the 
shift from contained to sprawling game that involves all component parts of the 
game, as well as their respective functions. 
Firstly, the ground is curious, "it was all ridges and furrows" that import the borders 
of the ground into the playing field itself and multiply them "so that there was 
generally a ridge or furrow in the way" 178 of any straight, directed, aimed movement. 
The ground is no longer a separate area designed to accommodate the game and 
offer an appropriate field for its development, but to the contrary is arranged in such 
a way that the unfolding of the game runs up against the limits of its claimed field, 
and thus the very separation of game and world at large. As two different formations 
(of ground and properties), they now need to be negotiated in the playing itself. 
Rather than aiming for a result, playing becomes a constant having-to-take-account-
of-the-territory. 
The playing-card soldiers "who had to double themselves up and stand on their 
hands and feet to make the arches,,179 further undermine the spatial logic of a 
regular game by "always getting up and walking off to other parts of the ground,,180 
thus constantly moving the goalposts. With the aim thus suspended, any move is 
reduced to the attempt of reconnecting with the game's spatial logic of static goals 
and active movement towards them. Here, that which is not supposed to move joins 
in an overall dynamic that radically undermines any fixed coordinates along which to 
orientate the game. 
Along with the spatial logic of the game, its temporal parameters are suspended 
too. The sequentiality of moves which normally allows to assess achievement in the 
game, is drowned out in the overall dynamic of deregulated activity too, with "the 
Oxford University Press, 1982, p.1-111. Carroll/Deleuze because it is here read as 
conjunction between the original text and the way it is opened up through Deleuze's 
engagement with it in Logic of Sense. 
178 Carol!: 'Alice's Adventures', p.73 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid., p.74 
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players all [playing] at once, without waiting for turns" and "quarrelling all the 
while,,181. 
This is still a game, but one that has effectively ceased to answer to the demands 
for (even partial and conditional) consistency and coherence of rules or ground. 
'They don't seem to have any rules in particular: at least, if there are, nobody 
attends to them.,,182 
Whilst a conventional game is premised on the distinction between mobile and 
immobile, active and passive components, between its players and their objects, the 
croquet game here enacts the confusion of "all the things being alive,,183, with "the 
croquet balls [being] live hedgehogs, and the mallets live flamingoes,,184. Instead of 
a clear-cut, contained account of the game, the croquet party enhances and 
demands other types of involvement, and with them a different range of possible 
effects. 
When things (players, elements, etc) fail to cohere into structure in this game, this 
failure releases activity in a new series of different ways that moves outside of the 
confines of what the game supposedly contains. When Alice "succeeded in getting 
[the flamingo's] body tucked away, 
comfortably enough, under her arm, 
with its legs hanging down [ ... ] its 
neck nicely straightened out, and was 
going to give the hedgehog a blow 
with its head,,185, the flamingo stares 
back in an act of defiance that 
undercuts the game (again) by 
suspending the appropriateness of the 
order so precariously imposed. At the 
moment when it has finally been 
prepared to assume its function as 
mallet in the game, the flamingo 
"would twist itself round and look up in 
[Alice's] face, with such a puzzled 
expression that she could not help 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid., p.75 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid., p.73 
185 Ibid., p.74 
fig. 16 
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bursting out laughing.,,186 The twisting itself runs against the straightened-out logic 
of component parts of the game; yet the puzzlement suspends the game's economy 
even more radically because it can only be met with laughter as a "bursting out" that 
in itself undoes the imposed rigidity of controlled movement. Not only the game 
changes here, but with it the range of possible reactions to it. "Bursting out" 
prolongs the internal undoing of the game into a particular kind of encounter with it, 
and inaugurates a new type of engagement between game and player. "Bursting 
out" is a response only insofar as it is also a going beyond the game, a leaving 
behind of its structured framework. 
The extreme point of this range of un-fitting though is the hedgehog that was 
supposed to be a ball in the game and instead "had unrolled itself, and was in the 
act of crawling away,,187. Whilst the flamingo's "puzzled" response challenges the 
appropriateness of the game, the hedgehog's move away is a decision to do 
something else, and in this irreverence produces the real scandal. It not so much 
refuses the game as it asserts its preference to do something else, in such a way 
that even the question of refusal ceases to present itself. 188 If anything, this very 
question has lost its validity, and that is one of the first effects this act of withdrawal 
feeds back into the now unravelling coherence of the game as such. 
Instead this kind of move produces a range of effects: Alice gives up her attempt to 
keep the game together and starts "looking abut for some way of escape, and 
wondering whether she could get away without being seen,,189 and at that very 
moment encounters the floating Cheshire Cat's head as embodiment of exactly that 
kind of (dis-)engagement. The cat is situated at the limit of the game, appears when 
Alice tries to leave the game behind but then has to negotiate her own non-position 
when asked into the game by the king. "I don't like the look of it at all,' said the King: 
'however, it may kiss my hand if it Iikes.,,19o The demand is one for recognition and 
accountability within the set-up of hierarchies and etiquette which run in parallel to 
and underpin the game of croquet,191 and comes with the full weight of authoritative 
186 Ibid. 
187 Ibid. 
188 The hedgehog walks away and ends up "engaged in a fight with another hedgehog" 
(ibid., p.76) leaving behind both the game and its flight from it. The flamingo too which 
originally protested against the game's inappropriateness, is next seen "trying in a helpless 
sort of way to fly up into a tree" (ibid). As in Bartleby's formula the shift from negation to 
preference sets up a zone of indetermination in relation to which an entire set-up unravels. 
189 Ibid., p75 
190 Ibid. 
191 The game is made impossible not only by the way it is played, but further unhinged by 
the Queen's insistence on privilege and status, the enforcement of which continually 
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power. Yet the cat answers this compulsory integration by not wanting to, and when 
threatened, by simply vanishing, disappearing with a grin. 
The "I'd rather not,,192 with which the cat replies, is a refusal to engage under the 
terms imposed and is qualified in the text as a remark, not an answer. It is also a 
refusal to even acknowledge the 
power of the threat underpinning the 
order: Even where the King's "well, it 
must be removed,,193 turns into the 
Queen's "Off with his head!,,194, the 
argument still was "that you couldn't 
cut off a head unless there was a 
body to cut it off from,,195. The cat 
appears as disembodied head 
already anyway, therefore failing to 
ever be caught under the terms of 
the threat the menace to coherence 
and wholeness has no leverage 
against a fragmented entity like the 
cat which can and does reconfigure fig.17 
its appearance itself. Paradigmatic for the type of engagement that 
the entire croquet game, the cat figures as trickster function that immerses itself in 
the game only so far as it wishes to 196 and withdraws itself with similar nonchalance 
after stirring a maximum of effect through its very refusal to engage. 197 
All of the game's components (ground, goals, mallets, balls as well as players and 
spectators (if that is what the cat is)) are thus entangled in the game exactly by 
moving beyond it. Any move away from the game is always implicitly a non-
engagement that has repercussions on the game it leaves behind, challenging the 
internal cohesion of what it leaves behind and opening onto a series of different 
suspends the game by substituting one order (royal privilege) for another (rules of the 
game). 
192 Ibid., p.75 
193 Ibid., p.76 
194 Ibid., p.76 
195 Ibid., p.77 
196 Once the whole head has appeared, "the cat seemed to think that there was enough of it 
now in sight, and no more of it appeared" (ibid., p.75). 
197 "The Queen's argument was that, if something wasn't done about it in less than no time, 
she'd have everybody executed, all round. (It was this last remark that had made the whole 
party look so grave and anxious.)" (ibid., p.77). 
page 93 
withouts. It is a movement away from and thus against the game and its structures 
of power only insofar as it is also a movement toward an elsewhere. Even though 
unspecified in Carroll, it constitutes the very horizon of the cat's repeated 
(dis-)appearances in the middle of the various game scenarios Alice inhabits in 
Wonderland 198. 
Insisting on the tension between the two tendencies and the impact this tension 
creates, Hardt/Negri conceptualise exactly this type of (non-)engagement with 
structures of power as an active possibility of 'desertion' that, rather than having a 
place, "is the evacuation of the places of power,,199. Its dynamics are twofold: "In 
effect, what pushes from behind is, negatively, desertion from the miserable cultural 
and material conditions of imperial reproduction; but positively, what pulls forward is 
the wealth of desire and the accumulation of expressive and productive capacities 
[ ... ]-and thus a certain hope.,,2oo In one and the same move, the scene is to be left 
behind and to be affected in a new type of directly critical function that is 
fundamentally twofold because it combines the two complimentary and mutually 
constitutive dimensions of withdrawal and assertion201 Since "being-against might 
well be most effective in an oblique or diagonal stance" of destructuring202 power, 
"Battles against the empire might be won through subtraction and defection,,203 
precisely because this type of being-against simultaneously encompasses and 
produces 'apparatusses beyond measure,,204 "defined by the productive activity that 
is autonomous from any external regime of measure,,205. This latter understanding of 
expansiveness and its affirmative potential allows to set apart trickery and treason 
as two simultaneous yet irreconcilable ways of (not) engaging with a given game. 
On one hand the expansive nature of 'game' as integrational and accumulative form 
of coherence, incorporating ever-new elements into its overarching structure; on the 
198 The cat is only ever partially involved from the beginning. When it first appears, it serves 
as a (dysfunctional) guide to Alice and is thus explicitly positioned on the outside of the 
situation, detached (sitting up in a tree) and commenting (albeit self-referentially) on the 
madness of everybody in Wonderland. Alice's question "but how do you know?" addresses 
exactly this ambiguity (p.56/57). The exchange establishes the cat's status as marginal and 
entangled, a status then played out in full in the croquet game scene. 
199 Hardt!Negri: Empire, p.212 
200 Ibid, p.213 
201 For Hardt! Negri, this is the most current (and currently most productive) form of 
resistance: "Whereas in the disciplinary era sabotage was the fundamental notion of 
resistance, in the era of imperial control it may be desertion" (Empire, p.212) 
202 ibd, p. 412 
203 ibd, p.212. On defection and desertion in terms of their direct (military) impact and the 
corresponding legal frameworks in their original military and political context, see Nachman 
Ben-Yehuda: Betrayal and Treason: Violations of Trust and Loyalty. Oxford: Westview, 2001 
204 Hardt! Negri: Empire, p.358 
205 Ibid., p.357 
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other, moves 'beyond measure' generating an "expansive power [ ... ] of freedom, 
ontological construction, and omnilateral dissemination,,206 that sprawls outward. 
2.3. Trickster moves 
If Spiel is therefore always a double configuration of inward and outward 
tendencies, within which each move has an ambiguous potential for both, then 
baseball's home runs must be among the most explicit examples for this bi-
dimensionality in the realm of actual games: They, too, are ambiguously framed by 
the game within which they occur and the spaces they temporarily incorporate. On 
the on hand, they involve the game whose contained structure is momentarily 
opened up. On the other, the movements of the ball itself go beyond the game and 
generate a new set of dynamics, effects and possible uses. 
Double operations: One in the game itself, where trickster function of the home-run 
opens active interstices on the threshold of the game's coherence and allows for the 
ultimate trickster operation. And the other in the aftermath of the game, and as 
observed through the ball itself as magical (and partially disconnected) object, 
removing itself from the scene, taking the game further out and simultaneously 
stretching and testing how (long) that very connection back to the game is still to be 
made.207 
2.3.1. Running home 
In the home-run as baseball's privileged moment, the player runs across the 
ground, traverses the diamond, and covers all remaining positions before returning 
home to base. All of this has to be completed before the ball is thrown back from 
wherever it was hit to, and intercepts the player's course. The risk lies in the ball 
206 Ibid., p.358 
207 Deleuze summarises the games in Alice in Wonderland as having the following in 
common: "they have a great deal of movement, they seem to have no precise rules, and 
they permit neither winner nor looser" (Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.58). In contrast to "the 
games with which we are acquainted" (ibid., p.58) and which "retain chance only at certain 
points" (ibid., p.59; see 58f. for the structural logic of these games), Deleuze profiles Alice's 
games as a starting point from where to think a pure "ideal game" without pre-existing rules 
where "all throws affirm chance and endlessly ramify it" and where "the throws therefore are 
not really or numerically distinct" (ibd, p.58f.). Ideal player of this game is the Aion as 
"infused and ramified chance " and "unique cast from which all throws are qualitatively 
distinguished" (ibid., p.64). Against this background and in order to set up the following 
investigation into other games, it is important to differentiate against this somewhat totalising 
account: Orozco's attitude (and the one under investigation here) insists on articulating the 
interplay between one type of game and the other. Replacing rules with "intention and 
concentration" and talking about his films, Orozco states that "the flow of images in my work 
is extremely controlled. I trace certain intentions with the camera, and then suddenly the 
tension between my intentions and reality becomes too great and the whole thing breaks 
down." (Gabriel Orozco: 'A Thousand Words. Gabriel Orozco talks about his recent Films', 
in: Artforum international, Summer 1998, p.114f) 
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coming back whilst the player is somewhere between a position covered and the 
next one, is the ball returning to the game and preventing the round from ever being 
completed. In the successful home run, this risk is inverted into the round being 
completed without the ball re-entering the game; in this case, it is the circuit of the 
ball that remains incomplete and thus open, rather than the player's. Either way, 
one circulation suspends another. 
There are two types of home runs essentially: the first type are those that attest to 
. the athletic capacities of a player where a good hit is followed by a successful run, 
executed against the threat of the returning ball. These are the dramatic ones where 
players skid into the position they need to reach, only marginally separated from the 
impact of the ball on that very same position. They stay firmly within the established 
parameters of the game premised on overcoming space through the (successive) 
creation of distance (the hit) and speed (the run).208 
The second type though is different and really pushes the opening potential by not 
only infolding the threshold of the game, but also following its expansive 
possibilities. These are the big majestic hits and runs where the ball does not return 
but is knocked out of the realm of the game and never comes back. They create 
moments where the game is essentially over because nothing is at stake 
anymore-the game simply needs to be completed, needs to be filled so that the 
obvious outcome can be asserted. The trajectory of the home run merely confirms 
what is already established, and opens a time-space between hit and non-return of 
the ball in which some fundamental characteristics and dimensions of the game 
change and inaugurate a new type of configuration (which is more than simply an 
acceleration or slowing down of the game). 
The interesting dimension of the home run is thus not the outcome it merely 
confirms but the bracketing within which it unfolds. No longer pressured by 
impending interruption, this kind of home-run is open on its way to the end, which in 
turn is pre-accomplished and has ceased to determine the temporal economy of the 
game. Instead of determining an outcome the home-run becomes a particular kind 
of non-completion that produces closure through infinitely deferring it. It defers the 
game to the realm of an aftermath that opens its own kind of duration because it is 
both the high point and complete breakdown of the game it is part of. 
Within this impossible bracket, the home-run is enacted as a different kind of play, a 
play that suspends the game by stripping its two main organising principles of their 
structural importance. One has to do with performance, the other with timing. 
208 see Delillo: Underworld, p.36 
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Performance changes in that it opens up onto a different pace where the result is 
unchallenged and the player can stroll, can run at ease (if that is still running). There 
is nothing that could possibly intercept his course, and so the pressure is off, the 
scores are effectively settled even though the game is not concluded yet. It is this 
kind of home run that allows for different speeds and movements. 
From the very moment the ball goes off, the loosing team is "already separated from 
the event, staring flat into the shadows between the decks,,209 where the ball went 
that conditioned and guaranteed their engagement with the field. And with this 
suspension of one of the parties and its "long dead trudge" from the field to the 
clubhouse, the field opens up to a re-enactment in which the formerly contested 
trajectory is performed as victorious and congratulatory display between one party 
and its audience, with "Thomson circling the bases in gamesome leaps, 
buckjumping,,210 and thus playing around the bases rather than aiming at reaching 
them. They turn from goals and endpoints of the game to its material, allowing for 
jumps and leaps and circles rather than imposing linear progression. Gamesome is 
a different quality then, a playfulness that introduces into the (upheld) framework of 
the game and its regulations a different set of movements and speeds. Completion 
of the run (and in this case game) is simply a given condition here, no longer a 
desired aim; all that is left to do is "making sure Thomson hits every base,,211. The 
ball as absence brackets a space in time within which the game then infolds and 
within which the actual completion is simply carried through because the ball is still 
out there generating the different kind of time that allows for a home-run. 
Around this kind of move, the relationship between anticipation on one hand and 
fulfilment on the other changes too, unhinging the game's assumed linear temporal 
logic. 212 Because the conclusion precedes its actual fulfilment, performance and 
jubilation cease being sequential and instead overlap in possible re-enactments. 
Since the jubilation applauds the hit and not the run really, the run is merely a 
continuation/ prolongation/ picking up of what was effectively achieved in the hit. 
And so since a home run does not simply complete the game [although it might do 
that too], it is the setting up of precisely this kind of relation to impact and 
performance that can be mobilised to open onto a fundamentally different kind of 
game. One where the achievement is not contested any longer and thus ceases to 
209 Ibid., p.43 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid., p.44 
212 Thomson "is forever Bobby now, a romping boy lost to time "(ibid., p.43f.), inhabiting the 
time lapse created by the ball. 
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be exclusive to the team and its capacities for clinching it. Instead, setting the 
winning team apart from the stakes of the game (everything is already 
accomplished) opens the game beyond its privileged players, levelling their activity 
in such a way that the game now allows for different modes of participation.213 
More than a sheer celebration, the encounter between crowd and players, game 
and surrounds allows for a new type of conjunction: "The Giants win the pennant 
and they're going crazy", because they [the audience] can now be the Giants by 
inhabiting the same (time)space opened through the home run.214 This is why the 
crowd goes in, "is growing over the walls" into the ground in order to playa different 
game around the same people - "Thomson is now out in the field dodging fans 
who come in rushes and jumps. They jump against his body, they want to take him 
to the ground". Or (in an equally twisted continuation) they take over by strolling 
around the field in the aftermath of the game and re-enacting what was in itself an 
enactment of something already achieved. "Some ushers are lifting a drunk off the 
first-base line and the man warps himself into a baggy mass and shakes free and 
begins to run around the bases in his oversized raincoat with long belt trailing,,215. 
Later, there is a "shrill cheer" when the same "raincoat drunk" slides into third 
base. 216 Who partakes in this series of appropriated re-enactments and in which 
order, is as open to re-arrangement and re-distribution as the disjointed temporary 
logic allows for. In the background of both, the ball is still out suspending time and in 
doing so, allowing for different distributions again and again. 
The ball (as trophy, souvenir, stand-in) figures as token for exactly this shift by 
which participation opens up towards degrees of involvement: "It's the ball they play 
with, the thing they rub up and scuff and sweat on,,217, the thing which, once it 
reaches beyond the field itself, becomes graspable and thus re-distributes roles. 
From object of the hit and generator of the game's dynamic, the ball's role changes 
to that of a carrier and transmitter of expanded participation once it becomes the 
213 There is a delay in this that does not generate tension/expectation, an a-synchronicity 
that re-sets the sequential structure of the game, including the disjointed realisation of what 
is actually still at stake for players and audience. Whilst the audience at some point 
recognises the departure of the ball, the player might not immediately do so and keep on 
running before he switches. As differing intensities they now overlap because they are 
fundamentally uncoupled from their sequential or causal arrangement. ("He says, "It's gonna 
be." There's a pause all around him. Pafko racing toward the left-field corner. He says, "I 
believe." Pafko at the wall, then he's looking up. People thinking where's the ball. The scant 
delay, the stay in time that lasts a hairsbreadth." (ibid., p. 42)) 
214 Ibid., p.44/45 
215 Ibid., p.47 
216 Ibid., p.53 
217 Ibid., p.45 
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ultimate token for an involvement in the game. It seems to carry, incorporate and 
thus spread what was its power over the game to ever new holders of the ball for 
whom this very effectivity becomes a promise of power. By gaining control over it, 
these new handlers complete the home-run's fetishistic inversion by which the loss 
of the ball (which determined the game) is made contained and complete in the 
grasp of the object in its disconnected aftermath. 
2.3.2. "Home-Run" 
When Gabriel Orozco's arranges oranges on windowsills surrounding the MoMA 
courtyard as his version of a home-run, he installs the fruit as stand-ins for winning 
balls in exactly this expanded field of operations. Scattered all over a vicinity that 
configures the sculpture court as baseball's diamond, and through which the 
surrounding flats become tribunes and beyond, these oranges are staged as the 
majestic home runs that don't return to the game and instead start taking place 
elsewhere, and differently. Staged on the windowsills surrounding the MoMA 
courtyard as residues of one game (baseball), they become carriers of another 
(expanded sculpture) and end up caught in the interplay of in- and outsides set-up 
in the home-run.218 
In its most binary dimenSion, the arrangement consists in juxtaposing the realm of 
the museum with the surrounding housing as realm of the domestic, the private, the 
residential, all of which only matter (in a first instance) in contrast to the equally 
over-coded domain of aesthetic experience they overlook. Most prominently 
Benjamin Buchloh has proposed a structural reading of Home Run by considering 
the piece as conceptual arrangement of "institutional spectacle", "discursive 
convention" and "private fetish object": 
"Fusing three types of radically different spaces, Orozco's intervention invites the 
spectator to recognize that these objects-easily suspended between the public 
and the private-articulate the fundamental condition of sculpture and its inability to 
resolve these contradictions. First of all the spectators perceive themselves as 
218 "I wrote to the occupants of the buildings located next to the museum, to ask them to put 
some oranges on their window, outside. They would accept it or not, if they agreed, the 
MOMA would send them fresh oranges every weeks, they would do everything on their own. 
This collaboration was an attempt to abolish the borderline between public and private 
space. It was an ordinary action." ('Benjamin Buchloh converses with Gabriel Orozco in New 
York', in Gabriel Orozco: Clinton is Innocent, exh. cat. Musee d'art moderne de la Ville de 
Paris, 1998, quoted in Liliane Terrier, 'Le modele Obersicht', in Le recit in teractif, 
Roundtable, Paris: Ecole nationale superieure des arts decoratifs, 6/12/00, n.p., available 
online under http://www.ciren.org/ciren/colloques/061200/terrier/terrier.html(last accessed 
14/10108). Since the distribution of balls depended on the residents' response, even the 
pattern itself was outside of Orozco's control. 
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positioned within an indoor museum searching from the authorized institutional 
perspective of public exhibition and its objects. Subsequently they contemplate the 
display of structures in the sculpture garden as an official institutional site where 
sculptural objects would generally be exhibited according to their discursive 
classification. Lastly, the spectators realize that they have to stare-somewhat 
illicitly-into the spaces of private homes and offices, where the actual installation 
takes place in the facades of the buildings that now function as a vitrine outside the 
showcase of the sculpture garden itself.,,219 
fig.iS 
But this account inevitably coheres the work around the spectator's viewing position 
as exclusive vantage point and thus eclipses the inverted perspective that projects 
altered perceptions of the museum as seen from the flats (even imaginarily). It also 
undercuts the oranges' precarious status as always already doubly entangled object 
tokens whose circulation is inevitably and necessarily two-directionaI22o : the shift 
219 Benjamin HD. Buchloh: 'Gabriel Orozco. The Sculpture of Everyday Life', in: Gabriel 
Orozco, exh. cat. Museum of Contemporary Art LA, 2000, pp.66-102, p.8? 
220 Buchloh's "peculiar dialectic between an artificially constructed specularity and a 
seemingly benign banality of displayed objects" (Buchloh, op.cit, p.8?) remains centred in a 
viewing position (experiential or discursive) - in terms of this centredness, specularity and 
banality become indistinct positions that have (ironically) already fused "pure perception" 
and "interpellation", precisely the two terms Buchloh sets himself to negotiate through 
Orozco's practice (ibid., p.69f). 
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enacted in their precarious positioning is directed from one realm to the other only 
ever to be reflected back immediately in a subtle reversal of values and prioritised 
features. (This is the fundamental levelling achieved in the majestic home-runs 
Orozco's arrangement re-installs). In Buchloh's account, this reflexivity is accounted 
for simply in terms of a disturbance of one realm (the museum) through the other 
(the domestic, the flats). But the flats are more than vitrines not simply because they 
occur outside of the sanctioned institutional realm, but also because they imply a 
different series of handlings and attitudes in relation to the objects thus inserted, 
attitudes that cannot be addressed in terms of display exclusively. Rather they 
coalesce around status and more importantly uses of the objects themselves (even 
if only imaginarily). 
In the context of and as seen from the museum, the oranges figure as exotic tokens 
of an other place, standing in for (irredeemable) promises of consumption and 
pleasure, and by extension also as time bound reminders of duration, carpe 
diem/memento mori allegories isolated and re-charged against the overall banality 
of their everyday occurrence in the kitchen. As seen from the windows overlooking 
the sculpture court though, the oranges figure differently, inserted as they are in a 
domestic realm where they are considered under their use value. Here, the oranges 
fig.19 
Only in this somewhat reductive reading as formal/ conceptual arrangement can Orozco's 
Crazy Tourist (1991, fig.19) figure as "complementary installation" (Buchloh, op.cit., p.81) to 
Home Run. Here too Orozco displays oranges, this time in the deserted arrangement of 
market stalls after the end of a street market in a small town in Brazil. Very differently, the 
oranges here relate to their surrounding through their contiguous relationship to trade. Also, 
the displacements the two works operate in time are incommensurable: whilst Crazy Tourist 
operates explicitly by activating the aftermath (of the market), Home Run gains its currency 
from imposing an impossible simultaneity on the two very differently structured circulations 
of the game and its aftermath. 
Also in the photographic documentation through which the works circulate, the former is 
cohered around a single viewing position removed in time and space, whilst in Home Run 
that very position is rendered impossible through the provision of multiple perspectives on 
the work, neither of which claims to cover or exhaust the work in question. Vantage points 
are multiple and explicitly dispersed in Home Run, whilst they are clearly established in 
Crazy Tourist. 
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effectively occur first of all as foodstuff awaiting consumption. Yet there is a similar 
layering of promises/ charges in the ambiguity with which fruit is the object of 
display, in the home too - generically in the convention of the fruit bowl and all 
those half utilitarian, half display-oriented ways of keeping fruit in and around the 
house. This is certainly emphasised here in its heightened form as prominent 
display on the windowsill, projecting inward as much as outwards. Orozco's display 
simply enhances this ambiguity by arranging the oranges in such a way as to make 
them visible from the courtyard below. The fact that they are displayed on glasses 
rather than in bowls renders this explicit, yet the way they are (primarily?) directed 
towards this outside is only a gradual difference, not an entirely new let alone alien 
dimension to the things one does with fruit. It is in this enhanced contiguity that 
'home-run' arranges its interplay between the two domains thus related. 
How the fruit in the windows echoes and challenges its own inverted framing as 
inaccessible promise as seen from the museum; and how (the other way round) the 
colour dimension of the oranges lends them very easily/ plausibly to aesthetic 
appreciation and links their appeal as brightly coloured spheres back to the formal 
considerations of the museum; all this intertwines domains and their respective 
expectations in such a way that the question becomes one of shifting degrees of 
involvement in these different registers. The display is consumed by museum public 
and residents alike, and exactly in the latent confusion of overlapping expectations 
and demands. Seen from the museum they look like fruit whilst in the flats they are 
removed from exactly that reality by becoming an extension/ outpost of the 
courtyard they overlook.221 Establishing a nexus of contiguous relations between 
domains and the objects they respectively and overlappingly claim, this 
arrangement of visibilities generates an overall dynamic of transversal relations that 
destabilises the registers of 'public' and 'private' supposedly juxtaposed in the work. 
Most fundamentally and resulting from these reductions, Buchloh's argument 
eclipses the way in which the transversality of connections mobilised in the piece 
goes beyond sheer display and instead actively confuses registers of reception and 
production too. By producing an interplay between the different use dimensions 
solicited, the work polemically levels different handlings of the objects and thus 
fuses exactly those territories that would otherwise separate out makers and 
receivers. In the way in which residents were approached and delivered oranges 
221 Structurally, this is probably the most prominent difference between Orozco's Home Run 
and the one in baseball, that Orozco's is never quite removed from either circulation and 
juxtaposes the two domains as independent yet mutually visible and thus mutually 
challenging circulations. 
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and would display them themselves, they become executers (if not producers) of 
the piece. This is the way in which the piece seems to fit all too neatly into the 
category of a (socially) expanded practice, to the point where "the title Home Run 
may be partly a deft pun on the communal aspect of the installation (which was, so 
to speak, run by people in their homes)".222 
But exactly in assuming that role of hosts to the project, these people engage in a 
dialogue (institutional, artistic, commercial, neighbourly/social) that is theirs only 
insofar as it was originally offered to them, and in which from the very start they are 
also at the receiving end. Like the museum visitors below, these participants too 
figure simultaneously as audiences and protagonists to the project. The piece 
culminates in making them visible, through the highlighters of displayed oranges, as 
having entered exactly this dialogue; they are exhibited as participants in the 
making of the piece and thus turned into its very material. Through the same 
involvement, they are incorporated as (secondary) producers and as projected 
highlighters of their own becoming material for the piece, making impossible the 
very vantage position assumed in Buchloh's account of the work.223 
For all of this, the orange/ball operates as impossible carrier224 , its particular 
prominence generated (like in baseball) through trickery - the baseball figures as 
222 Mark Haworth-Booth, The Atomists', in: Gabriel Orozco, Empty Club, London: Artangel 
1998, p. 55. 
223 It is in these overlaps that the work produces something other than an articulation of "the 
actually existing fragmentation of the experience of public space and the concomitant 
annihilation of simultaneous collective conditions of reception."(Buchloh, op.cit., p.87) By 
suspending the supposedly unified experience of that very public space in another time, the 
work can instead be seen to juxtapose a variety of spaces, attitudes and modes of 
entang lement, rather than necessarily referring this juxtaposition back to a supposedly lost 
condition that might have preceded it. On the other hand and with simi lar limitations, only 
part of this can effectively be thought as tying its participants into the broader operationality 
of an expanded art practice "governed by a concern to "give everyone their chance", through 
forms which do not establish any precedence, a priori, of the producer over the beholder [ ... J 
but rather negotiate open relationships with it, which are not resolved beforehand. This latter 
thus wavers between the status of passive consumer and the status of witness, associate, 
customer, guest, co-producer, and protagonist." (Bourriaud: Postproduction, p.58). This too 
is only a limited account-the work jumps between registers not only by referring everything 
back to the artwork, but also by spreading out away from it. Bourriaud's "hub of social "infra-
thinness" (I'inframince social)" too, "that minute space of daily gestures" at which Orozco 
supposedly operates (Relational Aesthetics, p.17), is too limited a locus for the sprawl under 
investigation here. It is only one facet, one type of linkage and intrinsically linked to and 
entangled in the working of others . 
• It is both medium and carrier, in the sense in which Brian Massumi explicates the notion 
of milieu in Deleuze and Guattari as meaning '''surroundings', 'medium' (as in chemistry) and 
'middle'. In the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari, 'milieu' should be read as a technical 
term combining all three meanings" (Brian Massumi: 'Notes on the Translation and 
Acknowledgements', in Deleuzel Guattari: Thousand Plateaus, p.xVII). It is in terms of this 
understanding of the middle as milieu that Deleuze argues that "it's not beginnings or ends 
that count, but middles. Things and thoughts advance or grow out from the middle, and 
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trickster object that disturbs a circulation by generating and inhabiting its impossible 
margins in such a way as to destabilise the entire arrangement in the process225 . 
The ball figures as the over-determined, super charged object/function that fuses 
withdrawal (of the object) and production (of the space to run in), with both being 
premised on the ball as constitutive absence.226 
2.4 Modes of treason 
But this is also how the game becomes uncontained and starts asserting a 
fundamentally dispersed, sprawling type of arrangement. The space produced in 
the home-run partakes in the established game only ever in oblique ways, partially 
suspending its dynamics and partially shifting its field as well as its possible and 
factual participants. In Orozco's Home-Run, this extends the game, Buchloh argues, 
and in doing so spins the logic further into an accumulative juxtaposition cohered 
around the difficulty of a viewing position. But it also generates a point where the 
game is unhinged to such a degree that the very relation between ball, game, 
players and the fields constituted through and between them, needs to be 
reconsidered beyond the dynamics of formalised game structures, and as possible 
components for a different kind of arrangement. "The inability to resolve its 
contradictions" then is no longer an endpoint but to the contrary, a beginning 
opening onto a whole range of set-up sprawls that betray the very logic of the given 
set-up. 
2.4.1. The ball "and ... and ... and ... " 
Most of what is projected onto and condensed in the baseball as trigger object (in 
both cases) relates the ball back to the game it emerged and disappeared from. 
Assessing its currency from this perspective refers the ball back to the function it 
fulfilled in the game and in doing so presents closure for a game that only opened 
up through the disappearance of its carrier. A home run occurs as play in the 
impossible bracket whose second part is the open-ended disappearance of the ball 
that's where you have to get to work, that's where everything unfolds." (Gilles Deleuze: 
Negotiations, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p.161) 
225 In a winning home run but also in a more regular one, its effects on the game remain the 
same, at least until the next hit. The decisive home run is only the more explicit variant. 
226 For a structural account of the function of absent centre and supplementarity in the form 
of play, see Jacques Derrida's notion of playas "field of infinite substitutions only because it 
is finite, that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field [ ... ], instead of being 
too large, there is something missing from it: a centre which arrests and grounds the play of 
substitutions." (365) (Jacques Derrida, 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences', in Writing and Difference, London/ NY: Routledge 2001, pp.351-370, 
p.365) 
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and that suspends and completes the original game. Yet positing the ball as 
ultimate trophy re-inscribes it in the competitive currency of baseball and in doing so 
stabilises the structural economy of the game. What it provides in this form is 
closure as completion of the incomplete that brackets its own impossibility. Hence 
the extreme value- this is the object as fetish, as carrier of its own impossible 
closure.227 
All this refers to value as defined within the currency of the game and its pre-
established stakes, and leaves the ball inside the picture. Yet taking off from the 
home run and extending its unfolding of spaces within which to operate, the ball 
also generates a much more promiscuous effectivity that is open-ended and in 
relation to which the player reaching home is but a substitute ending. This outwards 
effectivity is derived from the ball's status as multiply invested but then takes off 
from it, in combination (but not strict synchronicity) with its leaving the field. Only in 
the imploded economy of the completed game is the ball accounted for, yet on its 
own trajectory (on which the economy of the baseball ground is carried along only 
as a residual charge), the dynamic it generates spins out as much as it aims back. 
The ball produces a result, but it also enables all kinds of other things to happen. 
Relieved of its direct function for the game, its use too changes outside of the 
immediate realm of the game. 
Once outside the catchable, the ball does many things only some of which still 
relate to the game. The first effect is generated through the above-described 
trickery and works inwards: evading closure (defying to be re-introduced into and 
captured by the game). The ball messes with the economy and rules of the game 
and generates effects in relation to these: effects that push complete exchange 
patterns as well as rhythms of baseball into a slow dance of demonstrative 
unchallenged fulfilment. The one who knocks the ball out operates as its trickster 
generator, playing the game in such a way as to remove himself from its constraints 
whilst all the time remaining operative within its structuring framework. 
The second type of effect though spirals outbound, in such a way as to loose its 
grounding in the game it started off from. Even though the home-run is an implosion 
of the game, folding the game back onto itself in a paradoxical temporality of 
suspended deferral and anticipated completion, the ball is all the while also involved 
227 One possibility here is an argument about investment into the game (psychic and 
otherwise) as an inward perspective that could draw on mechanisms of displacement and 
transferance. The second one would propose an argument about the object as trigger 
function that generates a configuration, whilst it is supposed to contain it in the former 
reading. It is from the latter reading that the promiscuity of the trigger can be ascertained. It 
simply cannot be articulated from the other. 
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in an outbound sprawl that makes claims outside of the established ground. Even 
though and because its actual trajectory and movements cease to bear any 
relevance for the development of the game once they become irrecuperable for its 
exchange, the ball nevertheless stays in circulation and continues to generate 
effects in other milieus. 
In Delillo, the story of the home-run is one of un-grounding from the onset and 
starts with the way a boy enters the stadium by disappearing from grasp, by being 
out of reach. From the very beginning when he jumps the turnstile, "he knows 
absolutely-knows it all the way, deeps as knowing goes, he feels the knowledge 
start to hammer in his runner's heart-that he is uncatchable,,228, and it is like this 
only that "he hears the crescendoing last chords of the national anthem and sees 
the great open horseshoe of the grandstand and that unfolding vision of the grass 
that always seems to mean he has stepped outside his life,,229. In a way and from 
the start, the boy himself mirrors (approaches the condition of) the ball of the home-
run, and it is from this particular rogue status turned stealth that "you [then] lose him 
in the crowd,,23o and that this disappearance is not the end but the beginning of his 
engagement with (the) baseball. Only that this circulation is constituted beyond the 
structural coherence of the game, and produces/ allows for a fundamentally 
heterogeneous series of effects that only ever refer back to the game in oblique and 
partial ways. In the shift from one series to the other, the lost and recovered ball of 
the home-run is re-constituted as magical object with promises of effectivity that 
regard the object itself as much as they grant these powers to its new handler. And 
in this transferance lies the possibility of new realms within which new uses for the 
ball develop. 
In a first instance the inward move inaugurated by the boy's immersion in the crowd, 
continues in the dive under the benches to get hold of the ball and the difficulty in 
grasping the ball. Yet as a negative centre the ball also disappears from the game 
in the same move. The ball is simultaneously deep in the stadium and out of reach, 
outside of the game it propelled up to this point. Now it has determined the game, 
and starts disassociating itself by transforming the inward implosion of the game 
into an outward move that leaves the entire set-up behind. For the boy the "game is 
way behind him. The crowd can have the game. He's after the baseball now and 
228 Delillo, op.cit., p.14 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid., p.13f 
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there's no time to ask himself why,,231. As traitor to the game, he takes the ball 
elsewhere and towards new uses invented outside baseball and its grounds. 
Firstly and like in the home run itself, this is again a question of spaces and speeds 
and how to organise one in order to overcome the other. Along this way, the ball 
performs all kinds of tricks. First tricks of evasion, where the boy who had taken the 
ball (not simply found it)232 cannot get away because he is caught up in a situation 
that is not his and does not grant him the anonymity/ invisibility needed. "If he starts 
running at this point, what we have is a black kid running in a mainly white crowd 
and he is being followed by a pair of irate whites yelling thief or grief or 
something,,233, and it is under these terms that he uses the ball for tricks of evasion 
that fuse its function in the game with its use as a ball. Pursued by the other (white) 
man who claims the ball to be his, "he cuts sharp and ducks away, skidding to his 
knees and wheeling on his right hand, the ball hand, pressing the ball hard in the tar 
and using it to pivot,,234. Like in the game the ball is here too a vehicle for evasion 
that has to stay out of the other's reach in order to grant movement. 
Yet when the son finally shifts milieu and "they are past the ballpark crowd now, this 
is unmixed Harlem here", the game shifts and "all he has to do is get to the corner, 
to people and lights" to claim the safety granted by his touching base, his running 
home as it were. For Cotter, running home turns into the mode of a stroll that 
introduces its own kind of play into the dynamics. "He holds the ball chest-high and 
turns it in his fingers, which isn't easy when you're running-he rotates the ball on 
its axis, spins it slowly over and around, showing the two hundred and sixteen 
raised red cotton stitches.,,235 The gesture is gratuitous, a-functional and serves the 
sole purpose of demonstrating the new realm within which the ball can now unfold a 
different use, and one that is outside of the game's original economy (of powers, 
race, speed and distances): "The maneuver makes [the other man] slow down. [ ... ] 
Because the maneuver makes him realize where he is. The fact that [the boy] is not 
scared. The fact that he's parading the baseball" claims the ball for a circulation yet 
to be defined. "So he stands there [ ... ] and spins the ball up and over the back of 
his hand and catches it skipping off his wrist with a dip and twist of the same hand, 
like fuck you mister who you messing with.,,236 
231 Ibid., pA5 
232 All this obviously after having jumped the barrier in the first place. 
233 Ibid., p.52 
234 Ibid., p.56 
235 Ibid., p.57 
236 Ibid. 
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The ball is now constituted as potentially effective, rather than predetermined as 
fetish. This is the moment of the ball "like it's too magical to hold steady-it's giving 
him palsy and making his eyes pop", the magic of which is now the boy's who is 
"doing it nasty and mad" because it allows him to "star[e] down his old man" 237. In a 
series of new applications develops a potentiality for other uses, turning the ball into 
something to activate outside of its original economy. The boy taking the ball away 
and outside of the game indicates the function of the traitor as 'creative theft' in that 
he manages to steal in order to appropriate and re-configure, rather than simply in 
an attempt to usurp power and financial status. Whilst "the trickster claims to take 
possession of fixed properties, or to conquer a territory, or even to introduce a new 
order", the boy can be seen to operate as a "traitor to the world of dominant 
significations, and to the established order,,238 by re-assigning use and use-value in 
defiance of and beyond the game itself, and through a very different kind of 
investment in its residue. The boy's theft goes beyond the trickster operations 
performed to obtain it. (All his virtuoso trickery is organised around a question of 
ownership and indeed of inverting its distribution between the one without the ticket 
and the (white) one with ticket, between the impostor and the one with the rightful 
claim. And this claim is not even simply socially determined and biased. In the book, 
it is indeed the white man who takes hold of the ball first, the boy then snatches it 
only after.) In contrast to these distributions, the boy's treason consists in the way in 
which what happens with the ball is increasingly removed from any of those 
concerns and poses the boy in a deeper contradiction to "the world of dominant 
Significations (see above) for which the father as excluded is emblematic. His 
perspective on the ball is entirely scripted within dominant formations of economic/ 
exchange value and the desire to enter into their transactions. 
In this move, the ball is not only taken out of the ground, it is also removed from 
exchange. "The ball's not for sale, not this ball,,239 because it starts producing a 
different kind of dynamic where use value dominates, only that the dimension of use 
itself remains unclear, or rather multiple. This precarious potential implodes once re-
introduced into the economy of the game. The (newly expanded) value of the ball 
cannot be cashed in because once outside it carries its link to the game as purely 
residual charge that needs to be mobilised in different ways and for new situations. 
The link does not allow for the ball's new expanded use-value to be translated back 
into exchange value, because the original reciprocity and the mutuality of shared 
237 Ibid., p.145 
238 Deleuzel Parnet, op.cit., p.41. 
239 Delillo, op.cit., p.55 
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criteria for assessment are gone and have been replaced by a singular 
embedded ness in new use-inventions. 
The sale is therefore point of closure for this freely productive circulation of the ball, 
and marks the point where the previous holder and his 'creative theft' cease to be 
involved and the ball has reverted back (unsuccessfully) to being the object of 
trickery. Its current owner does not even enter into the equation; his entry is 
negotiated through monetary exchange and effectively re-introduces the ball into 
the 
economy that had been betrayed by the boy (albeit by way of hyperinflation, loss of 
value etc). This too is betrayal, but one which only re-introduces the ball into the 
pre-established Circulation, and thus eclipses the 'creative' potential of treason as 
other move. The difference also entails a very different attitude toward the object in 
question. For the boy and from the beginning, this was about the ball not the game, 
precisely in such a way that he didn't kow why. He was "after the baseball now and 
there's no time to ask himself why" in such a way that the object cancels out the 
notion of context and condition.240 For the father though and once "sitting in the 
open on the unused bed,,241, disconnected from the son, the formerly magical object 
is only ever "a valuable thing,,242 that he takes because this value is transferable, 
and exactly not singular. A relationship to a commodity object with no particular 
becoming whatsoever.243 The father thus betrays not only trust (his son's), but also 
the very potentiality of the ball as trigger for a series of different uses and with them 
juxtapositions and encounters under different terms. In contrast to the creative theft 
of the son, the father's appropriation is the kind of betrayal which operates 
exclusively within a contained horizon of recuperation.244 
240 Ibid., p. 45 
241 Ibid., p.149 
242 Ibid. 
243 All the boy's uses of the ball are a becoming other. "Nothing reveals treason better than 
the choice of object" (Oeleuze/ Parnet, op.cit., pA2), because even where it is not a 
becoming, it is an investment away from the game into the potentiality of its future handlings 
and uses. 
244 ParnetiOeleuze use betrayal and treason indistinctly (Oeleuze/ Parnet, op.cit., pAOf), 
partially also because the French language of the original text does not differentiate along 
the same lines as the English language does - trahison covers both betrayal and treason. 
Yet the slippage between the two terms in English allows to set apart inward and outward 
tendencies of treason: Zizek's analysis of the sacrifice proposes different degrees of closure 
in the various scenarios of betrayal presented but ultimately he subsumes all of them under 
a notion of feigned deception (Slavoj Zizek: On Belief, p.70f). 
It is in the writing of treason that the stakes become clearer. In Gore Vidal's traitor novel Burr 
(Narratives of Empire: Burr. A Novel, London: Random House, 1973), one level of betrayal 
is involved in the writing of a counter history from the perspective of the traitor figure 
(Colonel Aaron Burr). Its very perspective thus launches a challenge to canonical historical 
accounts by revalorising the figure of the traitor. But more importantly, under these terms 
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2.4.2 "and ... and ... and" its Stories 
But even after this cut, the validity of the conventional, recognised and supposedly 
verifiable economic criteria re-instated through Manx' (the father's) theft needs to be 
re-asserted through an effort to link the object back to its former milieu. Yet the 
object itself bears only incidental proof of that link, "a little sort of green paint 
smudge near the seam,,245 that refers back to the green pillars of the stadium and is 
already contaminated by the traces of its new use, "a scant trace of tar, because 
Cotter must have bounced the ball in the street,,246. Any attempt to re-introduce the 
ball into the economy of the game imposes verifiable categories on the ball's value 
that the object itself cannot answer any longer. It remains unverifiable as such, and 
so the needed link has to be argued through the story of its removal from the 
ground. The re-introduction becomes a lure challenged always through the story's 
fundamental lack of plausibility. Assessed under criteria that completely eclipse the 
new field of value, obstacled by class247 and race248 , the story itself fails to become 
a proof. "Who pays attention to us? They see two coloreds from nowhere. They 
gonna believe some colored boy snatch the ball out of them legions in the 
crowd?,,249 
Instead of trying to answer assessable categories of verification, the link needs to 
be made through enhanced fiction that bypasses criteria of verification because it 
can be prolonged and received as fiction. "He ought to be looking or fathers and 
sons.[ ... ] See, even if the man doesn't believe it, the boy will. And Manx can 
imagine a little conspiracy in the making, the father and the hustler working as a 
team to make the boy believe the baseball's rea I. ,,250 Beyond truth criteria251 ), the 
treason produces a series of effects (rather than simply producing an alternative history): 
There is an unravelling of treason that results from superimposing conflicting stories that are 
all underpinned by an exclusive underlying truth claim and therefore automatically challenge 
each other. There is a second type of unravelling where the truth claims themselves unravel 
through that same superimposition. And then there is a third type of treason that always has 
an elsewhere it refers to, and exists as a relationship to that elsewhere. In the overlaps 
between the narrator's betrayal of the traitor (the very premise of the historical account is the 
book's protagonist's desire to betray the traitor) and the various betrayals infolded in that, 
betrayal/ treason ceases to be an act or an operation and becomes a proliferating mode 
instead. 
245 Delillo, op.cit., p.647 
246 Ibid., p.646 
247 There is no stub to prove the boy was even at the match, and even if there was, "the 
ticket stub doesn't say what section you're sitting unless it's reserve seat or box seat" (ibid., 
p.147). 
248 "Won't work, Manx thinks. Black man's not gonna believe anything he says. Think I'm 
some fool running a penny hustle. Black man's gonna look him down with that saucy eye 
he's got for outrageous plots against his person." Ibid., p.642. 
249 Ibid., p.145 
250 Ibid., p.643 
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whole transaction is a passing-on that only partially overlaps with the financial 
exchange. "It is one of those happenstances where the mood downshifts once the 
deal is made. Only normal,,252, because the two registers of investment are 
incompatible: The fascination of the ball does not support the verification of its 
authenticity, or translating into quantifiable registers, since the whole point lies in its 
being somewhat illicit once outside the ground, and therefore uncertified and 
uncertifiable. The financial equivalent traded for inevitably fails to answer the ball's 
worth. "The baseball's bound to appreciate is the word. And the cash be worth less 
by the minute.,,253 All there is to do with the money is to dispose of it, "just to be 
done with it". 254 
Yet fiction is not only the fiction employed to legitimise the ball as economic asset. It 
is also the explicit condition of all this being narrated, with the ball operating as 
trickster object and milieu for the story, just like it does for the game. There is also 
an overall dynamic to the developmental loop from field to outside and back into 
trophy that goes beyond either economy; what is generated is not simply an 
expanded field or a comparative juxtaposition of incompatible economic registers, 
but above all a conjunction of acts and situations as narrated. The different uses of 
the ball as baseball, flight device, trick object255, fetish and dysfunctional commodity 
generate not only these instances of use, but above all exactly the jumps occurring 
between them that make the list so incongruous. Rather than all of these 
possibilities (or exclusively some of them) being contained in the object, the ball 
operates as trigger/ catalyst for these jumps and juxtapositions. Its aspects and 
functions don't cohere other than as devices for a narrativity that sprawls in jumps 
and contiguities. 
251 "The line is true in this case but what's the difference? Manx has told amazing lies that 
were a lot easier falling from his lips than anything he could say about this little spheroid 
fact." (ibid., p.647) 
252 Ibid., p.653 
253 Ibid., p.654 
254 Ibid., p.655 
255 The trick is sported by the boy at least twice: once in a gesture of defiance against the 
other who's after the ball ("and then he turns and does a caper, he does a physical jape-
running backwards for a stretch, high stepping, mocking, showing Bill the baseball. He's a 
cutup in a sour state. He holds the ball chest-high and turns it in his fingers, which isn't easy 
when you're running-he rotates the ball on its axis, spins it slowly over and around, 
showing the two hundred and sixteen raised cotton stitches." (ibid., p.57)), once against the 
father, feeling "anger and bluster come into his face": "He holds it out, he spins it on the tips 
of his fingers. He holds it high in his right hand and uses the other hand to spin it. He doesn't 
give a damn. He sports it, he shows it off." (ibid., p.144); and then as re-enactment by the 
father where this doesn't do anything because it is now intentioned/ functionalised to 
improve the chances of selling the ball, and thus has to fail. "He's not sure why he's doing 
this since it proves nothing except the fact that he has a ball, at least he has a ball, and he 
holds it up much the way his son Cotter had held it earlier in the evening." (ibid., p.642f) 
page 111 
Beyond the different functions of the ball thus recounted, this traitor function 
indicated by the boy is effectively fulfilled by the book as (baseball) novel too, 
carried forth by the narrative drive that carries the ball through situations as well as 
the book.256 Deleuze/Parnet address this kind of link between narrativity and 
treason when, in the context of "the superiority of American literature', they describe 
exactly "the traitor [as] the essential character of the novel, the hero,,257. In the 
particular type of conjunction Deleuze describes under the formula of 
"and ... and ... and ... ,,258, narrativity is not premised on development and resolution of 
plot, but offers instead a different model of dynamic, one "proceeding from the 
middle, through the middle, coming and going rather than starting and finishing,,259. 
It is always also directed at an elsewhere "which will make language shoot along,,260 
"syntax and experimentation, syntax and pragmatics,,261. 
If it was to be brought back into an oppositional configuration, exactly this 
incommensurability could be posited as contrast between an attitude of 
experimentation262 on one hand and 'Transgression,2630n the other.264 Whilst the 
Itter is bound up in the structures it supposedly overcomes and is constituted 
through their horizon as limit to overcome, the former constitutes this horizon as 
threshold (if at all) and actively inhabits what Deleuze/Parnet characterise as a 
"relationship with the outside".265 
With Orozco, this type of uncontaining narrativity is prominent in the videos and the 
importance paid to (random) itineraries in their making; his interest in "the liquidity 
of things, how one thing leads you on to the next" manifests itself in the combinatory 
contiguity of images through which "things are related, but through proximity rather 
than narrative" so that the resulting new type of narrative "is like a series of 
256 The particular construction of Underworld is important for this: made up of modular blocks 
that are arranged in disjuncted chronological fragments. They cohere around various plot 
lines and undermine these by constantly interspersing them with opening bits of all the other 
lines. The overall chronology broadly covers the second half of the twentieth century, but the 
book's effective temporality relies on the juxtapositions between fragments, and their 
development across separate occurrences. 
257 Deleuze/Parnet, op.cit., pA1 
258 See Deleuzel Guattari: Thousand Plateaus, p.25; Deleuzel Parnet, op.cit., p.10. and 
p.57-59. 
259 Deleuzel Guattari: op.cit., p.25 
260 Deleuzel Parnet, op.cit., p.59 
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid., pA1 
263 Ibid., pA7 
264 In a similar take on the postmodern as affirmative criticality, Lyotard opposes jubilation 
and invention to attitudes of melancholia and nostalgia of the whole. See Lyotard, op.cit., 
esp. 'Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism?', pp.71-82, esp. p.79-81. 
265 Deleuzel Parnet, op.cit., p.36 
page 112 
punctums-focal points of attention". Their new type of narrativity is determined by 
encounters that "trace a series of connections between two things" where "the 
connections themselves are real, not metaphoric,,266. They develop their own 
dynamics held together by a flow of contiguous narrativity (rather than the bracket of 
a plot and its implicit resolution in some kind of denouement).267 
In 'home-run', narrative potential in this sense of a runaway sprawl of connections is 
activated by a decisive nonchalance that characterises all levels of the project: 
There is irreducible nonchalance in the way the oranges are placed on the 
windowsills. And even this nonchalance is already double: Orozco's nonchalant 
gesture of invitation comes first, only to then be echoed back by the nonchalant (yet 
careful) way in which the oranges' presentations are put together, engineered and 
improvised and which reverberates through the work. 
And then most importantly there is too the nonchalance not only of their placing, but 
also of its harshly incomplete, fragmentary and exemplary268 documentation. 
Instead of actually documenting the project, 'Home-run's photographic afterlife 
stages multiple (and always insufficient) viewing positions onto the work through 
explicit non-documentation: different vantage points, some generally accessible 
(courtyard), some explicitly not (view from window), and the way the documentation 
plays with invisibility in the overall view of the apartment buildings where the 
oranges are hardly, if at all, visible, generate a range of trigger possibilities, rather 
than a conclusive account of the work. That they operate as starting possibilities, 
rather than prescribing a position, is enhanced also through the fact that some of 
the photographs are taken from a location on the same level as the participating 
flats (undoing the hierarchies implicit in any configuration of museum/world as 
superior, inferior etc). 
266 Orozco: A Thousand Words, p.11S. This insistence on the reality of connections found 
and made also leads Orozco to not use postproduction in the making of these videos, 
choosing instead to follow the dynamic and developments of encounters made as they are 
documented at the same time. 
267 Liliane Terrier talks about it as recit interactif (see Terrier, op.cit., n.p.), in the same way 
in which N Katherine Hayles talks about literature as hypertextual (Hayles, op.cit.). All of 
these accounts are structural though and here need shifting toward an engagement with the 
dynamics and possibilities thus generated. 
268 The photographic documents through which the work circulates (as far as it does not 
circulate exclusively through a talking about; see e.g. Bourriaud: Relational Aesthetics, 
p.17), have to be considered as another example of the work. Not its substitute in enduring 
form but an example in the active sense of "that which is shown alongside (like the German 
Bei-Spiel, that which plays alongside)" (Agamben: Coming Community, p.10). 
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fig.20 
The photographic non-documentation of the work as it circu lates through 
illustrations and catalogue documentation269 , thus fails to cohere the oranges into 
either elements of a documented exchange (no documentation avai lable of the 
transactions that took place, including correspondences etc) or component parts of 
an overall pattern arranged and cohered around the museum's sculpture garden 
(where the whole front is shown, it is nearly impossible to make out the oranges at 
269 The other way round , in the physical exhibition space, Orozco's Photogravity installation 
addresses his works' circulation as photographs and problematises their implicit promise of 
access(ability) by installing sculptural photo cut-outs of his best-known pieces, supported by 
somewhat excessively ornate metal supports, all facing one direction in a space to be 
traversed by the visitor (Museum Studies 5: Gabriel Orozco, Philadelphia Museum of Art, 
October 27 - December 12 1999). For a discussion of the combinatory logic between 
Orozco's works and the Arensberg collection of pre-Columbian artefacts in the museum, see 
Gabriel Orozco: Photogravity, exh. cat. Philadelphia Museum of Art, Philadelphia: 
Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1999. 
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all). Attention switches instead from an observing to a projecting gaze that never 
has enough support to know what register to project under, opening the range to all 
kinds of narrative fabulations27o. Exactly in this consciously staged insufficiency and 
surplus, the photographs act as triggers for the kind of narrative imaginings they 
seem at first sight to block. Avoiding an overall account of the work and thus acting 
against metaphorical subsumption, the photos impose instead multiple deviations 
on the reading of the work and allow for a new sort of attachment to the seemingly 
insignificant, multiplying the connective possibilities of the project itself with those of 
the photographic evidence thereof. 
When, in the same context, Orozco suspends a hammock between two trees in 
the museum court yard ,271 documentation pushes this contradictory type of 
dematerialisation even further: In the photographs of the work, the hammock as 
temporary and supplementary occupation of the space, already in itself closer to the 
Bertoia chairs than to the surrounding sculptures, becomes nearly invisible as 
physical structure and is hard to actually make out in the photograph272 . fig 
270 For fabulation as anti-memory, see Gilles Deleuzel Felix Guattari: What is Philosophy? 
London: Verso, 1994. esp. p.168: "The monument's action is not memory but fabulation, we 
write not with childhood memories but through blocs of childhood that are the becoming-
child of the present. Music is full of them. It is not memory that is needed but a complex 
material that is found not in memory but in words and sounds: 'Memory, I hate you.'" (It is 
however important to differentiate the notion of fabulation as invitation to narrative sprawl 
developed here from the way in which Deleuze and Guattari 's account posits affect and 
percept as "autonomous and sufficient beings that no longer owe anything to those who 
experience or have experienced them" (ibid .)). 
271 Gabriel Orozco: Hammock Between Two Skyscrapers, The Museum of Modern Art, New 
York 1993 
272 The chairs are actual museum furniture, yet Orozco himself has repeatedly worked with 
very similar chairs, playing their circumscription of volume off against a surrounding 
background penetrating its space. In Chacahua, he goes so far as to re-arrange the 
juxtapositon of hammock and chairs in the book's central double-page spread. 
fig.24 
Even where the chairs figure as explicitly sculptural like they do here, they are also shown in 
(the aftermath of) their original use-context (as belonging to the domestic when figured in the 
inverted ruin of a deserted construction site, or to the semi-public space of a shop front). 
They are thus related back to a (previous) functionality that now in turn informs their new 
contextualisation. 
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Undercutting even the volume of the wire-frame chairs surrounding it, the hammock 
instead enters into a visual dialogue with a light reflection on the wall behind it, 
thrown off a window of one of the surrounding buildings, and establishes a different 
register of visibility for the hammock supposedly at the centre of the work. The 
physical object is thus made, in the photograph, to approximate the temporary and 
insubstantial register of the light trace in such a way that both are bound together 
and mutually undone by being framed in the precarious visibility of the photograph. 
Instead of providing closure, the photographs thus play alongside, becoming 
another instance in the work's play across registers. 
From the initial set-up through to the non-documentation of its effects, the work 
always already undercuts and overspills representative closure. The baseball-
oranges are staged as starting points onto a dimension of contingency actively 
solicited through the work's various levels of letting go. This is the point where the 
work goes beyond the established parameters of the game itself (beyond baseball, 
and beyond the accountabilities of institutional critique, sculptural critique, social 
practice) and opens onto a different series; a series where Orozco's oranges 
disperse themselves in the open ended circulations they enter in the flats and 
beyond, rather than simply being incorporated: they become parts of social and 
domestic and individual, mundane and artificial sets of practices and handlings, with 
their own respective (at least imagined) narrativities the limits of which are no longer 
controlled by an authoring intentionality or scripted institutional framework but only 
be contained r indeed uncontained by the attitudes played out in relation to them. 
Looking at the oranges on the windowsills from the sculpture court (and even more 
so looking at the documenting photographs of some of the oranges), is not simply a 
staring illicitly into the flats and offices which would necessarily result in the 
recognition of an impossible conjunction of realms and the irresolvably 
compromised remit of art in relation to these273 . 
Fig 
See Gabriel Orozco: Chacahua, exh. cat. Portikus, Frankfurt aM: Portikus, 2000. 
273 See Suchloh, op.cit. 
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fig.27 
Rather it is a starting point that allows for or at least offers, entices an active 
dreaming up of stories too. Some of these dreams will be factual, that is the nature 
of the project's workings, carried out by the museum's administrative infrastructure 
inviting residents to become participants, writing and receiving correspondence 
which is then filed and archived etc. These are, like all others, only ever facets of a 
broader enabled milieu of ways of being involved. Being a functional 'registered' 
participant of the work and participating by dreaming/ imagining/ recounting/ 
fictionalising are then simply different facets in a fundamentally expanded mode of 
participation. This too needs to be accounted for in terms of treason, rather than 
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trickery. It is effectively taking the game outside of itself, and starts playing it 
elsewhere. 
The mirroring of modes that occurs between types of involvement and approaches 
to them, oscillates between trickery and treason and in doing so goes beyond 
simply replacing one way of playing the game by another. It reconfigures instead 
what kind of cohering or indeed un-cohering structures a game might set up, and 
what kind of operations might be produced in relation to it. The shift away from 
moves that are accounted for towards more random (multiple) dynamics marks the 
point where a certain way of playing the game (and this way is set-up in the very 
making of the project) feeds back onto the game in such a way as to un-cohere its 
basic make-up. An account of the game as structured activity can then no longer 
contain the range of grounds, moves and approaches involved. And time, too, is 
then only one facet of a multidimensional set-up operating along the lines of 
heterogeneous narrativity and poetics. The multiple realms of operation also 
undercut the generic applicability of criteria under which to engage with the work's 
component parts. 
The factual, empirical and sociological start overlapping with the fantasmatic, 
imaginary and their poetics here. Rather than imposing registers, they have to be 
worked out in conjunction with the work and read from it. Not as a reading into, but 
as a reading away from it that is itself a creative theft. Much like this chapter itself 
performs treason by taking the ball and playing (with) it elsewhere. 
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3 Mode Three: Humour (Imploding effects) 
"The world, however, is not a room into which one enters.,,274 
Playing in its expanded sense where it approaches the condition of treason involves 
and indeed requires moves beyond measure, and extends milieus beyond the point 
of recuperation. Yet the dynamics of sprawl generated in these moves are never 
uni-directional (as moves beyond measure do not exceed measure quantitatively 
but defy it qualitatively). Playing out humour, and indeed the dimension of effects 
triggered through it, allows re-setting this directedness. If anything, humour 
operates by means of implosion and inward destabilisation, as far as these 
spatialisations are tenable as such. In contrast to the proliferations outlined in 'Mode 
Two: Treason (Stories of play)' above, the present chapter therefore tentatively 
inverts tendencies, re-setting the outward tendencies of treason through humour as 
inward movement directed into situations. Traps are the final test for thus inverting 
inward and outward moves whilst simultaneously insisting on their destabilising 
potential and their capacity for undoing capture. 
3.1 Models and attitudes and some series of works 
The present chapter thus outlines humour as an equivalent to the outward dynamic 
of treason as discussed in 'Mode Two: Treason (Stories of play)' above. It will allow 
for a methodological shift from structuring models and their attendant reading 
strategies towards attitudes which allow to set up multiple engagements under 
shifting terms and beyond accountability. These shifts away from structures and 
towards flexible modes of engagement will be developed by outlining Freud's 
cohering model of the joke as one that produces closure through its insistence on 
structural coherence and (refined) legibility, and will be contrasted with a dynamic 
notion of humour as suggested by Deleuze. By mode of contrast, the latter notion is 
constituted as encompassing a multiplicity of approaches and involvements and is 
premised on a pragmatics of effects rather than on the coherent programmatics of 
structured sets and their operations. 
Treason sets up a twofold relationship with the outside of its situation in that it 
sprawls outward and through this very leaving-behind produces effects on what is 
being left behind. By leaving behind the situation it betrays and that situation's 
component parts in moves elsewhere, it simultaneously undermines the very 
coherence of that situation of departure, in the same operation but asymmetrically 
274 Nancy, Being Singular Plural, p.97 
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because under fundamentally different terms. It constitutes an unstable 
configuration, is inherently active, and only ever exists as dynamic set of tensions 
and movements between outsides and insides, through which both are re-arranged 
and re-articulated. Their effects combine asymmetrical outside and inside moves/ 
tendencies in a heterogeneity which makes even the underlying distinction between 
trickery and treason as two separate operations, untenable. This is not because 
they could not be differentiated. Indeed, Deleuze outlines their respective 
morphologies at length in Dialogues, with the kind of binary bias he then later 
reputes in relation to such key terms as tree/ root and rhizome275 . Rather, trickery 
and treason as mutually related and incommensurate umbrellas through which to 
conceptualise artistic practice, relate to their respective differentiations in very 
different ways: whilst trickery founds its supposed distinctions from treason through 
its economically premised logic of operations, treason destabilises any account if 
not practice of trickery by undoing the very logic of economic accountability on 
which the differentiation could be based. Treason is an operation/ effect of 
expanded entanglement that goes beyond clear-cut operations and accountabilities. 
In contrast to contained betrayal, which consists in a more or less straightforward 
switching over of allegiances, treason in this sense fundamentally defies the very 
premise of allegiance as such, allowing through this suspension for an unbound 
movement between things, positions and situations. Treason's affirmative potential 
itself thus betrays the differentiation between trickery and treason and turns that 
distinction itself into a strategic operation which matters only in relation to the kinds 
of effects either modality allows to generate. 
A juxtaposition between trickery and treason therefore never really sets up a 
relationship between distinct and mutually exclusive sets of characteristics and 
features. Instead it marks a shift towards new forms of engagement with 
corresponding sets of emphasis and interests. It constitutes a shift away from 
structures of intervention and analytically informed interference (trickery) and 
towards a sprawling entanglement and affirmative taking-elsewhere producing 
whatever effects. And if features in this relationship between inside and outside are 
unstable because they are generated under the terms of a dynamic premised on 
effective registers, then it must be possible too to modify or indeed invert most of 
these characteristics without necessarily altering/ undermining the attitude and 
stakes discussed above. If treason was above discussed as an outward move 
under these terms, then there must be a way too, to mobilise the multiplicity of its 
275 Deleuzel Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p.15 
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direction towards a new kind of inward move that operates without re-containing 
and re-cohering the arrangement. In this inversion, the very distinction between 
different spatialities is only ever of tactical relevance in relation to what it allows to 
produce. 
In this move, specificities of engagement and context are effectively replaced by 
attitudes. And these, as such, as attitudes, set up new forms of relations no longer 
only premised on the specific contextualities of a situation but also generative in 
return. 
In an oblique parallelism, this move from trickery towards treason is mirrored in the 
attitudinal shift Oeleuze outlines between irony and humour as two forms of the 
comic. "Humour is treacherous, it is treason,,276 in that both treason and humour 
allow for multiple modes of engagement. From this starting point, humour moves in 
relation to irony in a similar way to the way in which treason undermines trickery, in 
Oeleuze and for the purpose of the following. Whilst treason defies the contained 
economy of trickery, humour in this take goes beyond the signifying parameters of 
irony and opens onto other multiply involved registers of engagement. Following 
and foregrounding Oeleuze's proposed shift form irony to humour, Sigmund Freud's 
theorisations around the workings of the joke are here posited as operating at the 
opposite of engagements with the comic and can thus provides the kind of 
structured backdrop onto which the dynamics of humour as outlined above can be 
projected.277 
3.1.1 Irony and patterns of closure in Freud's jOke-work 
Freud conceptualises the joke as an internalised resolution of incongruities in the 
world, and relates it closely to the unconscious, his other central figuration of the 
inside. Oeleuze's notion of humour is an attitudinal form whilst Freud's joke is 
conceived as an analysable structure, and they are fundamentally 
incommensurable with each other. Yet even though they posit two diametrically 
opposed notions, they nevertheless overlap in their claims to 'the comic', and it is 
276 Deleuze/ Parnet, op.cit., p.68. 
277 The thesis here takes up Deleuze's proposition of a (polemical) move from irony to 
humour, and plays it through a consciously contrasting juxtaposition with Freud's notion of 
irony. This is certainly not even trying to work from more sophisticated notions of irony. To 
the contrary, this particular (and probably particularly blunt) template notion of the ironic is 
necessary in order to profile the shift Deleuze's move from irony to humour is trying to make 
available. Because of the polemical relationship to Freud throughout Deleuze's (and 
Deleuze/ Guattari's) work, Freud seemed an appropriate foil against which to project the 
shift. For a smoother discussion of Deleuze's notion of humour in relation to (postmodern) 
irony see Claire Colebrook, Irony in the Work of Philosophy, Lincoln/ London: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2002, pp.207-259 ('Inhuman Irony and the Postmodern'), reo humour and 
irony esp. p.237. 
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precisely by playing out the incongruities of this coming together that humour and 
the joke can be mobilised for a set of inward moves that translate treason's 
outwardly going-beyond into an equally ambiguous internalisation of world. 
The following will therefore read Freud's take on the joke as a quintessentially ironic 
model, and juxtapose it with gestures278 concerned with humour. As attitudinal 
gestures these stand in contrast not so much to the content of Freud's analysis as 
such but to the cohering attitudes informing its form of analysis and interpretation. 
Humour in this sense is not a model of intelligibility to be employed or a technique to 
be mobilised, but rather provides the possibility of generating encounters (outside of 
analytical and straightforwardly critical accountabilities) by setting up the slippery 
terms under which these can be produced and engaged with. 
In Freud279 and under the terms of an underlying conceptual fusion with the 
unconscious, the joke is a figure which produces an ambiguous challenge to 
signification, which can be recuperated through an expanded signifying economy 
very similar to and derived directly from the one Freud had previously developed in 
relation to dreams28o . As "arbitrary connecting or linking, usually by means of verbal 
278For a notion of gesture as production outside the parameters of functionality and 
economy, see Agamben's 'Notes on Gesture' in Agamben: Means Without Ends, pp.49-60. 
For their implied political dimension of 'free use' in contrast to "the dialectic of proper and 
improper" see his 'Notes on politics', ibid., pp.109-118, p.117. In relation to contingency 
these are discussed above in 'Mode One: Contingency (Un-fitting settings)' 
279 Sigmund Freud: Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. Newly translated from the 
German and edited by James Strachey. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960. 
280 Manifestations of the comic are here subsumed in the representational configuration of 
psychoanalysis itself which posits condensation, displacement and indirect representation 
as forms of expression or technical methods of the joke only as direct mirror projections onto 
the previously established structural characteristics of the dream-work. "We found that the 
character and effects of jokes were bound up with certain forms of expression, technical 
resources among which the various kinds of condensation, displacement and indirect 
representation are the most striking. But processes leading to the same results of 
condensation, displacement and indirect representation have become familiar to us as 
characteristics of the dream-work. Does not this agreement suggest to us that joke-work and 
dream-work must be identical [ ... ]?" (Freud, op.cit., p.160) 
The entire Freudian configuration of the comic (through to its latter day repercussions in 
quantifying psychology and its careful calibrating of laughter as quantifiable research 
outcome, generated under supposedly verifiable conditions, see e.g. Mary K. Rothbart: 
'Incongruity, Problem-Solving and Laughter', in: Antony J. Chapman and Hugh C. Foot 
(eds), Humour and Laughter. Theory, Research and Applications, London/ NY/ Sidney/ 
Toronto (Wiley and sons) 1976, pp.37-54) rests on a fundamentally cohering attitude for 
which utterances are necessarily representational and legible. The two assumptions 
mutually constitute and determine each other. 
This approach coheres the joke as psychological function and subjects it to overall legibility 
(as the very text of The joke and its Relation to the Unconscious in itself goes to great length 
to demonstrate). In the same move it also locks humour in a stimulusJresponse loop that re-
constitutes overall coherence exactly at the point where this coherence might have been 
undermined through the operations, effects or phenomena of humour and the responses it 
evokes. 
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association, of two ideas which in some ways contrast with each other,,281, the joke 
produces a contrast "only because ... we grant its words a meaning which, again, we 
nevertheless cannot grant them,,282; on this premise, a joke is therefore "able to 
deceive us only for a moment,,283 because the comic effect is produced in the 
subsequent moment when the tension between two incommensurable registers of 
meaning is released in a "solution of this bewilderment,,284. The joke's negotiation 
between different investments and expectations occurs thus as a resolution, and in 
a particular and strictly related economy which is integral to the effect produced, 
and in which "a joke says what it has to say, not always in few words, but in too few 
words-that is in words that are insufficient by strict logic or by common modes of 
thought and speech,,285. By shifting to a register outside of strict logic and common 
conceptual patterns, these words-of-the-joke then become sufficient to resolve 
perceived incongruities without however having to leave behind either logic or 
modes of thought as such. 
Fundamentally, the joke appears to operate between two levels of sense interlinked 
through an experience of incongruity, which is approached as key dimension to be 
taken into account and processed/overcome by the joke itself. The modalities of this 
overcoming differ, from resolution of the incongruity as problem solving through to 
(where such resolution cannot be obtained) the acknowledgement of the joke's 
particular status in relation to the world. "According to McGee(1972), a true humour 
response requires : (1) a concept, (2) awareness that the stimulus violates the 
concept and (3) 'confidence in the impossibility or improbability of the stimulus 
elements occurring as depicted'(p.66),,286 Either way in such structural accounts, 
jokes (and with them laughter, their index, as well as humour) are accounted for as 
ultimately cohering functions that stabilise and re-enforce pre-existing reality 
arrangements; "laughter may occur when an arousing stimulus is judged to be safe, 
when a problem is solved, or when an incongruity or improbable act has occurred 
281 Freud: op.cit., p.11 
282 Ibid., p.12 
283 Ibid., p.12 
284 Ibid., p.13 
285 Ibid. These observations are here brought together to foreground the fragmentary 
character (immediately eclipsed by Freud) of any overview and highlight it as a starting point 
rather than simply a preliminary and insufficient consideration. For a more structured 
account of humour theorisations (rather than humour) see for example: Patricia Keith-
Spiegel, 'Early Conceptions of Humour. Varieties and Issues', in Jeffrey H. Goldstein and 
Paul E. McGhee (eds), The Psychology of Humour. Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical 
Issues, New York/ London: Academic Press, 1972, p.4-39 
286 Rothbart: op.cit., p.51 
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and we can do nothing about it.,,287 In the latter case the recognition of this 
improbability as such safeguards the distance of a position from where to assess 
the arrangement, i.e. an imagined position on the outside of its workings. 
All of this accounts for the joke as structure to be analysed and understood. In order 
to make use of its characteristics in an engagement with practice, it is therefore 
imperative to posit the joke as potential for praxis (rather than structure) under the 
same terms, in such a way as to transform the joke into joking and translate its 
terms and operations from a descriptive model into a performative strategy. In 
Freud, the sequence of inappropriate response, challenge and then ultimately 
resolution of the incongruity underlying the entire proposition, are accounted for as 
consecutive steps in the functioning of the joke. In a straight transfer, they can 
therefore also be posited as consecutive moves in the making of a joke as produced 
through the strategic arrangement of operational component parts. 
In the perspective of such a functional appropriation of the joke as signifying 
pattern, Andreas Slominski's sequence of upside-down posters combining 1970s 
British children's TV programme Bagpuss288 and Bernardo Bertolucci's 1972 movie 
Last Tango in Paris289 with Muhammad Ali and presenting all of them and more 
glued onto a gallery wall,29o can be told step by step as a joke in the Freudian 
schema. Going through the full sequence of inappropriate response and 
subsequent challenge to the categories of what the appropriate would have been, 
the incongruity of the arrangement seems to be ultimately resolved in the comic as 
effect of the recognition of this incoherence. But the work also pushes to the point of 
overspilling any such schema. Both readings coexist (strategically, it is argued 
here). They will be developed one after the other here and such that the effects 
produced are accumulative rather than mutually exclusive. 
There are no apparent overarching criteria behind Slominski's arranged 
combinations, and this seeming lack of criteria in the choice of the works sets up the 
arrangement as incongruous in relation to the gallery space framing it. Their only 
coherence consists in the poster format as such. Supposedly disposable images, 
tokens of changing interests and tastes, the posters are here installed upside-down 
and glued to the gallery wall. Three of them were cut-out complete with their 
plasterboard background and then re-inserted the other way round in order to be 
287 Ibid., p.S2. 
288 8agpuss, TV series, directed! animated by Peter Firmin and Oliver Postgate, UK 1974 
289 Ultimo Tango a Parigi [Last Tango in Paris], directed by Bernardo Bertolucci, Italy 1972. 
290 Andreas Slominski: MUHAMMAD ALI vs SONNY LISTON, 2003 (seven posters, cut 
plasterboard wall), in Andreas Slominski, Sadie Coles HQ, London, 8.10.-8.11.2003 
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right way up. Under the seeming plausibility of this set-up, the inversion is a jokeful 
response to the incongruity of the arrangement in that it shifts the frame of 
reference such that the absurdly excessive series of gestures necessary for the 
image's re-orientation seems to allow for a derisory re-dressing of the perceived 
incongruity. Over-explicitly addressing the posters' inverted appearance rather than 
the obvious idiosyncracies of the installation in terms of choices made and 
handlings implemented, the intervention does not re-dress the incongruity itself, 
only its manifest order. It is in the recognition of this displacement as inappropriate 
that the work operates as a joke in the way conceptualised by Freud. 
" 
fig.28 
That the work should be considered under the terms of a conflict of different 
registers, different images and different worlds at all is set up in the heterogeneity of 
its material samples running up against each other. This same heterogeneous 
quality of their juxtaposition manifests itself also in the physically forced set of 
relations manifested in the foregrounded cutting and pasting of the plasterboard 
support upon which the arrangement is installed. Most prominently though, the 
works relation to an underlying and fundamentally structuring oppositionality is also 
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already signalled in the title, "MUHAMMAD ALI vs SONNY LISTON", taken from a 
boxing match between former heavyweight world champion Sonny Listen and the 
then holder of the title, Muhammad Ali, on May 25 1965. 
The poster for the event is part of the series displayed in the gallery and one out of 
those three in the whole series which were cut-out and turned around. It is part of 
and caught in the series, yet the privileged attention it receives through the 
foregrounded inversion and the reference to it in the overall title of the work, 
effectively simultaneously removes the poster from the series and places it at the 
level of commentary and extra-structural contribution. It becomes module in and 
example for a different pseudo-structural paradigm under whose terms the series 
appears first and foremost as a sequence of conflictual encounters. 
In this, the match signals not only the blunt oppositionality of encounters but also 
the multi-dimensionality of any such encounter. The event behind the poster itself, 
the heavyweight championship fight between Sonny Listen and Muhammad Ali, is 
itself conflict-laden in more ways than one. The clash was not just a boxing match 
because it involved more than one match, and because it articulated a claim that 
was only coincidentally involved in boxing, but was here negotiated through it. 
The match of May25 1965 was a second fight, a repetition of a first encounter 
between the two athletes on February 25 1964 when Muhammad Ali, who was still 
called Cassius Clay then, gained his first world championship title from Liston. The 
implicit pre-history produces a doubling that folds one event into the other and 
through this indicates a cluster of encounters in a broader and more diffuse sense 
that exists across different stories. When the two boxers first encountered each 
other in the ring, Muhammad Ali won his title through Liston not going back into the 
ring from his corner in round seven and conceding the title to a younger boxer with 
an unorthodox style based on surprises and misunderstandings, which in itself 
might or might not resonate with Slominski's work being concerned with the joke 
and the conditions around surprising moves. This was the fight before which Ali 
coined his strategy of 'floating like a butterfly and stinging like a bee', as challenge 
to the orthodoxies of fundamental and causal links in the tactico-stylistic make-up of 
the sport. It is assumed that Liston lost the fight to some extent because he mistook 
Ali's attitude for nervousness and therefore failed to develop adequate responsive 
tactics. 
But this first clash was a boxer's match only as much as it was also part of a 
political and cultural moment it took off from. This the first fight is the one after which 
Cassius Marcellus Clay jr., named after his father who in turn was named after a 
Kentucky abolitionist, became Cassius X on inspiration by his then mentor and ally, 
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spokesperson of the Nation of Islam Malcolm x, with whom he publicly associated 
himself, and then Muhammad Ali , a name given to him by Nation of Islam founder 
Eljah Muhammad, at least partially also as a repositioning gesture. All of this is part 
of the story of the second fight as its prehistory and politico-historical charge, to0291 . 
And with Muhammad Ali winning the second fight under the name he only adopted 
after winning the first one, the victory is part of an afterlife that only confirms the 
outcome of the first one and validates it also in all the grandiose claims invested in 
the choice of name(s) that followed it. While Cassius X served as a marker for 
difference and for the will to inhabit this difference explicitly, Muhammad Ali 
operated as a new given name of belonging and patriarchal allegiance. At stake in 
this naming/ re-naming sequence is not only a positioning, but also an insistence on 
that positioning being solidified into a 'name' in such a way that it forms an 
unsurpassable interface with the social which needs to be acknowledged by others 
and is thus continually re-asserted in an involuntary performance of the social. In 
the fight against Ernie Terrell at Madison Square Gardens in 1967, who had 
refused, along with leading commentators, to use the new name, Ali continually 
challenged his opponent to finally acknowledge his (new) name whilst 
simultaneously winning the fight over him292 . 
Even though apparently simply a boxing match and thus arguably one of the most 
basic types of binary confrontation, there is inevitably more than one economy at 
play in this exchange because the play is never just in the fight. The fight is an 
encounter between two boxers as well as between an old school of boxing and its 
challenge, but then also a junction between the fight on one hand and the march 
towards a political, cultural or social elsewhere on the other. 'Muhammad Ali', in the 
perspective of this double fight, marks the endpoint of an opening from the boxer 
Cassius Clay toward the cultural and political persona of Muhammad Ali. And it 
asserts the aftermath of this juncture trough the accomplished second victory which 
re-confirms all the stakes of the first encounter. All of this triggered through the 
name, and as such also only re-confirming the naming as strategic gesture 
indicating the unavoidable entanglement in supposedly unrelated concerns. 
291 Ali's famous refusal to go to Vietnam with the American army and ultimately successful 
claim for conscientious objector status resonate here too, and with them the often quoted 
statement that he "got nothing against no Viet Cong". The timeline of events does not hinder 
this reading-together because all are seen retrospectively and through reproduction anyway, 
in the same way in which the poster multiplies the original announcement into a 
retrospective trophy and confirmation of celebrity status. 
292 See Gregory Allen Howard, 'Biographical Sketch ', Ali. com, Nov. 2005, avai lable online 
under http://www.ali.com/article.cfm?id=26 (lastaccessed14/10/08).This was also the last 
fight for two and a half years due to the withdrawal of his boxing licence in response to his 
refusal to be inducted to the army to fight in Vietnam. 
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None of this adds up to an allegory, and the entire nexus is at best tangential to 
"SONNY LISTON vs MUHAMMAD ALI" the work and the way in which it 
incorporates the poster. Yet the poster-story's dispersal across levels and registers 
of relevance and meaning including the very probable loss of at least some of these 
registers in the overall nonchalance with which it is presented, at least indicates and 
thus opens onto, an embedded ness that is always multiple. Clashes can be 
simultaneously blunt and complex, heroic as well as treacherous, trasnaprent 
and/or opaque; and it is in this lack of clarity and the impossibility to assess the 
effective impact of any of this that the logic of the fight-poster is always both 
oppositional and multiple, contiguous also with the unstable economies of meaning 
as claimed through namings. Shifting allegiances and ideological as well as sports 
horizons overlap here in such a way as to generate a series of collisions between 
one economy and another which remains quintessentially unknown, and subject to 
an ongoing series of fights and rematches, across the other divide that is 
Muhammad Ali's suspension for the Vietnam refusal. 
Providing the title for the entire arrangement, 'Muhammad Ali vs Sonny Listen' sets 
the tone for an engagement in which combinations of posters and gallery space, 
sequencing and enforced re-orientation can be perceived as simultaneously 
oppositional and entangled. Overall, the entire arrangement sits explicitly 
uncomfortably in relation to what it could appear to present: As items of popular 
culture the posters do not quite cohere into a panorama because the choice is too 
broad and further dispersed through the different languages in which the various 
bits of text appear, irrespective of their countries of origin or particular cultural 
reference pOints (Italian erotic feature film, British children's tv or Afro-American 
boxing history). And as items of teenage bedroom decoration they fall short of the 
kind of psychological profile one could aim to deCipher, ranging too far both sides 
into adulthood and childhood. If anything, they could be argued to reconstitute the 
trivia of 1960s/ 1970s popular culture in the form of a memory assemblage that is 
simultaneously cultural, collective and autobiographical without however resolving 
the inherent tensions between a part-remembered, part-imagined and part-
projected range of stimuli. The organiSing criteria fail to become clear in either take, 
yet bedroom and panorama both seem to offer possible ways to impose order on 
what appears in either case as a sample isolated from a much broader range. The 
effective horizon is irreducibly vast, not least through the way in which posters as 
such circulate as disposable fragments for the assemblage of equally disposable 
(short-lived) reference fields. Posters customarily serve as pin-up projection 
screens, identification templates and constitutors of (imaginary) collectivities, and 
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various combinations of all of these. That they occur here in different languages that 
further multiply the field of distribution these posters occupy, only enhances the 
implicit promise and necessary disposability of the poster as form. 
For the image material in the installation this awkward fit is echoed as tension 
between forced and contingent conditions: between the choice of posters made 
here on one hand and the abundance of the whole available range of images on the 
other. In the same perspective gluing the posters onto the wall contrasts with and 
implicitly highlights what would normally happen to posters: pinning and other more 
provisional forms of temporary and fundamentally malleable arrangements the 
contingency of which normally tends to override the notion of choice and set 
sequences. Here, the work imposes precisely fixity and order as aim or promise 
onto the flexible overall promise of choice, to such an extent that in order for it to be 
changed, the wall supporting it has to be literally and physically cut out. And so 
whilst the underlying choice runs against coherence, its arrangement nevertheless 
defies flexibility and change. In doing so it also denies disposability, the other 
fundamentally defining condition of the poster as cultural carrier which undermines 
the economy of this kind of intervention. 
All of these can be read as jokes (failed re-decoration, incomplete panorama, and 
over-abundant non-bedroom) consisting in an inappropriate act in relation to its 
respective field, and exactly as such can be seen to function as transgressions in 
relation to those fields. Testing out and thus indicating the limits of the respective 
field, these acts of transgression cohere the field they supposedly leave behind by 
marking out its perimeters. Physical cutting reinforces (ex-negativo) the notion of 
flexibility, the popular culture of a moment becomes cult material by standing in for 
the larger field it emerged from, and teenage psychograms are invoked as foil 
against which to assess the work. 
In Freud too, who conceptualises the joke as near-breakdown of the foundational 
distinction between registers of experience and their processing, the pleasure 
derived from this displacement is only ever regulatory for the stable overall 
economy in relation to which it operates. The "localized economy,,293 of the joke 
"seek(s) to gain a small yield of pleasure from the mere activity, untrammelled by 
needs, of our mental apparatus,,294, yet "the effort made by jokes to recover the old 
pleasure in nonsense or the old pleasure in words finds itself inhibited in normal 
moods by objections raised by critical reason; and in every individual case this has 
293 Freud, op.cit.,p.169 
294 Ibid., p.179 
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to be overcome,,295 and thus remains limited to a transgressive function; and as 
such, as is the nature of transgression, only consolidates overall coherence of the 
law and its totalising completeness: "Dreams serve predominantly for the avoidance 
of unpleasure, jokes for the attainment of pleasure; but all our mental activities 
converge in these two aims,,296, and thus only stabilise each other in an overall 
balance of tendencies. The various features and occurrences can thus be 
subsumed, in Freud, under the generalised terms of a psychical process for which 
the actual manifestations and operations of humour in all their apparent confusion 
and lack of clarity are mere surface distractions to be overcome by appropriate re-
cohering reading strategies. 
Such transgression sets up role-templates. For "SONNY LISTON vs MUHAMMAD 
ALI", the figure of the 'artist' as trickster is one such stable outcome. As 
fantasy/reality assimilation combining extravagance and commentary function, the 
artist/trickster constitutes a representational template that allows to posit Slominski 
as author behind the inversions of "Sonny Listen vs Muhammad Ali". Slominski 
then, in this reading, becomes as trickster artist who engages with an existing range 
of conditions and framings from the particular vantage point of the artist as localised 
exception. It is then up to the artist, in the overall mess of lost references and 
unhinged coordinates, to restore a semblance of order. Under these terms, the work 
appears as a re-dressing of orientations (literally), as premised on the very 
particular economy of artistic intervention in relation to an overall economy of 
images, attention patterns and their globalised flux. Precisely this secured 
interdependence of both positions, image economy and artistic practice, as both 
separate and related (as separated so that they can be related), then allows to 
conceptualise the entire arrangement in terms of Freud's notion of pleasure from 
nonsense and localised expenditure of energy. 
The extreme formulation of this structurally cohering approach occurs in Freud's 
account of irony as indirect speech that "comes very close to joking and is counted 
among the subspecies of the comic,,297: 
"Its essence lies in saying the opposite of what one intends to convey to the 
other person, but in sparing him contradiction by making him understand-
by one's tone of voice, by some accompanying gesture, or (where writing is 
concerned) by some small stylistic indications-that one means the opposite 
of what one says. Irony can only be employed when the other person is 
295 Ibid., p.171 
296 Ibid., p.179f 
297 Ibid., p.73 
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prepared to hear the opposite, so that he cannot fail to feel an inclination to 
contradict. As a result of this condition, irony is exposed particularly easily to 
the danger of being misunderstood. It brings the person who uses it the 
advantage of enabling him readily to evade the difficulties of direct 
expression, for in stance in invectives. It produces comic pleasure in the 
hearer, probably because it stirs him into a contradictory expenditure of 
energy which is at once recognised as being unnecessary.,,298 
Freud sets it off against both the joke and the unconscious ("A comparison like this 
between jokes and a closely related type of the comic may confirm our assumption 
that what is peculiar to jokes is their relation to the unconscious and that this may 
perhaps distinguish them from the comic as well,,299), but also accepts it as "very 
close to joking", counts it among the "subspecies of the comic,,30o and assesses it 
under exactly the criteria he applies to his reading of both jokes and dreams. Even 
though it is only ever a part of the entire spectrum of the comic and its operations 
("The only technique that characterises irony is representation by the opposite.,,301) 
this focussed reduction only highlights its functional dimension and makes for its 
(potential) applicability. Irony functionalises the cluster of conditions surrounding the 
comic into the very premise of its operations. After all irony is saying something, 
indirectly but ideally in such a way as to be understood). In Freud's reading it is thus 
implicitly posited as a technology of the comic, as an application of the comic for a 
particular form of communication. The main difference to joke- and dream-work lies 
in the way in which they have to be deciphered differently. Both though, in Freud's 
account, need to be read. Providing a (critical) commentary (on situation, on 
impossibility, ect) thus remains within the register of legibility and representation 
Freud so clearly and decidedly imposed on the joke and its workings. Irony as 
indirect form of communication is straightened out when compared to the dream-
work. 
This communication's specificity and potential lie in the mutually shared conditions 
necessary for irony to be understood. The sharing occurs between partners who 
share reference points, and ultimately an attitude that sets the terms of its usage: 
That ironic statements can easily be misunderstood is not only the pitfall of irony, 
but also its critical potential. Along with the confusion about the speaker's position, 
the slippage between manifest and latent content of the statement simultaneously 
298 Ibid., p.174 
299 Ibid. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid., p.73 
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introduces the possibility of evasion and outlines irony as practice whose 
ambivalence creates a space of possible commentary and ultimately criticism. Irony 
is thus always potentially also an indirect talking about the conditions under which it 
takes place. Slominski's work too can then be seen to provide a comment on 
institutional framing, on the impossibility of redressing any kind of balance, as 
demonstrating the impotence of a gesture in the face of much broader exchange 
circuits, and as culturally gratuitous act responding to a generalised and 
uncontrollable assault of images. In this perspective of an attitude that combines 
strategic indifference and tactical evasion, irony goes beyond the frame work set up 
by Freud because the danger of being misunderstood which serves as a regulatory 
cautionary outline for Freud, can also be mobilised precisely as the beginning of an 
unravelling of coherently constituted statements and positions .. Once double talking 
is introduced, it can also become multiple, and in this irreconcilable multiplicity of 
registers (and approaches as spelled out here) irony as structured economy (Freud) 
reaches the limits of its applicability. The possibility of shifts between reading 
attitudes of commentary and evasion, for instance, or between strategy and play, 
mobilises irony exactly in order to unhinge the linkage between irony and 
conditions. If originally it seems to be offering an indirect way of talking about 
something (specific), it is precisely the unclear space of its indirectness tat 
ultimately severs the links to a signifying register. No longer referable back to 
context, it becomes an engine for multiple attachments. 
Irony as inscribed into this kind of tendency opens onto movements with a different 
validity and which Deleuze has described as the sideways movements of humour. 
These movements themselves, as shifts and displacements, play out the transition 
toward humour, and instead of replacing models of interpretation they allow to 
highlight this transition as marking the area where irony and humour are not 
opposed, but the latter undoes the former by flooding or overspilling its operations. 
Humour in this sense drowns out the cohering framework Freud develops from and 
applies to the joke. 
3.1.2 Deleuze's ad-ventures of humour and the laterality of multiple 
engagements 
Freud's focus on outcome and closure, the resolution of incongruities as economic 
parameter for the operations of joke-work, structurally has to overlook and thus 
overcompensates for the fact that a joke is not always and necessarily proto-ironic, 
that this emphasis is itself the result of, rather than material for, cohering structural 
perspectives, and that humour as other distinct underlying mode of 'the comic' is 
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also at play in the joke and can be mobilised for and through it. Irrespective of the 
comic and irony as psychological and/ or communicative functions, the joke (or the 
comic) can also (potentially, even though obviously not in Freud) be thought in 
terms of what Deleuze calls 'humour'. Rather than engaging in and contributing to 
pre-existing exchanges, such "humour is atonal, absolutely imperceptible and 
makes something shoot off', and in doing so vacates the place of scripted 
engagements. 
For Deleuze, "an ironist is someone who discusses principles; he is seeking a first 
principle, a principle that comes even before the one that was thought to be first, he 
finds a course that is even more primary than the others. [ ... ] This is why he 
proceeds by questioning, he is a man of conversation, of dialogue, he has a 
particular tone, always of the signifier." Humour, on the other hand, "is completely 
the opposite: principles count for little, everything is taken literally, the 
consequences are expected of you (this is why humour is not transmitted through 
plays on words, puns, which are of the signifier, and like a principle within the 
principle). Humour is the art of consequences or effects." 302 
In contrast to Freud's reading of the joke as resolution, this latter notion of the comic 
as humour in motion shifts the focus toward the generating of effects and provides a 
mode of un-containing and un-cohering arrangements through the active operations 
of humour. In contrast to joking as direct activation of a joke's structural make-up as 
it was played through above in a first reading of Andreas Slominski's combination of 
posters, walls, cuts and glue, humour entertains a less defined and less directed 
relationship to the effects it produces. Installed as an active assemblage of 
component parts and operations, humour triggers off effects. Deleuze ocneptualisas 
this in forms of different spatialities and the kinds of movements they respectively 
allow for. Instead of hierarchical verticality, spatial and otherwise, acted out between 
distinct levels of signification, humour consists in sets of attitudes played out in 
(relation to) a flattened milieu of operations. What is required for it is "an odd 
inspiration" through which one can "know how to 'descend'" to a surface playas 
"twofold dismissal of heights and depths".303 Deleuze describes it as a being-thrown 
that stands in clear contrast to clearer acts of conscious and directed movement, 
302 Deleuzel Parnet, op.cit., p.68. For the distinction between irony and humour as "two ways 
of overturning the law", see also (albeit within a different spatial model) Gilles Deleuze: 
Difference and repetition [1968], trans!. by Paul Patton, London: Athlone Press, 1994, p.S: 
"The first way of overturning the law is ironic, where irony appears as an art of principles, of 
ascent towards the principles and of overturning principles. The second is humour, which is 
an art of consequences and descents, of suspensions and falls." 
303 Deleuze: Logic of Sense, pp.13Sf. 
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such as (in this case) particularly the "technique of the ascent" he ascribes to 
Socratic irony. The contrast between irony and humour then really is no longer one 
of directions, between descending and ascending, but takes place between different 
types of movement and the relations they establish to whatever their subject or 
object might be. Humour-effect (or 'effect-humour') is opposed to irony not as a 
differently featured correlate (as if humour and irony were simply two different forms 
of the joke), but as a fundamentally differing modality of effects. 
As far as this can indeed be conceptualised in spatial terms, descent is only insofar 
spatially directed as it vacates any elevated position and leads towards a spatiality 
of lateral movement that ultimately defies the organisational logic of (spatial) 
dependencies and correlations itself. As fundamentally different mode, it is 
characterised by 'lateral' and 'slipping' movements and thus displaced from a 
spatialised model premised on structure (or on principles). "An ironist is someone 
who discusses principles", argues Deleuze. "He constantly goes up and down [ ... ], 
he has a particular tone, always of the signifier". Humour, by contrast, "never goes 
up nor down, it is on the surface" and consists in "surface effects" 304. Humour 
moves on a register of activity premised on the generation of effects, rather than 
resulting from or illustrating given dependencies, be they spatial or of the order of 
the signifier. Spatiality itself figures here as a signifying practice as soon as it 
establishes structuring splits between different levels of signification between which 
irony can then move up and down. Deleuze calls it an "art of pure events" precisely 
because it shoots off from the surface, irrespective of any underlying spatial 
organisation that would script its trajectory or indeed its operations. Humour, argues 
Deleuze, "has always undermined games of principles or causes in favour of the 
event,,305. Ultimately the difference between irony and humour is again one of 
attitude, and maybe excess, overspilling the equation of irony through attention to 
the wrong details, putting the energy in the wrong place, insisting on it being 
important beyond the (ironic) function it fulfills in relation to the given situation/ 
proposition. 
This re-configuring of reading perspectives opens another way of looking at 
Slominski's re-dressed posters in SONNY LISTEN vs MUHAMMAD ALI-not in 
304 Deleuzel Parnet, op.cit., p.68 
305 Ibid., p.69. In Deleuze, events emerge from a surface of multiple dimensions, but without 
defined spatiality. For a fundamentally differently structured account of the event as 
necessarily imposing itself from elsewhere, see how Jacques Derrida develops 'a certain 
impossible possibility of saying the event' (Jacques Derrida, ' A Certain Impossible 
Possibility of Saying the Event', in W.J.T. Mitchell and Arnold I Davidson (eds.), The Late 
Derrida, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007, pp.223-243). 
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relation to balance as aim, but precisely aiming at the dressing of an imbalance in 
which a partial economy does not resolve the incongruity of the overall (impossible) 
economy, as Freud would have it, but to the contrary affects the overall economy by 
deserting it in such as way as to make it unravel. Read thus (if indeed this is still 
reading; one could talk of a projecting, or indeed a mirroring instead), Slominski's 
turning of three posters only re-dresses an inversion that was already skewed 
through its multiplication into different languages, different films, materials, and their 
circulations up and until the point when they occur as posters in different languages 
on street stalls in a market in London (as far as this is a legible subtext; or at least 
as artefacts in a London gallery, that are not necessarily London bound by any 
visible clues). The inversion of three posters from that upside-down series does not 
restore order because it does not operate on the same register as the incongruity of 
the 'list' of posters. Instead it juxtaposes the incongruity of belonging and 
translations that occurs in the forced (glued) juxtaposition of Italian, German, 
English and French posters for all sorts of visual productions with the spatialised 
logic of inverted directions, and in doing so presents one as entirely unresponding 
to the other. The result is not enough and too much, inefficient in its effect on the 
cultural non-logic of dispersal, and excessive in its physicality toward the gallery 
setting and its modes of framing: the frame created (made visible) through the 
incision outlines the upright posters in contrast to the rest of the gallery wall and 
highlights the plasterboard physicality of the gallery wall as always potentially 
immaterial and originally installed as sub-structural material in order to 
accommodate for exactly the malleability that Siominiski solicits, but then defies by 
making it excessively visible. Plasterboard exists mainly for the purpose of being cut 
and pasted, only that this is normally so precisely because it allows for this 
operation to be performed without leaving any traces. The very material promise of 
plasterboard lies in the possibility of seamless montage it offers, a visually 
organised economy here destabilised through incision, an insistence on materiality 
and the visibility of traces that narrate exactly this story. The trace of the incision 
and re-insertion is visual only insofar as its visibility reveals the tactile/ physical/ 
sculptural operations the supposedly two-dimensional thinness of the poster has 
become entangled in. The inversions destabilise that economy too by insisting on a 
physicality that operates on an entirely separate register. 
The real impact of these operations lies in the improbable fusion of different 
registers of the situation engaged with and the gestures put forward in relation to 
them, even if individually the interventions/ operations can be accounted for as 
ironic comments and challenges waiting to be resolved. In their coming together, as 
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in Deleuze's appropriation of humour, "there is no resemblance (nor should there 
be) between what one points out and what one has been asked". What Deleuze 
calls a "difficult relation, which rejects the false Platonic duality of the essence and 
the example" and which can be articulated in "this exercise which consists in 
substituting, designating, monstrations, consumptions and pure destructions for 
significance",306 occurs here a as lateral con/fusion between situations and works, 
as well as works' registers and other works too. When posters are cut out complete 
with wall and re-inserted, the diagrammatic schema of the piece is shot through with 
a completely inappropriate materiality that is neither relevant nor truly metaphorical 
or symbolic. Instead it introduces physicality as other dimension and non-
response. 307 
Similarly, when this line of posters which is in itself heterogeneous and multiple in 
make-up and in terms of the responses it invites, occurs next to another line which 
is an electric cable feeding an electric stove in the gallery but circumnavigating the 
street in front of the gallery before arriving there, connections become more 
unstable still: not simply because the relation between the works is unclear (if 
indeed such a connection is authored here), but because they mutually cancel out 
categories of sense and appropriateness by crossing the line of the posters (in the 
photo) with the 'line' of the cable, and vice versa. This crossing is not just a 
Duchampian confusion premised on the transfer to language; rather it insists on 
both the factual use / connectivity as well as the metaphorical one. Not just "the 
ground of bodies" but also "the groundlessness of their mixtures,,308 as Deleuze puts 
it. Materiality, metaphor, symbolic appear in an overa ll and decidedly 'flat' 
306 Deleuze: Logic of Sense, p.135 
307 Explicitly this is played out in Slominski's work for manifesta 2 in Luxemburg where the 
mobility of a ladder is underplayed in a similar way (The Ladder, 1998). In order to move a 
ladder into one of the exhibition cubicles, Slominski cut back the walls in order to make 
space for the ladder's sideways profile, moved the ladder, deposited it in the space and 
repaired the walls so that no trace was visible. The anti-economy of the installation is on one 
hand only revealed in the accompanying video, and on the other manifest in precisely this 
near-invisibi lity - disappearance and invisibility of the trace act as further challenges to a 
straight economic notion of intervention here (documented under 
http://www.manifesta.org/manifesta2/e/artistes/slominski.html. last accessed 14/10/08) 
fig.29 
308 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.135 
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juxtaposition, which in turn and in the exhibition occurs next to Colour to Paint One 
German Tank309 which can now no longer be kept automatically separate either. 
fig 30 
Instead the various arrangements and embedded gestures start slipping between 
one joke and another, in such a way that the joke comes undone as operation of 
closure and instead recedes behind an overall 'movement' of humour. This 
"adventure of humor, this two-fold dismissal of height and depth to the advantage of 
the surface,,310 installs a new type of ground on which these things take place no 
longer in verticality of signification and legibility, but as lateral shifts in a flattened 
field of gestures, objects and moments, where aspects and sets combine in an 
overall unravelling of coordinates. 
At stake in this approach (if not the work) is a take on humour as inward pull that 
operates like the outward proliferation discussed above: as arrangement of effects 
that remain unstable, simultaneously underperforming and overspilling any cohering 
function the joke supposedly serves. Freud's causal link and strict sequentiality of 
"bewilderment and ill umination,,311 too comes undone then and is replaced by a 
309 Slominski: Colour to paint one German tank, 2003 (twelve tins of paint and one tin of 
thinner). 
310 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.136 
311 Freud , op.cit., p.12 
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decidedly less determined 'coming together' of the "criteria and characteristics of 
jokes,,312 Freud pulls together in a challengingly heterogeneous list: a coming 
together in which "activity, relation to the content of our thoughts, the characteristic 
of playful judgement, the coupling of dissimilar things, contrasting ideas, 'sense in 
nonsense', the succession of bewilderment and enlightenment, the bringing forward 
of what is hidden, and the particular brevity of wit,,313 appear as series of dynamic 
possibilities, and precisely not as "disjecta membra, which we should like to see 
combined into an organic whole,,314. In particular the "coupling of dissimilar things, 
contrasting ideas" and "sense in nonsense" can then be set free from the Freudian 
formula of "representation by nonsense and by the opposite,,315, and become here in 
the following starting points for humour's particular forms of what Deleuze calls 
'proliferation'. The list of observations about some of the key features and 
characteristics of jokes Freud assembles from then existing literature on the topic 
still holds but some aspects might come to the fore more than they ever could under 
the reading attention of cohering approaches; Freud dismisses the list as 
unsystematic and posits it as in need of structured organisation, whilst here it is 
productive precisely in its levelling of features through which the implicit hierarchy 
constructed in and through Freud's text comes undone. Shifting attention away from 
the psychological function of humour opens up a new use for exactly the 
incongruities diagnosed and criticised by Freud in his initial resume of existing 
accounts of humour. Once outside the optics of a cohering reading pattern, the 
incongruity of Freud's list itself can then finally become crucial as mirror and 
response to humour, rather than simply preparation for its containing framework316 . 
With the heterogeneity of the list now opening onto humour under very different 
terms, it ceases to demonstrate a psychical (or psycho-social) function and 
indicates instead 'humour' in all its vagueness as an operating mode that can switch 
between qualities of the object and the subject (as Freud himself despairingly 
acknowledges when critiquing the disparity between accounts of humour in the 
312 Ibid., p.14 
313 Ibid. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Freud, op.cit., p.159. "We have now learned", claims Freud, "that nonsense in jokes is 
made to serve the same aims of representation" that he already suggested for dreams as 
"the way to a knowledge of the unconscious" (Ibid., p.175). Even where he acknowledges 
that "nonsense in a joke is an end in itself' (ibid., p.176), this besides functionalises 
nonsense for the pre-supposed "intention of recovering the old pleasure in nonsense" which 
he stipulates as "among the joke-work's motives" (ibid.). 
316 In Freud, the list appears as a vaguely dysfunctional sum total of existing accounts, all of 
which appear to be lacking in rigour and focus (according to Freud who imposes his own) 
and fail to see the representational function Freud accords to the joke. 
page 138 
subject and the object respectively by different writers317), and can start oscillating 
between quality and activity, function and operation, result and instigator. In light of 
this shift, the stimulus-response loop of psychological accounts of humour can then 
be replaced by humour as operational mode, to be internalised only ever as mode 
of dealing with world and thus never simply internal. 
The above "list" Freud works so hard to cohere into features and possibilities of the 
joke and which he "should like to see combined into an organic whole,,318 becomes 
here an open field of possible beginnings, strategies and modes. The series of 
posters becomes precisely such a conjunctive list, too, and with it the entire work. 
Ceasing to exist within hierarchically defined parameters, the work enables an 
ambient configuration instead through which it exists in and generates multiple sets 
of relations simultaneously as well as incoherently. Instead of the economy of the 
joke, this is humour as a way of undoing economy as a relevant category. 
3.2 Expanded traps and open forms of capture 
All this is only a range of encounters defined by the poles of closure on one hand 
and multiple engagements on the other if one wants to insist on their 
distinctiveness. But if distinctiveness as such is the result of (or at least affected by) 
registers of attitude and behaviour in relation to conditions (rather than responses to 
context), then even extreme forms of closure can be undone from within. And so, if 
Andreas Slominski has been building functioning animal traps for exhibitions since 
the mid-1980s, even these can and have to be re-considered in terms of what they 
set up, what (if anything) they enclose and what kind of mobilities they allow for. 
Although they obviously present, as tools for catching animals and their attention, 
rich technological metaphors for the making of art, this is only ever one dimension. 
"Even technology makes the mistake of considering tools in isolation: tools exist 
only in relation to the interminglings they make possible or that make them 
possible.,,319 As always in the logic of representational commentary, these traps can 
be looked at as ironic objects commenting upon the situations they are inserted into, 
objects thus to be understood as ironic comments in terms of an advanced position 
within institutional critique and informed by a Duchampian attitude through which 
function is transposed from an empirical to a metaphorical register. Or they can be 
read as organised around a Freudian set of moves of displacement and 
317 See Freud, op.cit., p.9f 
318 Ibid., p.14 
319 Deleuze/Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, p.90 
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condensation as indicators for the interlocking registers of meaning and art 
historically framed promises of transgression. 
Or, and that is informed by the fundamentally opposite perspective, they can also 
be mobilised as vehicles in a move to different sets of attitudes and questions. The 
underlying difference between both tendencies can be played out in the ways in 
which these traps produce capture. On one hand, capture can be the result of a 
completed function. On the other, it opens onto gradual involvements and modes of 
engagement which remain tentative and premised on a desired potential for contact. 
In this sense, what is being captured and in which mode, remains equally open-
ended. Inside and outside, movement and stillness are then simply indications of 
different states on a sliding scale of forms and motions, and capture ceases to be a 
functional horizon and starts occurring instead in a whole series of attitudes, 
attractions and sympathies that prolong themselves right through to the inside of the 
trap, and out again. 
The working assumption here is that Andreas Slominski's traps can be activated to 
push this shift from economic exchange to humorous dislocation to the extreme 
point where the very distinction underpinning the shift collapses. And in order to test 
how far this can carry, the following will read these traps formally/ diagrammatically 
in a micro-undoing. That and how they relate to surrounding phenomena and to 
what one would otherwise call context, is only accessible after that first operation. 
Projecting Deleuze's spatialised rhetoric onto them both enables and unhinges this 
formalist tendency such that it can be played out in the always unclear slippage 
between concept and shape. 
3.2.1 Reaching out 
In a functionalist reading a trap only ever leads to the kind of capture which rigidly 
frames a creature into immobility that is otherwise and originally unframed in its 
inhabitation of the given shared environment. Waiting for the animal's movement 
and then body to complete the set-up, the trap's apparatus is a more or less 
elaborate device for bringing about closure, set in anticipation of an action acting 
merely as trigger and generating finite conclusions. They produce tangible, even 
quantifiable results: When the trap snaps close, the fulfilment of its function and the 
degree of its efficiency can be measured by what remains in its mechanical fangs. 
The intricate elements of its arrangement, its making, placing and setting are purely 
preparational in this scenario and important only as preliminaries to the outcome 
they facilitate. 
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But this is thought too much from the perspective of the end32o , where the trap 
appears as point of closure for a movement it terminates and completes by cutting it 
off. And even this one is not necessarily definitive since the trap itself does not have 
to seal the fate of the prey. Rather the basic principle and sole common 
denominator of traps is the (more or less drastic and more or less temporary) 
restriction of movement. The use then made of that condition is a separate issue -
killing is only one, close examination or even simply transit and transport are others. 
All of them are arrangements of movement that overspill the idea of even the closed 
trap as static. Yet even is one was to assume the finality of a full trap, up until that 
point, the trap is necessarily an arrangement of attractions and interferences, not 
simply an outcome. It consists not so much in an action comple(men)ting a given 
setting ['closure'], but rather in soliciting, facilitating and arranging encounters as 
partial overlaps between territories that only tentatively and seemingly blend in the 
moment of their coming together when the trap snaps close. Whilst a straight setting 
seeks completion by fitting action, traps are always multiple set-ups. There is a 
difference of movement where the setting flips into a set-up of a different sort, 
where setting and action cease to be parallel and appropriate and start overlapping 
in such a way as to generate much unclearer kinds of effects. A set-up is always 
multiple because it involves at least two courses of events (one empirical and one 
potential, one habitual and one exceptional, one regular and one illegitimate) and 
fundamentally negotiates their interferences. Its focus is shifted: unlike a setting, it 
does not so much allow for an action to occur or something to be enacted as it 
interferes with an action already taking place. Where it is an enhancement, it 
modifies an outcome by accelerating and facilitating one course of events over 
another, and is always closer to being abusive than to being appropriate. 
From the start and in the very nature of its make-up, any trap is primarily an insert 
premised on the implicit assumption that there already is a territory - normally that of 
the elusive and/or dangerous animal -, that this territory is worth interfering with and 
that it is made up of patterns of movement (path) or of behaviour (habit) which can 
be known, at least vaguely, and translated into trajectories to be crossed. And 
rather than complementing this territory in the same way in which an action 
complements a setting by fulfilling it, a trap adds to this original milieu by doubling 
320 Cfr. Eva Meyer: Faltsache, Basel/Frankfurt am Main, Stroemfeld, 1996, p.45 ("Soweit 
Koch, doch ist dies zu sehr vom Ende her gedacht"). To refuse closure here means to turn it 
from an end into a starting point and to investigate what comes before and after it, and what 
happens against its horizon. Deleuze's anti-psychoanalytic project similarly claims that "the 
Freudian formula must be reversed" so that the unconscious can be understood as an object 
of production rather than of revelation (see Deleuze/Parnet, op.cit., p.78). 
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parts of it, and reaches out for a movement (it is movement that triggers off traps) 
that takes place in its own separate milieu, its own set of conditions, possibilities 
and arrangements and is unprepared for the contact. One milieu is a supposedly 
given habitual set of patterns carried out by the animal, the other is set up by the 
trap and synthetic; but their crossing is of the order of the encounter and 
denaturalises both. The juxtaposition of these two milieus arranges an asymmetrical 
engagement precisely by maintaining an incommensurable qualitative difference 
which allows for an active (and actively triggered) exchange between the two fields. 
Movement and action are equally distributed: given on one set and solicited by the 
other, but also given in the latter in thee very setting up of the approximating 
arrangement. 
The trap is a mode of interfering that involves and requires321 smell to be copied and 
re-placed, directions to be deviated ever so sligthly, tension to be set up as potential 
and setting-up in general as the anticipation of impact. The hunt for food as way into 
the hole, the bite at the bait as snap of the trap operate first and foremost as 
replications. They replicate food as bait, jaws as steel and bite as snap, invert the 
bite at the bait into the snap of the trap and in doing so not only catch, but re-
arrange elements that make up the animal's trajectory: its paths and preferences for 
certain spots over others, its most desired smells and tastes and forms of attention. 
By appropriating bits of processes, sequences of movement and patterns of 
preference, a trap assemblage encompasses both the trap and the animal as 
diagrammatic configurations. Necessarily accounting for the animal "less by its 
genus, its species, its organs, and its functions, than by the assemblages into which 
it enters,,322, the trap replicates and appropriates the animal by turning it into a 
complex of operations. This translation affects the animal as much as its territory. 
Caught in the same overlapping connectivity of operations, the existing territory and 
the trap's setting too are assemblages, neither spatial nor natural but operational. 
As Deleuze argues in a different context, these "are not encounters between 
domains, for each domain is already made up of such encounters in itself,323, but 
321 The seemingly inevitable necessity of the arrangement arises as an aftermath of its 
original applications and their heightened sense of urgency. Even though more or less 
severed in the exhibition context, function constitutes the trap's unalienable horizon of 
expectation. 
322 Deleuze/Parnet, op.cit., p.69. The assemblages are also constituted in different modes of 
attention that condition fundamentally different types of traps. Some are disguised and 
account for an ambient mode of perception, others functionalise a highly focussed attention 
to the bait that necessarily excludes seemingly more marginal information. In this model of 
the trap, its workings can be blatantly exposed because attention will not be brought to 
them. 
323 Deleuze/Parnet, op.cit., p.28 
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"rather an encounter between two reigns, a short-circuit, the picking up of a code 
where each is deterritorialised.,,324 Setting a trap thus does not consist in the 
(re)creation of a complete environment to duplicate the supposedly natural habitat 
of the species at stake. For the trapper, a habitat only ever exists as a functional 
arrangement made up of attractions and needs and patterns and all the provisions 
to accommodate these. Understanding the environment means being able to break 
it down into an (always approximative) understanding of its make-up and thus being 
able to interfere with it by multiplying and/or substituting attractors, movements and 
trajectories. 
fig.31 
This is how plastic tubing in Fox Trap (1998, fig.31) replicates the den without 
copying it through the kind of operation Deleuze and Guattari define as a 
"productive mapping" in contrast to a reproductive and representative "tracing,,325. 
Slominski's setting up of tubes and attractions is a fox's den as diagram and not as 
image (copy), and sets up movement as trajectory and condition within which it can 
best take place. The narrow tube and its arrangement are an approach to the 
condition most suited for the particular capacities and preferences of the fox in 
movement. Rather than the replication of a natural given, coming close to the model 
here is an optimization of conditions. 326 Those that seem most appropriate, 
324 Ibid., p.44 
325 Deleuze/GuaUari: Thousand Plateaus, pp.12f. 
326 Donna Haraway describes the transition from perfection to optimization as one of the 
features of emerging "informatics of domination". With "biotic components" replacing the 
"organism", both fox and trap can be understood as elements in a cyborg arrangement of 
feedback and control (Donna Haraway, op.cit., p.167). 
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promising and thus appealing for the fox are reconstituted in an attempt to 
appropriate and integrate its movements. 
It operates by what Gilles Deleuze calls stealing in the context of a different kind of 
capture: a capture that does not produce closure (capture of the animal), but "takes 
hold of a form and a subject to extract from them variable speeds and floating 
affects,,327 as a way of interfacing through "capture and thefts,,328. 
Dislodging "combinations of fluxes, emissions of particles at various speeds,,329 and 
re-arranging them in an assemblage "the only unity [of which] is that of co-
functioning,,330 stealing like finding become operations of the encounter, and 
contrast with the normative operations of "regulating, recognizing and judging,,331 
that rely on clear-cut entities and established relationships between these. The trap 
is set up as an interface to, not as the opposite of the animal's habitual movements 
in an overall smooth space of solicited entanglements. 
Features (bifurcations and zigzag) and conditions (narrow long spaces to be 
traversed) of the den are appropriated yet re-arranged so as to constitute a different 
sort of territory. They differ above all else in their directionality: Whilst the den is an 
open-ended arrangement of entries, exits and lines of flight, the tubing is centred 
and one-way in character. Lured in by the scent of the bait, the fox is stopped from 
exiting. The trap aims at a convergence between the two movements that 
eliminates their distance in space and difference in character and interlocks them in 
a forced joint duration. That is the horizon of the trap as fulfilled potential where 
relationships are stable and lasting. 
But whilst the den assembles a functional machine for engaging the world (survival), 
the trap consists in the reverse engineering of an approximative functional analogy 
for the purpose of closure (catching), and so relationships between den and trap 
have to be established before the trap can be imposed on the den. Any setting of 
the trap is firstly an attempt at setting up the sheer possibility of interference. The 
interception of the animal takes place in the collision between a movement on one 
side and a partial reconstitution of its setting on the other side. Any set-up is a trap 
only ever after having been a (partial) facilitator, and the "nature-artifice distinction is 
not at all relevant here" because both are synthetic if that term designates a 
compositum of functional elements. Once the given territory is understood as 
327 Deleuze/Parnet, op.cit., p.99 
328 Ibid., p.14 
329 Ibid., p.98 
330 Ibid., p.69 
331 Ibid., p.8 
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assemblage, it too is a "nature which must be constructed,,332 and always already 
is.333 
Setting it up is therefor to aim at contact between two assemblages that are 
different in nature as well as heterogeneous already in their respective make-ups. 
And so "the difficult part is making all the elements of a non-homogeneous set, 
making them function together. Structures are linked to conditions of homogeneity, 
but assemblages are not. The assemblage is co-functioning, it is 'sympathy', 
symbiosis,,334 and as such happens in the (partial) overlap of operations. Their 
encounter is an approximation along functional lines rather than mimetic ones and 
replaces the linear coming close of similarity with the multiple coming together of 
functional sets and their short-circuited operations. The trap is not a copy but an 
approximating re-arrangement whose working takes off from wherever contact is 
established because it consists much more centrally in interfering with the animal's 
movements, perceptions and operations, than it does in potentially catching it.335 
First and foremost (and certainly here for the exhibition context), the trap adds to 
the existing animal assemblage, albeit in an attempt to subtract the very animal 
from the assemblage. And since the points of interference are multiple in terms of 
their elements, in terms of the way in which they encounter each other and in terms 
of the quality of their outcomes, the relationship between animal, environment and 
trap remains quintessentially unstable.336 It is articulated through the very 
interrelationship between attitudes, forms and their mutual contaminations. 
3.2.2 Sympathizing appeals 
One place from which to revisit the trap in terms of such expanded connectivities is 
the difference between a model of 'sympathy' on one hand and patterns of 
332 ·t 98 Op.CI., p. 
333 That, in Kafka's story, the den/ burrow can be a trap and vice-versa in a continual 
oscillation between protection and capture, plays on this fundamental proximity between 
both types of assemblage. What is installed as a safeguard against intrusion is inevitably 
polyvalent and also potentially traps the inhabitant (Kafka, The Burrow', in op.cit., pp.325-
259). 
334 Deleuze/Parnet, op.cit., p.52 
335 Boris Groys proposes this kind of sympathetic engagement as a central characteristic of 
Slominski's practice. He sees it as an attempt "to say more with the fulfilment of 
expectations than with deviations from these expectations" (Bettina Funcke, Jens Hoffman, 
"'SlominSki" - a conversation with Boris Groys', in: Parkett 55, 1999, pp.99-102, p.100). 
336 Shifting the focus towards the making and the processes invoked solicited and triggered 
is - even though achieved through the art placement - not an art-effect. It is rather at the 
very core also of the trade and craft of the trapper and constitutes its particular form of 
knowledge. In relation to the notion of the trapper and the complication of the readymade cfr. 
also Nancy Spector, 'Berlin Detours', in: Parkett 55, 1999, p.70-75 and "Of traps, tricks, and 
other riddles", in: Andreas Slominski, exh. cat. Deutsche Guggenheim, Berlin, n.p. 
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'seduction' on the other. Seduction places the emphasis on strategic functionality 
and is fundamentally uni-directional. The sympathetic exchange between trap and 
den is not only multiple but also multi-directional. Whilst seduction may indicate the 
trap's functional horizon, its making and operations are organised differently. 
Attractors and their arrangements have to be configured with "deepest 
sympathy,,337, in a balance of variables that is always experimental: a tentative 
solicitation of the encounter through the setting up of attractions as connective 
sympathising, enabling a co-functioning lateral to given procedures, and allowing for 
attitudes to bear upon linkages without automatically re-inscribing agency. 
Suspended in hopeful anticipation that an encounter will take place, this lure is the 
effective condition of the trap and stands in stark contrast to the finite character of 
the projected outcome. Against the implicit claim of a close fit that collapses both 
territories into one that is manageable and under control, the set-up opens onto a 
multiplicity of possible contacts before the decisive moment of the trap snapping to 
or not. 
For the individual sample of a targeted species, this is mainly a question of the 
relation to bait or scent or the appeal of a bit of environment. But for the trap as a 
device and an invention this interface is multiplied further because it always aims at 
a population, not just an individual specimen. This plural imposes its own 
approximative condition which distinguishes traps from weapons and 
improvisations. Weapons are applied in a specifically focussed way, directly aimed 
as they are at a target; improvisations feed directly on the immediate conditions of 
a given situation. Both are ways of responding to a specific set of elements and 
simultaneously projecting them as targets and set horizons for their operations. A 
trap by contrast works on assumptions of a more general kind. It is premised on a 
notion of plausibility that comes out of a history of uses made and having been 
tested on the real. Embodying the knowledge of a trade, traps have a history of 
development and optimization that constantly attempts to narrow the gap between 
their own workings and that of the territory preyed upon. But precisely because 
traps inevitably encompass this sum of experiences and failures and improvements, 
'closure' inevitably remains evasive. The width of encounters and the notion of the 
population itself defy it and as such undermine any finitude. 
337 Deleuze/Parnet, op.cit., p.52 
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fig 32 
Instead of snapping close, Mass Mousetrap (1990, fig.32) is a device for continual 
processing that groups multiples in one direction and organises their movement as 
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an entry without exit. Often in traps, their re-setting is an implicitly acknowledged but 
well disguised background of their operations. Here, it is one of its most prominent 
dimensions and highlights the infinite populations it is set up to take on. Since the 
tube swings back into position each time a mouse has passed and tipped the tube 
into a slide, re-setting the device consists solely in emptying the bucket before the 
mice inside reach critical mass. The emptying has to be imagined as a repetitive 
gesture in a futile attempt to eliminate masses. And like the individual prey, these 
masses too have to be thought of as multiple. Additionally and always in the 
background lurk all those other animals that might not have responded to this set-
up, that remain indifferent to the type of bait or are deterred by the construction 
itself, other active populations not reached by this machine that remain to be 
grasped by others, existing ones and those yet to be invented. 
Plural in populations and multiple in attractions and modes of encounter, trap 
arrangements are never complete because there is no definitive trap and never just 
one register they have to answer to. Control is only ever containment (if that) and 
thus vague and only relative, constantly allowing for change and invention. This is 
why, in trapping, there is always a broad range of technically very different traps 
targeting the same species. And it is how, for Slominski, a whole range of traps 
targeting very different species can be juxtaposed in one and the same territory 
without this superimposition affecting their basic, always already multiple 
operations. Juxtaposing traps for different species and traps aiming at the same 
type of animal, some of them similar, some very different, in one and the same 
space, Slominski only highlights their mutual overlaps and necessary, fundamental 
lack of overarching efficiency. Where a trap for leopards (Leopard Trap, 2002, 
fig.33), a re-enforced container for aggressive dogs (Trap for Combat Dogs, 2001/2, 
fig.34) and a housing suggestion for guinea pigs (Guinea-Pig Trap, 1997/8, fig.35) 
come together and constitute an excessive overlap of solicited territories, they 
inevitably mark out more potential inhabitations than the one(s) they respectively 
target. 338 
338 Slominski's overall installation of traps at Fondazione Prada, Milan, in 2003, is one such 
case that successfully stages the traps in their mutually overlapping claims (Andreas 
Slominski, Fondazione Prada, Milan, 10/04-13/062003). (By contrast, see for a musealised 
presentation of Slominski's traps for example the room installed at Kaiser Wilhelm Museum, 
Krefeld (2008), which seems to display, rather than set, the traps. The room is furthermore 
roped off and invites viewers only to look at the works from a (safe) distance, from the 
entrance.) Throughout the discussion of Slominski's traps here, the Fondazione Prada 






One only ever multiplies the other in an always potentially expendable series. 
Setting them up remains a tentative activity on all levels - an elaborate staging that 
hijacks preferences to divert movements, to introduce altered trajectories by always 
only partially following lines of attraction. Against an ever-receding horizon of all-
encompassing efficiency, the real activity of the trap arrangement lies in setting up a 
'becoming possible' of contact and in arranging the coming together of trap and 
prey as an intertwining of potentials in a fundamentally multiple field of attractions to 
be encountered and/or followed. Sympathy here is an attitude enabling the co-
functioning of the various milieus and their partial overlaps, as well as the possibility 
of a condition of closeness that is not bound by an established set of conditions any 
longer. The sympathies exchanged as well as the sympathies leaking from one 
juxtaposition to the next in contiguous jumps, constitute a field where sympathies 
can generate proximities without fixating them. 
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3.2.3 Forms of surfacing 
For the situation set-up by the trap, this establishes a new type of grid. "A thing, an 
animal, a person are now only definable by movements and rests, speeds and 
slownesses {longitude) and by affects, intensities (latitude)" on a field of "cinematic 
relations between unformed elements", as Deleuze outlines it rather than being 
defined as or indeed definable by established sets of characteristic features. The 
"map of speeds and intensities,,339 resulting from this kind of account can never 
account for results and closure and has to replace questions of particular 
characteristic qualities with an attention to modes of movement and their 
overlaps.340 
fig.36 
339 Deleuzel Parnet, op.cit., p.93 
340 Even inside most traps, the animal is not still at all. Very often its movement is much 
more intense, because its expanse is more contained. Movement is not arrested but 
organised in a different way. Although this could appear as a blatant illustration of the 
structural opposition between the planes of "consistence" and "organization" (ibid., p.91f.), to 
read it as such would mean to reduce the trap to an outcome and foreclose an 
understanding of how its overall set-up aims at diverse (invisible) populations and potential 
inhabitations of space. 
page 151 
In Slominski, the crossovers of these multiple solicitations are negotiated on a 
ground where trajectories are organised along lines of attraction and directed 
across the adjoining surfaces of the floor and the trap. In a proliferation of traps for 
mice, hamsters, guinea pigs, the prey operates on floor level. The trap is set up as a 
continuation of this ground that directs movements by leading snails up a slope that 
continues the floor at a slight angle (Ditch to Trap Slugs, 1998, fig.36) and guiding 
mice up a ramp that takes off from it by continuing and diverting it (the ground) in a 
whole variety of mouse traps. 
fig 37 
What matters here is that this floor is sometimes tilted, sometimes folded up but 
never broken. 341 Rather than digging out a double ground as a challenge to the 
integrity of the given space, these traps project themselves onto it. Even in Trap to 
Throttle Small Vermin (1992, fig.37), the decisive gap is constituted between 
additional grounds that open only to then come down again. And in Birdstation 
(1998/2002, fig.38) it folds up in the form of nets that become a container of three-
dimensional space only when activated. 342 In all of these, depth and the puncture of 
a given ground are replaced with the modulations of a plane that translates one 
movement into another. 343 
341 Even the fox's den in Fox Trap is arranged on the surface and not underground. 
342 Even birds are caught only at the moment when they approach the floor. In Trap for Birds 
of Prey (1997), they are (imagined as) impaled on its spiky extensions, in Bird Trapping 
Compound (1998/99) contained in its vicinity by the activated nets. 
343 This flatness is not automatically a feature of traps; see e.g. Carsten Holler's children's 
trap made by digging a hole on a beach and filling it with jellyfish before covering it with sand 
and baiting it with a toy (Carsten Holler: Jenny, 1992, 13 mins, colour, sound). 
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fig.38 
Deleuze elaborates such smoothly lateral type of motion as a form of ad-venture: It 
is "by sliding" that Carrol's Alice arrives at "her climb to the surface, her disavowal of 
false depth and her discovery that everything happens at the border. This is why 
Carroll abandons the original title of the book: Alice's Adventures Underground", 
why Deleuze himself reads Carrol, and why Slominski places his traps on the 
surface of the gallery floor and negotiates encounters by overlapping trajectories on 
top of it. "Digging and hiding", which are the beginning of Alice's journey and 
conventionally prominent forms of making traps, here "[give] way to a lateral sliding" 
that stays at the surface. "It suffices to follow it far enough, precisely enough and 
superficially enough in order to reverse sides,,344 and get to the other side of the 
trap345. 
344 Deleuze: Logic of Sense, p.9 
345 In Deleuze's reading of Carrol's Alice, sliding is primarily a movement between the two 
sides of the surface. But it is also a mode of engaging with material that oscillates ('slides') 
between registers of description and affirmation, analysis and claim, following the work and 
re-arranging it. A similar approach is adopted here for the engagement with Deleuze and 
Slominski. "Her" ad-venture is Deleuze's adventure with Carrol. Their coming together with 
Slominski is the author's . 
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In Deleuze, this is played out as humour, "the art of the surface, which is opposed to 
the old irony, the art of depths and heights,,346. Whilst irony introduces different 
distinct levels and occurs in their clashes, in humour "all height and depth [is] 
abolished,,347. The shift from irony to humour marks a change mainly of direction. 
"One could say that the old depth having been spread out became width.,,348 
Movement towards and into the ground spreads out into a continual lateral 
displacement that inaugurates an "art of the surfaces and of the doubles, of nomad 
singularities and of the always displaced aleatory point,,349. No longer grounded, 
this art and the exposed trap350 take up a random position on the floor, which 
becomes its sheer support rather than constituting its material. 
This is why Snow-Grouse Trap (2002, fig.39) does more than simply integrate the 
transportation of the prey into the make-up of the trap as an additional function. 
Rather it places the image of an environment on the surface of the floor on 
runners351 , and turns it into an explicitly mobile occupation. The perspective of the 
quest and its focus of direction are replaced with a laterality that occupies a plane 
by moving sideways along it.352 
346 Ibid., p.9 
347 Ibid., p.141 
348 Ibid., p.9. Even though Slominski often interferes with the very fabric of the gallery 
setting, he digs no holes as traps to fall into. In a similar way to Alice's "digging and hiding 
[giving] way to a lateral sliding" (Ibid., p.9), Slominski's solicitations can be seen as an 
engagement with space that supplants the more metaphysical/ transcendental depths of e.g. 
Beuys' "StraP..enbahnhaltestelle" in the German pavilion of the Venice Biennale or Gordon 
Matta-Clark's cuts, which are always vertical as well as horizontal. In art historical 
references, Slominski's traps are closer to the implied efficiency of Marcel Duchamp's snow 
shovel set-up "in advance of the broken arm" than they are to these more obvious but 
fundamentally different excavations. 
349 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.141 
350 Slominski's traps are always exposed. In his actions/ performances, the question of 
visibility is itself challenged; yet his ongoing series of traps exist and operate exclusively 
under the condition of the exhibition venue's hypervisibility. Max Wechsler argues that the 
exhibition space produces a visibility which contrasts with the trap's functionally inevitable 
invisibility to the animal. For him, the traps' art function consists in a making-explicit that 
relies on visibility to trigger thought (see Max Wechsler: Max Wechsler: 'Kunst aus dem 
Hinterhalt: Ein Fall fOr Verblendung', in Andreas Slominski, Zurich: Kunsthalle, 1998, pp.31-
40, esp.p37f.) The problem is more complex though: challenging precisely the visible as 
guarantor of either insight or safety, the traps stage the compossibility of their being set and 
being exposed. Looking at a trap does not stop it from operating since it is not automatically 
defused through recognition. Often, vision does not even come into the functionality of the 
trap, either because the gaze is simply not a dominant sensory regime, or because it is 
bypassed by other, stronger stimuli through which the visual becomes potentially irrelevant 
in spite of its explicit staging. 
351 Or rather 'skids', which comes more explicitly close to the motion implied. 
352 Institutional critique is intrinsically ironic in its claim for revelation because it relies on a 
crossing of separate layers of meaning production, through highlighting hidden layers 
underneath (a surface of appearances) or beyond (a veil of disguises). Its premise is 
necessarily transgressive and clearly directed even where it operates in contiguities/ 
metonymies because the laterality of these moves gains its political, ideological and counter-
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fig.39 
3.2.4 In and Out 
In doing so, the trap opens up to a proliferation of encounters not only with its prey, 
but also with other occurrences taking place on the same plane. 
When a trap takes the form of a rocking horse (Mouse Trap, 2003, fig.40), it does 
not so much challenge the supposed idyll of a child's playroom than it incorporates 
it into the extended play of a becoming childish. Another one fuses the exhibition 
space as potential habitat with the festival by appropriating its decoration for yet 
another Mousetrap (2003, fig.41). In all of these, the trap is the ungrounded and 
blatantly exposed 'aleatory point' of more or less plausible encounters, and creates 
a level playing field for the different machines and milieus invoked. The diverse 
institutional currency from the crossing of a supposedly given limit that normally blocks 
access. In the works under consideration here, sliding has to be understood as a different 
mode of movement that constitutes and operates in milieus, and is therefore aleatory rather 
than focussed, and generates encounters rather than addressing organising structures. 
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assemblages are grounded by the overarching condition of their supposed 
functionality, but grounded only ever as heterogeneous assemblages and in a 
mobile way, as an engagement with potential inhabitations. The trap serves as a 
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Exceeding notions of and allusions to nature, these traps install a multiplicity of 
milieus that sets up environments as well as formats and attitudes of interference. 
Way outside the parameters of reasonable efficiency, the impossible horizon of 
function is supplanted by an indifferent excess of theft353 that (re-)claims the cage, 
353 The level of their craftsmanship is only a further element in this arrangement; not the aim 
but the necessary condition of the trap and its functioning. Since they are either bought or 
reconstructed from existing models and functioning plans, craftsmanship is not the subject of 
perfection, but the embodiment of and response to processes. The traps incorporate and 
display a particular kind of knowledge rather than constructing it. Even the attitudes behind 
them are readymade parts of the assemblage. The work is not about the craft that has gone 
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the trap, domesticity,354 but also the readymade, craftsmanship and the attitude of 
the trapper. 
fig.41 
Levelling different registers of the assemblage, they set up and incorporate potential 
sites ('aleatory points') of encounter. The obvious exposure of their workings and 
charges on the hypervisibility of the gallery floor forecloses the depth of analytic 
operations and detailed understanding and appreciation of the trap's making and 
into their making and could be deciphered or appreciated in its product. On the contrary, the 
objects stand in as blatantly obvious embodiments of a skill base that does not have to hide 
behind the product but explicitly generates it as a particular form of knowledge; traps are 
machines, not objects. The craft of their making is invoked as a format that has its own 
tradition but then figures simply as a found attitude, a found history, a found charge in the 
overall set-up. All these elements and formats are 'captured', not 'produced', as is the 
formal vocabulary of sculpture (see also Wechsler, op. cit.). The obvious pilfering of kitsch 
domesticity is just another level of this activity. 
354 Guinea-Pig Trap (1997-98, fig.35) is probably the closest such fusion between habitat 
and domesticity in the form of a trap that emulates the cage as given condition of the animal. 
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mechanisms on the slippery surface of humour. Beyond the supposedly clear 
targets and prey, these traps cannot be "closed on recognition, but [are] open to 
encounters" and have to "always be defined as a function of an Outside,,355 that is in 
itself multiple. In and through the blur of the set-up, setting and trap as well as 
background and action are fused as a complicated form of mutual capture.356 
In these forms, encounters with the object now occur under unclear terms because 
any possible spatiality of distance makes place for an involvement for which form is 
simply permeable: traps include by smoothing out transitions, blurring the edges of 
different realms to such an extent that it becomes a near-impossibility to designate 
an inside and an outside in relation to the trap. Arranged on the flat surface of the 
exhibition space and articulating precisely this flatness as a milieu for attractions to 
be inserted, played out and followed, the traps make a claim on the ground for the 
interplay of lateral movements dictated by attractions generated through a 
productive and generalised mode of continuity, smooth in its incorporation of the 
heterogeneous, as opposed to the striated arrangements of defined entities. 
Whilst the pseudo-functional accounts of the traps account for a connective 
engagement that follows paths set up for other species, and made active through 
partial overlaps and identifications, the same multiple involvement also informs the 
aesthetic appeal these objects project. Never premised simply on functions, but 
project an overall field of attraction that also mirrors animal behaviourism into a play 
with aesthetic responses codified along stimulus response lines set up by 
decoration and advertising. Domesticity and the child's playroom figure here as 
fields of strong visual appeal, whose decorated attraction is prolonged in the 
ornamental excess of other works, traps and lighting arrangements alike. The 
appeal follows the established patterns of fairground attractions (the ride might be 
another metaphor through which to regard the entire trap arrangement), colourful 
detail, ornate applications, and at times fuses all of these, e.g. when the box used 
for the construction comes from a different set of attractions: the advertising-led 
design of a brightly branded tin-drum coexists here with the new set of appeals for a 
new set of audiences set up by using the drum for a bird trap (Bird Trap, 2000/2001, 
355 Deleuze/Parnet, Dialogues, p.24 
356 Function is set up only in order to challenge appropriateness. Even the exhibition as 
(intellectual and factual) "minefield" (press release Andreas Slominski, Fondazione Prada, 
Milan, 10.4.-13.6.2003) or "landscape painting" (Julian Heynen, 'Wordless', in Parkett 55, 
1999, p.96-97, p.96) viewers find themselves immersed in, is only ever a series of elements 
in an expanded "geography of relations" (Deleuze/Parnet, op.cit., p.56) set up by the works' 
multiple interferences. (Gabriel Orozco calls it a 'home run' and arranges it between 
circulations of art and the everyday, sculpture and gesture; see above, 'Mode Two: Treason 
(Stories of play)'). 
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fig.42) which also exists under the conditions of an art piece. Especially where they 
come together, the traps then open onto a set of surround attractions for which 
seduction is not grounded in properties of the object, but in the way in which the 
object inscribes itself into existing fields of attraction. 357 
fig.42 
Always already fully immersed, objects and situations both sympathise and solicit 
sympathy. In the place of a critical examination comes a movement within an 
always already pre-existing field. Light is probably its most expansive and most 
explicitly ideological carrier. The lighting works in Milan surround and envelope 
objects and produce leakages away from the object toward the glittering effects of 
a set of all-over surface appeals (and the other way round, from surround into the 
object as reflective surface for this kind of inscription). Similar in character and 
357 That these attractions are clustered around commodity status etc is secondary. The field 
of advertising, too, disavows the object more than it highlights it, surrounding and 
increasingly replacing it with fields of attraction only loosely and indirectly connected.) 
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effect to the way in which Felix Gonzalez-Torres' street lighting amplifications blur 
distinctions between generic decoration, seasonal celebration and customised 
agency, Slominski's lights too fuse appeal and embedded ness to create the 
ambiguity of an attraction that becomes involvement through its overall dispersal 
into (and emergence from) a broader field of pre-existing settings. Distance in time 
and space between Christmas from Belfast and spring in Milan, work as pointers 
toward the possibility of setting up always already displaced fields of surround 
attractions. 
fig.43 
When Felix Gonzalez Torres' installs piles of wrapped candy as an invitation to 
consumption as shared intimacy, this series of candy works is a trap of the same 
kind, setting the point of consumption as linkage into at least two pre-existing 
circulations emblematically caught between intimate portrait and anonymous 
consumption, specific invitation and surrounding mercantility. It follows both 





And when Liam Gillick conceives of a pile of glitter particles as discussion island: 
item a001 (1996, fig.45), this too emphasises the work as always suspended 
between attraction and spill. Combining both into a new form of contamination, the 
instruction for the work stipulates that "glitter should be purchased and sprinkled in 
private areas of a home. Under furniture, beneath rugs and inside cupboards. A 
very light sprinkling may also be made over general floor surfaces. The work 
designates a fragmented zone where it might be possible to consider the potential 
of discussion and compromise". Slominski's traps sprawl out as a result of the trap's 
claims whilst the glitter particles are dispersed through physical leakage. Yet in 
either case, the physical operates as component part of a process in relation to 
displacements prod uced. 358 
This kind of involvement always starts with an engagement that precedes it, and 
eventually leads to a recognition of the nature of that engagement (the moment of 
the joke). Yet the aleatory point of encounter at which this linkage occurs, is 
aleatory point of linkage with a field in relation to which it is then impossible to 
develop a stable relation. Catching yourself is only to the fact that one is always 
already caught up in the set-up. Art is itself a trap here in which you are caught 
once you engage because it oscillates between metaphorical and literal readings 
and ways of engaging. 359 
Against these displacements, any engagement overspills diagrammatic clarity 
because it is always already caught up in the very fields of attraction it engages 
with. Slominski's strategically behaviourist interlocking of metaphorical charge and 
morphological presentation thus opens his traps onto a generalised, simultaneously 
abstract and empirical morphology of humour. Slopes, sliding, lateral flat 
movements across pre-existing as well as proclaimed milieus take off from 'aleatory 
points of encounter' as multiple movements that destabilise the constitutive 
differences between formerly separate realms such as work and situation, spectator 
and object, human and animal and their possible contiguities and points of contact. 
3.3 Ambient effects ("A certain piping") 
In such expanded co-extensiveness of different registers, opposed directions 
"sense with nonsense", "surface" and "doubles", "nomad singularities" and "the 
358 One might consider the relationship between Gillick's glitter and Slominski's trapping at a 
point where they come close through internal juxtapositions. Similar to the way in which 
Slominski arranges traps and lighting devices/ fixtures in Milan, Gillick stages his glitter in 
relation to the coloured light carried onto it through the surrounding 'discussion platforms'; 
both are playing with atmosphere as challenge to/ in indifference to normalised expectations 
of impact. 
359 Kafka's The Burrow could be read as its allegory. 
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always displaced aleatory point,,36o, not only the trap is unbounded. In setting up a 
denaturalised milieu, the trap in turn denaturalises the pre-existing milieu it solicits 
into its making-contact by imposing a crossing along which encounters can occur. 
Once the trap is set up, it inevitably re-configures both arrangements, its own and 
that which it invites into fused operations, by importing them into an overall set of 
operations. "To enter or leave the machine, to be in the machine, to walk around, to 
approach it -these are all still components of the machine itself: the are states of 
desire, free of all interpretation. The line of escape is part of the machine. Inside or 
outside, the animal is part of the burrow machine. The problem is not that of being 
free but of finding a way out, or even a way in, another side, a hallway, an 
adjacency.,,361 . The 'problem' in this adjacency is not one of avoidance, but to the 
contrary one of involvement under other terms where a 'way out' is equally a 'way 
in' because both animal and trap are now (posited as) assemblages. In their coming 
together, humour produces not only this erasure of different directions under one 
operation, in doing so it also inaugurates a contagious doubling: the visitor/ animal 
assemblage mirrors and echoes the trap's assemblage quality by replicating what is 
already replicated in the trap as an approximation of the victim's 
perception/movement/trigger assemblage. Mirroring of functions and operations, 
attractions and appeals becomes two-way, opening a feedback loop in which both 
come undone. 
What Deleuze calls an art of the doubles operates here within the realm of 
partialised engagements, interactions as well as attractions and sympathies through 
which connections are instigated and a heterogeneous range of attitudes need to be 
inhabited. And the trap is thus no longer a question of sprawl and leakage 
exclusively, but also of internalisation. What is required is a particular form of 
internalisation that, again, undoes the very distinction between inside and outside 
and their corresponding directionalities. And through this becoming-indistinct, the 
"art of the doubles" opens onto an activation through "doubling" as heterogeneous 
appropriation. 
In Kafka's "Report to an Academy" it figures as a thinking with the belly which allows 
the ape to become human in the first place, and presents only at first sight an 
argument about embodiment. For the ape, access to humanity figures as "A fine, 
clear train of thought, which I must have constructed somehow with my belly, since 
apes think with their belly.,,362 What matters here is the improper fusion between the 
360 Deleuze, Logic of Sense, p.141 
361 Deleuze/GuaUari, Kafka, p.7f. 
362 Kafka, 'Report to an Academy', p.253 
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two domains, not the replacement of one (rationality) through another (biological 
necessity). Similar to the way in which the audience in Slominski's trap scenarios as 
art figure performs movements "head over heals" and "sideways" in approximation 
of the animal, Kafka's ape assimilates reason perfectly, but by drawing on his belly. 
In doing so, he undercuts hierarchies as well as their adjacent sequences. For this, 
the belly is not about hunger or fulfilling basic needs either. What the ape describes 
instead is spitting and whiskey, the inverted mirror of food and drink intake363, and 
the pipe, and overcoming repulsion rather than satisfying desire.364 What passes 
between these poles is not a development anymore but an unstable exchange, and 
one in which supposed/ pre-established hierarchies cease to impact. 
For the ape in his report to an Academy, becoming human is simply a pragmatic 
way out (of the trap), rather than a desirable aim (accession to the realm of 
humanity). "The way of humanity" figures simply as a "special way out for me,,365, 
and there is a very strong insistence that "there was no attraction for me in imitating 
human beings; I imitated them because I needed a way out, and for no other 
reason. ,,366 
The supposedly parallel development in which the ape in question as well as 
mankind at some point emerge from (or exit) the condition of ape in order to enter 
into humanity, is then also simply one possible way of co-evolution or conjuncture. 
Beyond the ape as "eager, too eager", as "impatient and desperate to emulate 
[man]", this becoming-human generates a combination of very different movements. 
One type of pose is stable, "One stands over oneself with a whip; one flays oneself 
at the slightest opposition.". But another one occurs too in response to it: Deleuze 
classes this latter with humour, and posits it as a lateral and discontinuous 
movement also and notably in jumps. "My ape nature fled out of me, head over 
heals and away, so that my first teacher was almost turned into an ape by it, had 
soon to give up teaching and was taken away to a mental hospital,,367. In this latter, 
discontinuous movement, 'nature' now passes between ape and teacher, instead of 
the civilising influence the whole process is supposedly premised on, being passed 
on from one to the next (as is the case in the former, disciplined and disciplining 
movement). Exchange passes not just from one to the other, and certainly not in the 
363 Ibid., pp.255-57 
364 This is not about perceived splits between body and mind, to the contrary figures as 
inappropriate fusion similar to the way in which, for the mice in Josephine, "quiet laughter is 
always, so to speak, at our elbows" (Kafka: 'Josephine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk', in 
The Complete Short Stories, pp.360-376, p.365). 
365 Kafka, 'Report to an Academy', p.258 
366Ibid.,p.257 
367 Ibid., p.258 
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prescribed and necessary order of civilisational certitudes. Instead of being his 
teachers' malleable material, the ape is now the one who "used up many teachers, 
indeed, several teachers at once,,368 since the point at which his ape nature first fled 
him. Ways out and ways in start crossing over, and the real contrast is now between 
prescribed development and sprawling contamination. 
In Slominski, this is the challenge laughed off and the horizon of the always already 
fulfilled immersion into an other constitution of self in response to the trap. Slominski 
can be seen to transpose trap machine onto culture (and vice versa) in such a way 
as to perversely combine machine as liberating and machine as ultimate instrument 
of capture. 
For Deleuze the infinitesimal horizon of such mutual malleability is a becoming 
molecular, as augmentation of a becoming animal still limited to entities. The animal 
only ever really figures as decentred assemblage in relation to which traps serve as 
'connectors,369. They operate as trigger devices in a generalised movement toward 
a becoming-molecular. 
This becoming molecular is a way out also in that it stages the trap's operations 
whilst defying its economy of capture. Yet it provides no horizon of finally resolved 
incongruities. As 'the art of consequences or effects' which 'makes something shoot 
Off,370, humour like treason is operating as a means of proliferation rather than 
reductive homogenisation, and constitutes (a connection with) an outside too; just 
that this outside is no longer opposed to the inside, rather constitutes the very 
configuration anew. The only possible way out is a way in, one that humanity seems 
to provide in the ape's case in such a way that humour here produces 'escape' as 
inward treason. 
The trap thus understood as assemblage-machine topples assumptions about what 
a trap does and produces: rather than foreclosing movement, it now opens up 
connectivities that generate a way out by asserting escape as an inward as well as 
lateral movemenf "The problem is not that of being free but of finding a way out, or 
even a way in, another side, a hallway, an adjacency.,,371 At stake is not "liberty" or 
"to flee his father", in the case of Gregor Samsa turning into a cockroach, "but rather 
to find an escape where his father did not know how to find one.,,372 
368 Ibid. 
369 Deleuze/Guattari: Kafka, p.61 
370 Deleuze/Parnet, op.cit., p.68 
371 Deleuze/Guattari, p.7f. 
372 Ibid., p.13 
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In Report to an Academy, too, flight would only translate captivity into a continual 
series of equally caught up situations outbound.373 What really matters, here and 
there, is inventing ('finding') an escape that allows for movement: a "way out", using 
the expression "in its fullest and most popular sense. I deliberately do not use the 
word 'freedom''', states Kafka's ape: "Only not to stay motionless, with raised arms, 
crushed against a wooden wall". In this shifting of perspective, any conventionally 
assumed functional relation between "way out" and "freedom" is inverted too: 
instead of a way out leading to freedom, the ape acknowledges that "he had to find 
a way out or die, but that my way out could not be reached by flight,,374. 
The question is not one of liberty as opposed to capture, but one of escape as 
opposed to immobility, and opening up through ambient dispersal. "No, freedom 
was not what I wanted. Only a way out" proclaims the ape, "right or left, or in any 
direction; I made no other demand; even should the way out prove to be an 
illusion".375 On the slippery scale of non-engagements, illusion for instance is a valid 
form of response then too, and with it fiction. As is the delirium that constitutes the 
first step of the ape's way out: it was his holding the whiskey bottle which started his 
being recognised as potentially human-like, which was the subject of praise and 
finally triggered, through intoxication, accession into the realm of the human: 
"because I could not help it, because my senses were reeling, [I] called a brief and 
unmistakable "Hallo!" breaking into human speech.,,376 
Here too, in intoxication as elsewhere, Deleuze and GuaUari's notion of 'escape' is 
intimately entangled with a notion of effects that echoes this unframing of 
exchanges from registers of mutuality, causality or other inter-dependencies in that 
it needs to be and can be thought in terms of the a-directional perspective set up 
under these terms. The question of what an effective potential might be then 
becomes equally unclear within a horizon that includes illusion as simply another 
register of effectivity, paralleling them in such a way that effect is unhinged from a 
linear connection with outcomes and results but entangled with their generation. In 
the story of a mouse that make noises which mayor may not qualify as singing, 
373 "[Alt that time I could have certainly have managed by degree to bite through the lock of 
my cage. I did not do it. What good would it have done me? As soon as I had poked out my 
head I should have been caught again and put in a worse cage; or I might have slipped 
among the other animals without being noticed, among the pythons, say, who were opposite 
me, and so breathed out my life in their embrace; or supposing I had actually succeeded in 
sneaking out as far as the deck and leaping overboard, I should have rocked or a little on 
the deep sea and then been drowned. Desperate remedies." (Kafka: Report to an Academy, 
p.255) 
374 Ibid., p.254 
375 Ibid., p.253-255 
376 Ibid., p.257 
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Kafka circumscribes such expanded (and unstable) notion of effectivitl77. 
Josephine, singer of the mice folk, occupies a precarious status within her people 
which oscillates throughout the text in parallel to the ways in which her singing is 
accounted for. Her singing, if that is indeed what it is, remains resolutely unclear in 
terms of how it is produced and what it might give rise to, and is described primarily 
in terms of its indifference to and defiance of causality and categorisations: unclear 
as to whether it is "singing at all", it may well be "perhaps just a piping,,378 which is 
"even in her lifetime" never "more than a simple memory".379 It is unclear throughout 
the story whether she is actually performing more than an effect, one that is 
nevertheless answered, albeit in indifference and defiance. The indifference is the 
narrator's and more generally that of the mice people, the defiance is hers, "fighting 
for exemption from all daily work on account of her singing,,380, but then also theirs 
in the mice people's refusal to acknowledge her claims and ensuing demands when 
"our people draw other conclusions and quietly refuse it". Yet neither challenge the 
very recognition of effects being generated. 
What remains is a fascination, even though diffuse381 , and a collective arena against 
which this fascination or its disconcerting nature can be articulated. Throughout the 
text, the particular "power of song" through which "there is no one but is carried 
away by her singing,,382, is suspended as effect between its various circulations as 
collectively imagined and effective. 
The whole range of dimensions is levelled in a smooth milieu of effectivities which 
encompasses the qualities of her singing and its attractions, the instances of 
comfort and protection it seems to grant protections, as well as-with the same 
intensity and lack of clarity-also diametrically opposed repercussions, including her 
positively endangering the mouse folk itself when the "large gatherings" around her 
performances "have been unexpectedly flushed by the enemy and many of our 
people left lying for dead". In these instances too, it was Josephine "who was 
responsible for it all, and indeed perhaps attracted the enemy by her piping,,383. Her 
amorphous signal also has effects for other ears, yet the way these are being 
assessed in the text only mirrors the lack of clarity about the very nature of the 
377 Franz Kafka: 'Josephine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk', in Complete Short Stories, 
pp.360-376. 
378 Ibid., p.361 
379 Ibid., p.376 
380 (371) 
381 "She gets effects which a trained singer would try in vain to achieve among us and which 
are only produced precisely because her means are so inadequate" (ibid., p.368). 
382 Ibid., p.360 
383 Ibid., p.371 
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singing's appeal to the mice in the first place. By suspending the dimension of a 
purpose, effects are thus flattened out in such a way that differentiations between 
effect and side-effect collapse accordingly because the prioritisations they rely on 
are always anchored in an assumed function and its relative fulfilment. 
For any work to operate and to be considered under these terms, this also means 
that supposedly separate registers of effectivity can thus start overlapping. Drawing 
on Spinoza, Deleuze conceptualises effects in such a way that they can be physical 
and optical simultaneously: "We must also understand "effect" optically and not 
merely causally. Effects or signs are shadows that play on the surface of bodies, 
always between two bodies. The shadow is always on the edge. It is always a body 
that casts a shadow on another body. We have knowledge of bodies only through 
the shadows they cast upon US,,384. Fusing supposed ly separate dimensions and 
thus cutting across supposedly fundamental differentiations between the 
conceptual, the metaphorical and the empirical, effectivity can then be thought as at 
least double, generated through and generative of multiple involvements. 
fig.46 
The light that bounces off Felix Gonzalez-Torres' Placebo Landscapes (eg. Untitled 
(Placebo Landscape for Roni), 1993, fig.46) produces, or at least points toward this 
double effectivity of a contact! contagion in that the ingestion of sweets is doubled 
(announced, invited and anticipated) in the light bouncing off them. And similarly, in 
384 Oeleuze, 'Spinoza and the Three "Ethics"', in Essays Critical and Clinical, pp.138-151, 
p.141. Eric Alliez discusses this blurring as a materialist cinematicism n what he calls the 
"'materialist programme' of a Bergsonian world. In this world, the identity of the real and the 
image (i.e., that which appears) results in the affirmation of an ontological indifference 
between Image, Movement (irreducible to any "pose"), Matter (the "in-itself' of the image), 
and Light." (Eriz Alliez, 'Midday, Midnight. The emergence of Cine-Thinking', in Gregory 
Flaxman (ed.), The Brain is The Screen: Deleuze and the Philosophy of the Cinema, 
Minneapolis/ London: University of Minnesota, 2000, p.293-302, p.293) 
page 168 
Liam Gillick's Discussion Island Preparation Zone (1993, fig.47), any light bounces 
off glitter washed with vodka on the floor of a (gallery) space prior to an opening, 
and is prolonged in the glitter attaching itself to surfaces in contact, bodies and 
others. 385 
fig.47 
385 Gillick describes his floor-glitter works as follows: "The work involves the preparation of a 
space. A mixture of vodka, water and glitter should be used to wash down the floor of the 
gallery or the space under consideration" (Smooth Space, 2002). This floor treatment like 
the insertion of glitter into The Wood Way (Liam Gillick: The Wood Way, exh.cat. 
Whitechapel Art Gallery, London, 2002) echo Discussion Island Preparation Zone and 
amplify its ambiguities in that the glitter in the Whitechapel was not even referenced as a 
work and occurs in the catalogue too merely as image, without being reclaimed as work 
anywhere outside the image. 
fig.48 
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Shadow and light share the same (inverted) working in the same way in which 
physicality and opticality start co-occurring here. In this sprawl, the glitter remains 
active precisely as carrier and reflector of light effects, blurring the very distinction 
between both types of 'effect' because both continue transporting each other. This 
does not produce a new morphology, all remains entirely flat, but constitutes fields 
of attitudes, sympathies and attachments that are a-directional. In the place of form 
and objects emerges a carrier in the full sense of a milieu as field and centre and 
medium to be animated by attitudes of attractions and sympathies. It fuses the 
milieu into an ambient trigger that is both effect and its carrier, side-effect and end-
result. 
Along the glitter particles as 'aleatory points of encounter', a sprawling 'lateral 
movement' of humour thus reproduces itself in the oscillation between different 
registers of impact. That this is then both a 'preparation' (of a discussion island to 
be activated) and an aftermath (of the party that would have left it behind) as well as 
a starting point for yet another circulation (of glitter particles on people and clothing 
and hair and shoes), only prolongs the work's ambiguous effectivity onto the 
temporal register it always inevitably collapses, too. 386 
386 Like Home Run, the work ends with a preparation that is also an aftermath and manages 
to escape into a time that is doubly framed. When asked, in 2001, what he expects from an 
art institution in the 21 st century, Gillick projects such twofoldedness in spatio-visual terms, 
positing that "we must request a place that can act as s shadow and as a distant mirage" 
(What Do You Expect From an Art Institution in the 21 st Century?, Paris: Palais de Tokyo, 
2001, p.11). The gallery washed in vodka and glitter appears as a mock embodiment of this 
function, inflected with time. 
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4 Conclusion ("Arriving beside itself,,387) 
'The better it works, the more it leaks.,,388 
In a sense, the Ambient Attitudes project started with the ambition to outline a new 
type of criticality that seems to be emerging, in parallel and with different degrees of 
visibility, across recent cultural production, in artistic works, gestures and 
propositions on one hand and in esthetico-political theories and conceptualisations 
on the other. Its projected aim, originally, was to clarify this new mode, to argue it 
and, in doing so, to claim it as a new opening from which to re-assess possible 
intersections between theory- and practice-based elaborations. At its most 
ambitious, it set itself up to pick up on this mode as an emergent tendency389, 
announcing a dominant mode of the future. 
For this purpose, the term ambient seemed to lend itself as a tentative descriptive 
template: it seemed to indicate diffuse qualities, dispersal, low intensity attraction 
thresholds and over-determined contamination with all sorts of pop-cultural and 
proto-scientific connotations as some of the key features of this new mode. 
Simultaneously, the term seemed to indicate the methodological challenge inherent 
in any attempt to address a similarly diffuse set of concerns and practices, 
especially in an academic context. It also seemed to at least announce the 
complicated relationship it entertains with a broader set of post-critical projects and 
their explicit political rhetoric and/ or determinations. 
In addition to the notion of ambient, Attitudes emerged early on in the research as 
the other key dimension of this new series of modes animating the research. 
Attitudes attest to the ambiguities played out between the conjunctions that seem to 
be produced by the work, and the forms of attention and strategies of reading 
projected onto the work. The interplay between both sets of projections is integral 
to the project, and has provided one of its key engines. 
387 "But there where it comes is not "into itself," as though into the interior of a determined 
domain. It is "beside itself'. Beside itself means into the dispersal of the dis-position, into the 
general element of proximity and distance, where such proximity and distance are measured 
against nothing, since there is nothing that is given as a fixed point of ipseity (before, after, 
outside the world). Therefore they are measured according to the disposition itself." (Nancy, 
Being Singular Plural, p.96) 
388 Gilles Deleuze, 'Two Regimes of Madness', in Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and 
Interviews 1975-1995, New York; Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2006, pp.11-16, p.16 
389 For the notion of historical tendency, the way in which Negri appropriates it from Marx 
and how it relates to quantitative change and qualitative/ paradigmatic shifts, see Hardt! 
Negri: Multitude, p.140-153 ('Excursus 1: Method: In Marx's Footsteps'), esp.141-144. 
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It would have been plausible from the title and indeed to some extent the working 
brief for the project for the two dimensions of ambient and the attitudinal to come 
together in a clearly recognizable formation, to cohere into an ambient attitude as 
and through and with which to read contemporary practice (artistic as well as 
critical), and which could provide productive ways out of cohering and indeed 
limiting systems of meaning. The respective clusters of the thesis can be read as 
attempts of setting up this kind of oriented fusion through instances of a close 
reading-together into three (types of) ambient attitudes. 
In this sense, the first chapter describes Contingency as a form of ambient dispersal 
across registers of indifference which are conceptual as much as formal and 
discursive as well as spatialised. Between work, situation and an approach to either, 
the chapter unhinges the notion of a close fit and generate a looseness instead 
through which a response no longer falls into place but remains ungrounded. 
The second outlines treason as an ambient sprawl beyond established fields and 
sets of operations. It is created not by following contingent slippage, but rather 
through the willful juxtaposition of narrative fragments and devices into a plot of 
sorts circumscribing a new notion of use. In this outbound orientation, connections 
made have to be productive rather than enlightening. 
And the third one stages multiple intersections of ambient fields solicited and 
crossed in works in metaphorico/material arrangements within a horizon of effects 
to be solicited, as Humour. Observations as well as horizons here are inward bound 
in such a way as to implode (and insist on) the notion of effect as crucial and 
unclear, confused, axiomatic and under constant revision. 
Each cluster is mobilized against an existing explanatory framework mainly by 
challenging that framework's inherent cohering perspective. Against the 
representational distances diagnosed in site specificity and relational sociability in 
the first instance, structural accountability of games in the second and Freudian 
notions of irony in the third, these ambient attitudes insist on close forms of 
involvement (very different ones in each case) and replacing stabilizing 
perspectives with decidedly unstable ways of handling the material as well as its 
translation into other forms of knowledge. Rather than a question of new paradigms, 
this is the realm of reading strategies, but even these are ultimately only ever 
resulting from this fundamental shift toward an un-cohering attitude. And because 
this attitude challenges not only existing frameworks but also new ones being 
hinged upon it (contingency, treason and humour, as well as their relations), it 
affects the translation between work and theorizations as much as it concerns the 
translation of those approaches into an overall project. 
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In elaborating these clusters, the project as a whole has moved on only by always 
resisting to cohere around a single axis. Through producing the work whilst trying to 
outline its material as conjunction of attitudes and concerns and approaches, it turns 
out that what is tentatively described as ambient ends up manifesting itself very 
differently in each case. Various exemplifications of a whole series of attitudes are 
produced here that can fall under the category of the ambient only insofar as that 
category is itself subject to the dispersal it announces, rather than providing a neatly 
defined framework. In parts of the thesis, ambient becomes an entirely 
inappropriate category of description and in fact disappears as such in the text. Or 
rather, truer to the spirit of its use, ambient remains outside of the grasp of focal 
attention and operates as an animating background dimension, indeed operates as 
background as such, without ever really coming into the fore. It does not settle in a 
fixed dimension either in the making or indeed the writing of the project, and the 
methodological as well as conceptual problematic and challenge resides in the way 
in which ambient functions instead as a repeat trigger, as a device for generating 
the dynamics along which the project develops. To some extent, true to its spirit and 
tactical currency, it becomes a decoy of sorts, continually deceiving the coherence 
seemingly promised in the term as such, whilst Simultaneously projecting it, as a 
supposedly binding theme or feature. 
The attitudes around which the project is organized remain similarly distinct. 
Contingency, treason and humour as guiding modes and loose reading templates 
for the respective chapters, in each case fulfill the twofold function of leaving behind 
established critical (art-historical) models and opening onto new possible 
mobilizations of the works and materials solicited. In the first instance, the research 
points toward Contingency in order to outline an approach which overs pills the 
theoretical confines of specific determinants to a situation engaged with by shifting 
away from a designated site of engagement and into contingent assemblages which 
abut against it. It engages in a de-centred playing with existing frameworks in the 
second instance where Treason tests the possibility of a fiction-driven departure 
from existing scripts and the playing fields (spatial and conceptual) upon which they 
are customarily enacted, moving outside of structural frameworks and into narrative 
leakages and plots as stand-in engine for a narrative sprawl moving the work along. 
And it concerns a modality of attention in the last one, where the broader horizons 
set up before implode into the near-indiscernibility of diffuse effects as key 
dimension for an engagement with the work-humour attempts to broaden and 
ultimately open up the notion of effect in relation to artistic interventions by 
imploding it into a set of formal! conceptual involvements and toward an interiorized 
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becoming-smaller which underplays the hermetic remit of close (formal) readings by 
slipping away toward imperceptibility on one hand and de-regulated timeframes on 
the other. If any, the dimension of effectivity is what could and should be pursued 
from here, and seems in need of more, additional or maybe different attention. But 
that will have to be for another project. 
All of these instances produce openings and are fundamentally evasive in an 
extended sense of the word-the project does not zoom in on a single recognizable 
attitude but rather goes through three, and suggests a question after the 
relationships set up between them, and what ever is produced in their interplay. If 
the thesis itself follows an evasive trajectory in the unfolding of its chapters as 
modes with increasingly involved modalities (from overspilling through invention to 
inversion) and if these modes also indicate the scope of the entire project, then one 
of the questions to be asked here is the one after the kinds of effects thus 
generated, if there are any at all, whether they ever become discernible, and how 
that might matter. Do they (and does it) all come together? In that sense the last 
cluster organised around notions of effects is the least and the most complicated 
one at the same time, risking complete implosion of all of the claims made for 
ambient into formalist aesthetic registers. But that too is necessarily at stake in the 
unclear notion of effects developed precisely here, and is where surprising results 
are generated in form of side-effects produced through the operations of these 
attitudes: they set up new terms for the project and new directions for the thesis, 
away from its cohering impetus. This expanded effectivity of the research sits 
alongside sits alongside its more narrowly productive dimension (of insights, new 
readings, knowledges), and at times takes over from it. In their intersections, each 
of the chapters ended up being surprising in the way it shaped up: in the way in 
which open-endedness cuts through attempts to set up a problematic; how narrative 
elements allow to produce contingent frameworks through which to propel thinking 
forward; and how the perspective of an infinitesimally small deviation that borders 
on irrelevance constitutes micro-black holes also for an ever-refined close reading 
that verges on identification. 
If the chapters can all somehow be bracketed under the dimension of ambient 
attitudes as strategic pointer, this pointer remains necessarily multiple. Rather than 
binding different clusters together as a qualifying umbrella, Ambient Attitudes (the 
project and the performative title) constitutes a permeable and malleable umbrella, 
an interface that allows to juxtapose different investigations on one hand and 
combine very different materials on the other. And in doing so, the concept, the 
invention of this non-category, combines them only insofar as it also spaces them 
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apart, and indicates how this type of combination is always a matter also of 
spacings rather than simply fusions. 
If indeed Ambient Attitudes inscribes all of this into a shared horizon, this horizon 
needs to be understood in two fundamentally different and seemingly opposed 
readings of the term. Nancy describes the tension between a static and a dynamic 
notion of the horizon as tension between a line "which orients or gathers the 
meaning of a course of progress or navigation", and the horizon as a function of 
suspension, which operates as "the opening or distancing of horizon itself', and 
which can be inhabited only ever "as the opening itself' and the "fault line of a 
rupture,,390. A lot of the thesis is produced around the double notion of ambient and 
attitudes and inscribed into a horizon very much under these terms. 
In this sense ambient and attitudes and their various respective and combined 
formations never really come together, are never finally defined and remain 
suspended, in and of themselves and in their coming together. And that may well be 
in a first sense, a failure of the project, its fundamental lack: that there is no singular 
new mode, that the project remains plural, necessarily only ever posits a set of 
attitudes, never simply the one, which are here unfolded into three modes and 
potentially always extendable. 
Yet Nancys double understanding of horizon always produces both inside and 
outside dynamics where everything "(all that is) [is] put on hold everywhere, pushed 
to the outside just as much as it is pushed back inside the self,391, and this project 
always encompasses both tendencies too, not just the one of spacing, but also one 
geared toward a particular kind of cohesion (not coherence). 
In Ambient Attitudes, the tendential disparateness of solicited component parts 
attests to the spacing Nancy formulates for the kind of horizon he circumscribes as 
a horizon of (future?) criticality. Yet their combinatory juxtaposition within the 
framework (as such unchallenged) of the overall project also forces them together, 
and in itself produces the kind of inward pull exemplified in detail in the chapter 
around spatialities of humour. All of these instances are reclaimed for Ambient 
Attitudes so that their disparateness also takes on a tendency to implode. And this 
too is one of the modes of the thesis-a pulling together that produces its own 
390 N ·t·· ancy, Op.CI ., p.XII 
391 Ibid. 
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mode of contiguity392 in which Ambient! attitudes serves as a productive (invented) 
framing device that allows for juxtapositions, and adjoining. 
The continual/ repeated and explicit absence of a single cohering axis is not a 
shortcoming of the conceptual framework but rather points to and exemplifies the 
necessary state of the project, as well as its stake. In that sense it is an ambient 
project, rather than a project about ambient. What appears as looseness in one 
perspective is also, when considered the other way round, an exercise of 
appropriating difference through forcefully imposing smoothness. If there was to be 
another dedication here, it would be to the gestures of the Pink Panther as Deleuze 
presents him, and the way in which he imposes sameness by "painting the world his 
colour", pink. The panther makes the world his own without imitating or reproducing 
anything, so that it, the panther, becomes imperceptible itself in his ultimately 
involved form of appropriation. 393 
But then where does that leave the art in relation to the thinking around it? And vice 
versa? Ambient Attitudes is treading a fine line between a need for space that is 
available only by insisting on the loose fit between at least some of the elements 
assembled here and the insistence on all of these sharing a milieu of current 
modes: the dissertation plays out different modalities, from opening out through 
invention to inward pull and formalist reading, with each of them as another form of 
loose-fit or indeed un-fit. But insisting on the looseness of their proximity is only one 
way of looking at it, and a strategic one at that, leveled as it is against interpretation, 
knowledgeable analysis, expertise and control. The other dimension is having to 
make it work, as Deleuze and Guattari say, that it has to be productive of 
something, even if that something does not have to be defined yet and only ever 
exists in the realm of effects, rather than products. For a stage of sort it may then be 
necessary to follow all the wrong leads. For a play around baseballs and art it may 
then be necessary to project a whole other set of fictions. And for animal traps, it 
may then be useful to try out the diagrammatic spaces of philosophical spatialities. 
Somewhere between the raindrops reflecting all kinds of outsides back into the 
work; a baseball a son shares with his father and which a game shares with its 
outside and which the art shares with a novel; and the monkey Deleuze shares with 
Kafka, motives such as exit and exodus, inversion and confusion reoccur and that is 
also why the last chapter ends with the traps (and does not, in the way it invents its 
392 For Nancy, singularities only ever come together under a mode of contiguity, never 
continuity, so that "[t]here is proximity, but only to the extent that extreme closeness 
emphasizes the distancing it opens up" (ibid., p.5). 
393 Deleuze/Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, p.11 
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own way out}. Not because there is something else that remains unreached, 
untouched by the traps and their workings. Rather because even traps can be 
turned inside/out and into something else entirely. Once they cease to be machines 
of capture automatically, they can become lures that operate as engines too. They 
are propelling devices toward the point where one needs to give up on the idea of 
capture and has to replace it by some other account of encounters as offering 
perspectives onto a series of shifts moving from specificity to contingency, from 
trickery to treason, from irony to humour. 
And again, the works and the thesis are always multiplied through the doubling of 
works and approaches to these, and the feedback loops between the two levels. 
This multiplication too unhinges the stability of ambient: Rather than a question of 
dispersal as object of study, it disperses the work by setting it up in conjunctions 
along which it can diffuse itself (other works, concepts, other material, styles of 
writing etc). So also in the sense of a response to academic discipline, the thesis is 
dedicated to a monkey inventing ways out of a box which is also a cage, and as a 
research project and text enacts its own exiting from existing (reductive) models. 
That this is set up in the biggest possible way, matters not in order to uphold that 
scale, not in order to operate on it, but in order for precisely this shift in dimensions 
to be recuperated and moved away from a perspective of 'failure' toward an 
undoing of scale which can make it possible to re-assess perceived relations 
between registers. And that has an immediate and absolutely crucial link to the 
stakes of the present project. It is a matter of imploding horizons, if anything, which 
is why this thesis goes from sprawl via invention to implosion, and in the process 
indicates 'three ways into thinking ways out' (where the fathers can't see one) which 
mark out their own movement from indifference and defiance through to affirmation 
(albeit never coherently). 
This overall attitude cuts out the specificity of necessary connections. And it also 
undermines any claims for immediate political relevance (through to the sense in 
which Deleuze and Guattari claim that a minor literature always inevitably and 
immediately generates such relevance). Instead this approach re-arranges the way 
in which the different realms solicited come together: geopolitics and socio-cultural 
formations as well as the formal, the microscopic and the seemingly purely 
metaphorical are all subject to the same loose fits then, and thus continually to be 
re-arranged. 
Whether there is a link back from the imploded effect-horizons of 'humour' as 
described in Andreas Slominski's traps to the stakes of current geopolitics is beside 
the point. That both open diagrammatic possibilities through which to re-assess and 
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construct differently the coming together of situations, agents, demands and factors, 
is where the constructive potential lies. 
This also means that the connections between the different realms can then be 
thought in different ways, and notably both ways round, i.e. counter-intuitively in the 
relation between critical/political horizon and examined practice: Whilst on one hand 
the project takes off from current re-formations of critical thought and notions of 
post-critical practice through to their explicitly political manifestations, and 
diagnoses these new configurations in / projects them onto current artistic practice, 
the setting of terms can also be thought the other way round. Ambient dispersal as 
a new, fundamentally contingent milieu for contemporary practice and its articulation 
in qualities, effects and attitudes, it is argued here, has a quasi-paradigmatic 
relevance for resistant practices at large, including any theoretical involvement with 
them, precisely because it too does not cohere yet manages to generate. It too, like 
resistance, appears as a diffusion of singular behaviours (of resistance) and 
"accumulates extensively,,394 so that a close reading of effects in one offers a way of 
re-assessing them in the other, and thus to address a notion of effectivity in either. 
And under the terms of the extensive accumulation that this is subject to, precisely 
this inversion is one that cannot be proclaimed or indeed scripted, but can only be 
accounted for after having been generated. (Taking stock is then necessarily 
subject to the same condition of extensive accumulation as the production of the 
modes in question.) 
This does very little to satisfy the original desire for a new mode, but does a lot to 
challenge the limitations its underlying desiring structures are built upon. And in the 
process it opens another attitude for assessing effects produced in the process. If 
indeed there is a register of change for which it is a matter, as Deleuze claims, of 
"loving those who are like this: when they enter a room they are not persons, 
characters or subjects, but an atmospheric variation, a change of hue, an 
imperceptible molecule, a discrete population, a fog or a cloud of droplets", and if 
"everything has really changed,,395 once they do, and if love is an attitude here, then 
change really is produced as unclear, from here on, between effects generated and 
attitudes carried toward them. 
394 Negri, Alma Venus, Kairos, Multitudo, p.188 
395 Deleuze/Parnet, op.cit., p.66 
page 178 
Bibliography 
Natascha Adamowsky: Spielfiguren in virtuellen Welten. Berlin: Campus, 2000 
Giorgio Agamben: Idea della Prosa. Milan: Feltrinelli, 1985 
Giorgio Agamben: The Coming Community. Minneapolis/London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1993 
Giorgio Agamben: Potentialities. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999 
Giorgio Agamben: Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics. Minneapolis/ London: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2000 
Giorgio Agamben: The Open: Man and Animal. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004 
Jennifer Allen, '1000 Words: Liam Gillick and Philippe Parreno', in Artforum International, 
February 2005, p. 144-145 
Eriz Alliez, 'Midday, Midnight. The emergence of Cine-Thinking', in Gregory Flaxman (ed.), 
The Brain is The Screen. Deleuze and the Philosophy of the Cinema, Minneapolis/ 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000, p.293-302 
Eric Alliez, Antonio Negri, 'Peace and War', in Theory, Culture and Society, 20:2 2003, 
pp.109-118 
Karlheinz Barck, Peter Gente, Heidi Paris, Stefan Richter: Aisthesis: Wahrnehmung heute 
oder Perspektiven einer anderen Asthetik. Leipzig: Reclam, 1990 
Jean Baudrillard, 'L'esprit du terrorisme', in Le Monde, 2 November 2001 
Jean Baudrillard, 'La violence de la mondialisation', in Le Monde Diplomatique, November 
2002, p.18 
Nachman Ben-Yehuda: Betrayal and Treason: Violations of Trust and Loyalty. Oxford: 
Westview, 2001 
Claire Bishop, 'Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics', in October, Fall 2004, pp.51-79 
Claire Bishop, 'The Social Turn: Collaboration and its Discontents', in Artforum international, 
February 2006, pp. 178 - 183 
Holger Birkholz: Kontext. Ein Problem kunstwissenschaftlicher Methodenliteratur und 
kOnstlerischer Praxis. Cologne: VDG Verlag, 2002. 
Nicolas Bourriaud: 'Standards' in XLV Esposizioni Internazionale d'Arte: Punti Cardinali 
del/'Arte, Milan: Electa, 1993, pp.322-324 
Nicolas Bourriaud: Relational Aesthetics. Dijon: Les Presses du Reel, 2002 
Nicolas Bourriaud: Postproduction: Culture as Screenplay: How Art Reprograms the World. 
New York: Lukas&Sternberg, 2002 
Joan Broadhurst Dixon and Eric Cassidy (eds.): Virtual Futures. Posthumans and 
Cyberotics. London: Routledge, 1998 
Jonah Brucker-Cohen, 'Hi There Leak Much?', on Rhizome.org, 20/10/2002, available 
online under http://rhizome.org/editorial/924 (last accessed 29/10/08) 
Benjamin Buchloh, Gabriel Orozco, 'Benjamin Buchloh converses with Gabriel Orozco in 
New York', in Gabriel Orozco: Clinton is Innocent (exh. cat.), Paris: Musee d'art 
page 179 
moderne de la Ville de Paris, 1998, quoted in Liliane Terrier, 'Le modele Obersicht', 
in Le recit in teractif, Roundtable, Paris: Ecole nationale superieure des arts 
decoratifs, 6/12/00, n.p., available online under 
http://www.ciren.org/ciren/colloques/061200/terrier/terrier.html(last accessed 
14/10108). 
Lewis Carroll: Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass (1866). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971 
Claire Colebrook: Irony in the Work of Philosophy. Lincolnl London: University of Nebraska 
Press, 2002 
Alex Coles (ed.): Site - Specificity: the ethnographic turn. London: Black Dog, 2000 
Paul Delany, George P. Ludlow (eds.): Hypermedia and Literary Studies. Cambridge (MA)I 
London: MIT, 1991 
Gilles Deleuze: 'Un manifesto di meno', in Carmelo Bene and Gilles Deleuze: 
Sovrapposizioni, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1978 
Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari: Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. Minneapolisl London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986 
Gilles Deleuze, Claire Parnet: Dialogues. London: Athlone, 1987 
Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari: A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia vol. II. 
London: Athlone, 1987 
Gilles Deleuze: Foucault. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988, p.89 
Gilles Deleuze: The Logic of Sense. London: Athlone, 1990 
Gilles Deleuze: Difference and repetition. London: Athlone Press, 1994 
Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari: What is Philosophy? Londonl New York: Verso, 1994 
Gilles Deleuze: Negotiations, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995 
Gilles Deleuze: Essays Critical and Clinical. Londonl New York: Verso, 1998 
Gilles Deleuze: Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995. New Yorkl Los 
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2006 
Don Delillo: Underworld, London: Picador, 1999 
Jacques Derrida: Writing and Difference. Londonl New York: Routledge, 2001 
Jacques Derrida, ' A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event', in W.J.T. Mitchell 
and Arnold I Davidson (eds.), The Late Derrida, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2007, pp.223-243 
Timothy Druckrey (ed.): ars electronica: Facing the Future. Cambridge (MA)I London: MIT, 
1998 
Brian Eno, 'ambient music manifesto', published with 'ambient #1': music for airports (1978 ), 
available online under http://music.hyperreal.org/artists/brian_eno/MFA-txt.html(last 
accessed 29/10108) 
Sigmund Freud: Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1960 
page 180 
Bettina Funcke, Jens Hoffmann, '''SlominSki'' - a conversation with Boris Groys', in Parkett 
55,1999, pp.99-102 
Michel Foucault: 'Of Other Spaces' (1967), in Diacritics 16, Spring 1986, pp. 22-27 
Susanne Gaensheimer, Nicolaus Schafhausen (eds.): Liam Gillick. Cologne: Oktagon, 2000 
Alan Gilbert, 'In Concert', in Artforum international, May 2004, p.52 
Liam Gillick: Erasmus is Late. London: Bookworks, 1995 
Liam Gillick: Ibuka! A musical in three acts based on the book "Erasmus is Late". Stuttgart: 
KOnstlerhaus Stuttgart, 1995 
Liam Gillick: Discussion Island/ Big Conference Centre. Ludwigsburg: Kunstverein/ Derry: 
Orchard Gallery, 1997 
Liam Gillick: Big Conference Centre. Ludwigburg: Kunstverein/ Derry: Orchard Gallery, 1997 
Liam Gillick: McNamara Papers. Erasmus and Ibuka! Realisations. The What If? Scenarios. 
Dijon: Le Consortium/ Hamburg: Kunstverein, 1997 
Liam Gillick: Five or Six. New York: Lukas&Sternberg, 2000 
Liam Gillick: Renovation Filter. Recent Past and Near Future. Bristol: Arnolfini, 2000 
Liam Gillick, 'Fifth Cousin Not Removed', in Metronome no.7, 2001, pp.181-186 
Liam Gillick: Annlee You Proposes, exh. brochure, Tate Britain, 7 Sept 2001 - 31 March 
2002. 
Liam Gillick: The Wood Way (exh.cat.). London: Whitechapel Art Gallery, 2002 
'Interview Liam Gillick! Anthony Spira', in Liam Gillick- The Wood Way/ Helio Oiticica -
Quasi Cinema, 3.5.-23.6.2002 (exh.brochure), London: Whitechapel Gallery, 2002, 
pp.8-10 
Liam Gillick: Literally No Place. Communes, Bars and Greenrooms. London: Bookworks, 
2002 
Liam Gillick: Spring in Kitakyushu, in exh. brochure Liam Gillick Annlee You Proposes, 
London: Tate Britain, 2002, p.8-12 
'Liam Gillicks Szenarien. Ein Gesprach mit Edgar Schmitz', in Kunstforum international, 
Jan/Feb 2003, pp.205-213 
Liam Gillick, 'Contingent Factors: A Response to Claire Bishop's "Antagonism and 
Relational Aesthetics"', in October, Winter 2006, pp. 95-106 
Oliver Grau: Virtual Art: From Illusion to Immersion, Cambridge (MA)/ London: MIT, 2003 
Felix Guattari: Chaosmosis. An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm. Sydney: Power Publications, 
1995 
Felix Guattari: The Three Ecologies. London: Athlone, 2000 
Donna Haraway: 'A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the 
Late Twentieth Century', in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of 
Nature, New York: Routledge, 1991, pp.149-181 
Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri: Empire. Cambridge (MA)/ London: Harvard University Press, 
2000 
page 181 
Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri: Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. New 
York! London: Penguin, 2004 
N Katherine Hayles (ed.): Chaos and Order. Complex Dynamics in Literature and Science. 
Chicagol London: University of Chicago Press, 1991 
Martin Heidegger: Poetry, Language, Thought. London: Harper Collins, 1974 
Julian Heynen, 'Wordless', in Parkett55, 1999, p.96-97 
Johan Huizinga: Homo Ludens: a Study of the Play-Element in Culture. Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1955 
Pierre Huyghe, Philippe Parreno, 'Centerfold: A Smile Without a Cat (Celebration of 
Annlee's Vanishing)" in Artforum international, January 2003, pp.11 0-111 
Donald Judd, 'Specific Objects', in Arts Yearbook, 8,1965, p.74-82 
Mehdi Belhaj Kacem: TMorie du Trickster. Paris: Sens & Tonka, 2002 
Franz Kafka: The Complete Short Stories. London: Random House Vintage, 1999 
Patricia Keith-Spiegel, 'Early Conceptions of Humour. Varieties and Issues', in Jeffrey H. 
Goldstein and Paul E. McGhee (eds), The Psychology of Humour. Theoretical 
Perspectives and Empirical Issues, Academic Pres: New York! London, 1972, p.4-
39 
Christian Kravagna (ed.): The Museum as an Arena. Institution-critical statements by Artists. 
Cologne: Walther Konigl Bregenz: Kunsthaus, 2001 
Miwon Kwon: 'One Place After the Other. Notes on Site Specificity', in October 80, spring 
1997, pp.85-110 
Miwon Kwon: One Place After Another: site-specific art and locational identity. Cambridge 
(MA)/London: MIT, 2002. 
Manuel de Landa: 1000 Years of Non-Linear History. New York: Zone Booksl London: MIT, 
1997 
George P.Landow (ed.): Hyper/text/theory. Baltimore/ London: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1994 
Maurizio Lazzarato, 'What possibilities presently exist in the public sphere?', available online 
under http://www.generation-online.org/p/fplazzarato4.htm (last accessed 6/11/08) 
Herschel W. Leibowitz, C.L. Shupert, Robert B. Post, The two modes of visual processing: 
Implications for spatial orientation', in Peripheral Vision Horizon Display (PVHD): 
NASA Conference Publication-2306, Edwards: NASA, 1983, p. 41-44. (available 
online under www.nasa.gov/centers/dryden/pdf/87978main_H-1232.pdf, last 
accessed 29/10108) 
Sylvere Lotringer: 'In the shadow of the Red Brigades', in Sylvere Lotringer and Christina 
Marazzi (eds.), Autonomia: Post-political Politics, Los Angeles/ New York: 
Semiotext(e), 2007, pp.V-XVI 
Peter Ludlow (ed.): High Noon on the Electronic Frontier. Cambridge (MA)I London: MIT, 
1996 
page 182 
Peter Ludlow (ed.): Crypto Anarchy, Cyberstates, and Pirate Utopias. Cambridge (MA)/ 
London: MIT, 2001 
Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard: The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986 
Lev Manovich: The Language of New Media. Cambridge (MA)/ London: MIT, 2001 
Brian Massumi: A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Deviations from Deleuze 
and Guattari. Cambridge (MA)/ London: MIT, 1992 
Brian Massumi: Parables for the Virtual. Durham/ London: Duke University Press, 2002 
Emily Mast, Pierre Huyghe and Philippe Parreno (eds.): No Ghost Just A Shell. Cologne: 
Walther Konig/ Eindhoven: Oktagon, 2003 
Marcel Mauss: The Gift: The form and reasons for exchange in archaic societies [1950]. 
London: Routledge, 1990 
Herman Melville, 'Bartleby the scrivener', in Bartleby; and, Benito Cereno, New York: Dover 
Publications, 1990 
Eva Meyer: Faltsache, Basel/Frankfurt aM: Stroemfeld, 1996 
Eva Meyer: Architexturen, Basel/ Frankfurt am Main: Stroemfeld, 1981 
James Meyer: Minimalism: Themes and Movements, London: Phaidon, 2000 
Aleksandra Mir (ed.): Corporate Mentality. New York: Lukas&Sternberg, 2003 
Jean-Luc Nancy: The Gravity of Thought. London: Humanity Books, 1997 
Jean-Luc Nancy: Being Singular Plural. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000 
Jean-Luc Nancy, 'Rumoration', in Rem Koolhas/Harvard Project on the City, Stefano Boeril 
Multiplicity a.o., Mutations, Bordeaux: arc en reve. centre d'architecture/ Barcelona: 
Actar, 2001, n.p. 
Jean-Luc Nancy, 'L'lntrus', in The New Centennial Review, Fall 2002, pp.1-14 
Antonio Negri: Time for Revolution. London/New York: Continuum, 2005 
Philip Nobel, 'Annlee, Sign of the Times', in Artforum international, January 2003, pp.104-
109 
No Ghost Just A Shell, press release, Institute of Visual Culture, Cambridge, 2002, available 
online under http://www.instituteofvisualculture.org/2002_no_ghost.php (last 
accessed 15/10/06) 
Gabriel Orozco: Empty Club. London: Artangel, 1998 
Gabriel Orozco: 'A Thousand Words. Gabriel Orozco talks about his recent Films', in: 
Artforum international, Summer 1998, pp.114f 
Gabriel Orozco: Chacahua (exh. cat.). Frankfurt aM: Portikus, 1999. 
Gabriel Orozco: Photogravity (exh. cat.). Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1999 
Gabriel Orozco (exh.cat.). Los Angeles: Museum of Contemporary Art, 2000 
Philippe Parreno: Snow Dancing. London: GW Press, 1995 
Philippe Parreno: 'Notes on Annlee', 1999, Galerie Air de Paris, Paris, available online under 
http://www.airdeparis.com/annlee2.html(last accessed 14/10/08) 
page 183 
Philippe Parreno: 'Annlee monologue', 2000, PS1, New York, available online under 
ttp://www.ps1.org/cut/animations/install/parreno.html(last accessed 14/10/08) 
Sadie Plant: Zeros + Ones: Digital women + the new technoculture. London: Fourth Estate, 
1998 
Mark J. Prendergast: The Ambient Century: from Mahler to trance: The evolution of sound in 
the electronic age. London: Bloomsbury, 2000. 
lIya Prigogine, Isabelle Stengers: Order out of Chaos. Man's New Dialogue with Nature. 
London: Heinemann, 1984 
Juliane Rebentisch, 'Mythos "Betrachtereinbeziehung"', in Texte zur Kunst, December 2000, 
p.126-130 
Irit Rogoff, 'What is a Theorist?', in Martin Hellmond, Sabine Kampmann, Ralph Lindner, 
Katharina Sykora (eds.), Was ist ein KDnstler? Das Subjekt der Moderne, MUnchen: 
Fink,2003 
Mary K. Rothbart: 'Incongruity, Problem-Solving and Laughter', in Antony J. Chapman and 
Hugh C. Foot (eds.), Humour and Laughter: Theory, Research and Applications, 
London/ NY/ Sidney/ Toronto: Wiley and sons, 1976, pp.37-54 
Edgar Schmitz: 'Liam Gillick. Annlee You Proposes', in Kunstforum international, January-
March 2002, pp.379-80 
Edgar Schmitz: 'Hintergrund ist Uberall. Liam Gillick in der Whitechapel Art Gallery, London', 
in Texte zur Kunst, September 2002, pp.180-182 
Edgar Schmitz: 'Ambient effects. Symptoms and side effects of virtual centres', in Centre of 
Attraction. 8th Baltic Triennial of International Art, Vilnius: Contemporary Art Centre/ 
Frankfurt: Revolver. Archiv fUr Aktuelle Kunst, 2003, pp.169-174 
B.F. Skinner: Walden Two. New York: Macmillan, 1962 
Richard H. Y. So, Andy Ho, W. T. Lo, 'A Metric to Quantify Virtual Scene Movement for the 
Study of Cybersickness: Definition, Implementation, and Verification', in Presence: 
Teleoperators & Virtual Environments, April 2001, pp.193-215 
Nancy Spector, 'Berlin Detours', in Parkett 55,1999, pp.70-75 
Nancy Spector, 'Of traps, tricks, and other riddles, in Andreas Slominski (exh. cat.), Berlin: 
Deutsche Guggenheim, 2002, n.p. 
Neil Spiller (ed.): Cyber Reader: Critical Writings for the Digital Era. London: Phaidon, 2002 
Isabelle Stengers (ed.): D'une science a /'autre. Des concepts nomades. Paris: Editions du 
seuil, 1987 
Charles J. Stivale: The two-fold thought of Deleuze and Guattari. Intersections and 
Animations, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998 
Martin Stingelin: Das Netzwerk von Deleuze: Immanenz im Internet und auf Video. Berlin: 
Merve, 2000 
Erika Suderberg (ed.): Space, Site, Intervention: Situating Installation Art. Minneapolis/ 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000 
page 184 
Marcella Tarozzi: Nonrepresentational Forms of the Comic: Humour, Irony and Jokes. New 
York: Peter Lang, 1991 
Liliane Terrier, 'Le modele Obersicht', in Le recit interactif, Roundtable, Paris: Ecole 
nationale superieure des arts decoratifs, 6/12/00, n.p., available online under 
http://www.ciren.org/ciren/colloques/061200/terrier/terrier.html(last accessed 
14/10/08). 
Sassa TrOlzsch: 'Liam Gillick', in: Kunstforum international, June-July 2001, pp.188-193 
Gore Vidal: Narratives of Empire: Burr: A Novel, London: Random House, 1973 
Paolo Virno: A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life, 
Los Angeles/ New York: Semiotext(e), 2004 
Robert Walser: The Monkey', in: Selected Stories, trans!. by Christopher Middleton and 
others, foreword by Susan Sontag, New York: New York Review of Books Classics, 
1982, pp.145-148, p.145 
Max Wechsler: 'Kunst aus dem Hinterhalt: Ein Fall fOr Verblendung', in Andreas Slominski 
(exh.cat.), Zurich: Kunsthalle, 1998, pp.31-40 
Peter Weibel (ed.): Kontext Kunst. Kunst der gOer Jahre. Cologne: DuMont, 1994 
What Do You Expect From an Art Institution in the 21st Century? Paris: Palais de Tokyo, 
2001 
Stephen Wilson: Information Arts. Intersections Between Art, Science and Technology. 
Cambridge (MA)/ London: MIT, 2002 
Carey Young: Incorporated. London: Film and Video Umbrella, 2002 
Slavoj Zizek: On Belief. London/ New York: Routledge, 2001 
page 185 
